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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines Midwestern development and focuses on the early 
development of Marion County, Indiana, through the end of the Civil War and examines 
the ways that the region’s overwhelmingly rural residents adapted to the challenges and 
successes of the urban growth and market interconnectivity that they sought from the 
moment of settlement.  Starting with initial meetings of the Marion County 
Commissioners and examining major municipal turning points including the passage of 
the Mammoth Internal Improvements Bill, the Panic of 1837, the arrival of the first 
railroad a decade later, and the onset of the Civil War, it argues that Hoosiers, rather than 
trying to remain disconnected from external markets as proposed by some historians, 
immediately pushed for market participation but had difficulty dealing with the 
unforeseen consequences of their actions.  It ultimately demonstrates that Americans had 
a powerful desire to foster market capitalism in the early republic but lacked the foresight 
to critically examine the potential for negative externalities.   
This dissertation has two goals.  First, it reorients the history of the transition to 
capitalism toward the Old Northwest, a region relatively ignored by historians interested 
in the onset of the so-called “market revolution” along the eastern seaboard.  This timely 
re-examination of Midwestern economic and social change allies itself with the “New 
History of Capitalism,” and challenges historians to expand their focus beyond the 
Northeast to engage with the rest of the American experience during the long nineteenth 
century.  Second, it engages a small but growing movement to reorient the history of 
American Western development east of the Mississippi River.  Indianapolis presents 
historians with a unique opportunity to examine the process of the transition to capitalism 
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in an area that is firmly on the border of East and West during the early nineteenth 
century.  Bridging a gap between these two burgeoning historiographies, this research 
contributes to studies of American social and economic history, borderlands, regional 
identity and the environment. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In the fall of 1829, a young western merchant named Nicholas McCarty found 
himself in a particularly troubling dilemma.  His shipment of dry goods, purchased from 
Philadelphia manufacturers, arrived at Pittsburgh ready to take a steamboat down the 
Ohio River to the small town of Madison, Indiana, between Cincinnati and Louisville.  
From there, the goods were to be unloaded into Conestoga wagons and shipped along an 
old Native American footpath north to McCarty’s store on the southwest corner of 
Washington and Pennsylvania Streets in the recently established state capital of 
Indianapolis.  Unfortunately, when McCarty arrived in Pittsburgh with his goods, the 
Ohio River was already frozen due to an unusually cold fall.  His merchandise would 
either have to remain in the future Steel City until the spring thaw, or he would have to 
pay for expensive overland transportation across the state of Ohio on the National Road.1  
He was nearing the unpleasant position of disappointing either his customers or his 
creditors.  If he waited until spring, his customers would be more likely to purchase 
goods from other merchants in the future, while immediately transporting his goods 
overland would bankrupt his burgeoning business.  McCarty needed to pay for the extra 
cost of transportation along the new National Road.  To cover these costs, he partnered 
with James Blake, a local businessman, to pay cash for ginseng from Marion County 
farmers, dry it at his “Sang Factory,” and prepare it for a return trip to Pittsburg.2  
                                                 
1 Berry Robinson Sulgrove, History of Indianapolis and Marion County, Indiana, Part One (Philadelphia: 
L.H. Everts & Co, 1884), 116.   
2 Blake’s “factory” was little more than a barn where a few temporary employees would process and dry 
the root.  One discussion of ginseng’s value is seen in Alvar Carlson, “Ginseng: America's Botanical Drug 
Connection to the Orient,” Economic Botany 40 (1986): 233-249.   
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Although McCarty’s business would survive, he would have to begrudgingly split the 
profits with his new partner.   
McCarty’s frustration emanated from the fact that the opportunity to reap sizable 
profits was available.  He knew that the burgeoning population of Indianapolis needed 
finished goods and that the city was too new to create them.  The city’s 1900 residents—
especially after only ten years of settlement in a hard-to-reach outpost—had little to trade 
for goods from East Coast merchants other than agricultural products.  The ability to 
obtain and transport goods to the new city would handsomely reward any brave 
entrepreneur willing to assume the risk of transport and sustain the Hoosier capital until it 
could encourage its own industries.  McCarty—in order to capitalize on this market 
potential—recognized that he needed to make his products available on a regular basis 
and at low cost to prevent competitors from opening shops and eliminating his virtual 
monopoly on long-distance trade in finished goods in Marion County.   
McCarty’s problem mirrored the problem for all residents of Indianapolis.  There 
was a will to connect to outside markets, but not a way.  Technological and 
infrastructural weaknesses in early American society prevented Hoosiers from accessing 
outside markets so they could sell excess crops in exchange for the creature comforts of 
the day.  The only effective transportation technology available in the Old Northwest in 
this period was limited to boat travel on rivers.  If the environment was uncooperative, all 
but the most local of commercial activities ground to a halt.  Unfortunately for Hoosiers 
like Nicholas McCarty, the state legislature chose the wrong location for their new state 
capital.  Upon order from the state legislature, surveyors laid out a site at the confluence 
of Fall Creek and the western fork of the White River in central Marion County.  The 
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potential for water access would allow residents of Indianapolis the opportunity to use 
steam power to obtain goods and set up trade networks within the economic system of the 
western United States.  However—as Hoosiers quickly found out—the White River was 
far too shallow and sandy to allow anything but the lightest boat traffic.  In 1831, the 
steamboat Robert Hanna actually made it to the city, arousing a great hope for the future 
prospects of the city, but ran aground upon a sandbar on which it remained until the 
following spring.  For residents of 1830s Marion County, the available transportation 
technology could not overcome natural environmental barriers in landlocked regions of 
the United States and prevented them from undergoing the same changes that were 
occurring in western river towns such as Cincinnati, Louisville, St. Louis or New 
Orleans.  Steamboats were as useless to central Indiana Hoosiers as a canal without 
water.   
This problem was doubly frustrating because of the unmistakable transformations 
in the United States during the same period.  Industrial change brought the seedlings of 
modern capitalism.  Wage labor replaced the artisan system in major cities and allowed 
enterprising industrialists and investors to reap profits from separating workers and the 
means of production.3  Industrial growth, beginning in New England, spread throughout 
the Northeastern part of the United States allowing for the production of durable goods 
for the rest of the country.  McCarty—along with all other attentive merchants—certainly 
would have heard about the development of manufactories in cities that streamlined 
production and drove down the price of goods.  At the same time, the Appleton, Lowell, 
                                                 
3 Two of the foundational works on this topic are E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class 
(New York: Random House, 1964) and Herbert Gutman, Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing 
America: Essays in American Working-Class and Social History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974).   
4 
 
 
and Slater groups began constructing early factories during the nineteenth century and 
urban society became directly tied to surrounding rural areas in ever widening distant 
regions.  Boston factory workers needed food from upstate New York and Pennsylvania 
in 1810 and from Indiana and Illinois by 1850.  Northeastern textile mills needed 
Southern cotton.  Cities needed progressively more timber from western states to build 
lodging for workers.  Urban society, far from pulling away from rural society, became 
increasingly dependent on an ever-expanding base from which to obtain sustaining 
resources.4  
The rise of urban centers also changed rural society.  As railroad networks 
extended into the countryside during the first half of the nineteenth century to residents 
not near natural waterways, goods produced in New England factories became readily 
available for the first time.  Farmers could send their excess products to a market for 
national or international consumption.  They could increase cash-crop production and 
focus less on subsistence-style living.  Increasingly populated farmlands in the trans-
Appalachian West needed complex infrastructures to ship those crops to urban markets.  
For McCarty and other enterprising Americans, these changes were the harbingers of 
fortune.  The western edge of the gradually, but relentlessly, expanding national dynamo 
                                                 
4 For changes in the economy and its effect on society in the United States see Charles Sellers, The Market 
Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).  For technological 
change and its effect on the economy see Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The 
Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).  For examples of how 
economic and social change affected rural society in the United States see Lou Ferleger, Agriculture and 
National Development: Views on the Nineteenth Century (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1990); 
Clarence Danhof, Change in Agriculture: The Northern United States, 1820-1870 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1969); Paul W. Gates, The Farmer’s Age: Agriculture, 1815-1860 (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1960); Allan Bogue, From Prairie to Corn Belt: Farming on the Illinois and Iowa Prairies in the 
Nineteenth Century (New York: Ivan R. Dee, 2011).   
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that was the United States provided forward-thinking, enterprising Americans with the 
chance to seize the opportunities of an increasingly interconnected economic age.   
Historians have long debated how best to characterize the economic development 
of the United States. Influential early historians like Charles Beard argued that the 
economic development of the United States was driven by class conflict.  In their most 
famous instance, they argued that the debates over independence were driven by 
economic interests of the founding fathers and their quest to remain at the top of society.5  
Their interpretations fell out of favor during the 1950s when the Cold War made this 
view unpopular but re-accelerated in the 1960s when historians began to examine the 
mentalité of market-oriented farmers.  New Left historians such as Michael Merrill and 
James Henretta began studying the mindset of historical actors to understand the ideology 
that underlay early American society.  These historians—labeled the “social” school—
studied settlement patterns and family economic strategies to argue that until the early 
nineteenth century, Americans were focused on preserving family institutions and 
continuing “traditional” cultural patterns of “self-sufficiency” instead of focusing their 
energies on producing for market sale.6  They were convinced that the United States was 
not always “capitalist” and that the institution emerged sometime after the American 
Revolution.  Their opponents—dubbed the “market” school—argued that Americans 
sought marketplace opportunities long before the Revolution which, they suggest, proves 
                                                 
5 Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1921).   
6 Michael Merrill, “Cash is good to eat: Self-Sufficiency and Exchange in the Rural Economy of the United 
States,” in Radical History Review 13 (1977): 42-71; James Henretta, “Families and Farms: Mentalité in 
Pre-Industrial America,” William and Mary Quarterly 35 (1978): 3-32; Christopher Clark, "Household 
Economy, Market Exchange and the Rise of Capitalism in the Connecticut Valley, 1800‑1860," Journal of 
Social History 13 (1979): 169-189.  
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the existence of a capitalist orientation at the nation’s conception.  Winifried Rothenberg, 
for example, examined rural Massachusetts economic patterns to argue that Americans 
have been “capitalist” in their accumulative patterns as early as they had access to 
markets; as long as there was trade, Rothenberg asserts, there was a capitalist mindset.7  
For Rothenberg and others, the transformation of the early nineteenth century was one of 
scope, not style.8  The most controversy in this period emerged from Charles Sellers’ The 
Market Revolution.  His tome argued that the market emerged during the 1820s and 
1830s as a revolutionary force that swept Americans into an international net that 
ruthlessly and impersonally decided the value of one’s labor and established bourgeois 
capitalism as the middle-class ideology of the United States. For Sellers, the brief era of 
Jacksonian democracy was the last gasp of cultural and social authority that the lower-
classes had against the moneyed elite.  The market revolution was a process by which 
opposition to the established social and cultural order of wealth and respectability was 
eliminated.   
The 1990s saw a major shift in the debate over the nature of capitalism in the 
United States as the term “transition to capitalism” emerged in the historiography.  
Sellers’ book provided fuel to the flames of the debate, but a noticeably different trend 
emerged with Christopher Clark’s publication of The Roots of Rural Capitalism, which 
closed the gap between social and market schools.  It acknowledges that markets existed 
before the massive economic change of the 1820s but argues they were not as powerful 
                                                 
7 Winifred Rothenberg, “The Emergence of a Capital Market in Rural Massachusetts, 1730-1838,” Journal 
of Economic History 45 (1985): 781-808; idem, “The Emergence of Farm Labor Markets and the 
Transformation of the Rural Economy,” Journal of Economic History 48 (1988): 537-566.   
8 For an examination of this particular era of debate, see Allan Kulikoff, “The Transition to Capitalism in 
Rural America,” The William and Mary Quarterly 46 (1989): 120-144.   
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as described by the “market” school.  Instead, he argues that the changes did not occur 
smoothly over time, nor was their one major transition point.  Changes occurred during 
transitional periods of “involution” and “concentration.”  An intermittent period where 
impersonal market factors coupled with personal decisions created the inertia implied by 
Sellers that pulled residents of western Massachusetts toward market-oriented 
production.9   Other historians, including Daniel Vickers, question rural residents’ 
ideology and argue that early Americans transitioned to capitalism by using “a mode of 
production geared to considerations of use and sale.”10  This important article pushes 
historians to reexamine the ways that people thought about and understood the choices 
they were making when participating in market activities.  Instead of examining the 
specific economic aspects of individual choices—which are difficult because of a dearth 
of sources—historians have begun to look at how Americans shifted their mindsets to 
account for the change in action.  Thus, studying the “transition” to capitalism emerged 
as the best way to understand how American society dealt with the momentous changes 
in the social and economic fabric of the early nineteenth century.   
The most recent historiographical works continue to examine the transition to 
capitalism in this fashion.  Contemporary historians are focused on examining the system 
of values held by early Americans in their quest for economic security as a way to 
understand why they made their economic choices.  Martin Brueghel’s excellent study of 
the Hudson River Valley focuses on finding the moment when the capitalist “mindset” 
                                                 
9 Christopher Clark, The Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860.  (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1990): 15.   
10 Daniel Vickers, “Competency and Competition: Economic Culture in Early America,” The William and 
Mary Quarterly 47 (1990): 6. 
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emerged.  For him, capitalism emerged when “commercial transactions had moved from 
a physical setting to an abstract, intangible sphere where prices mattered more than 
people and relationships.”11  Other historians such as Sven Beckert examine corporate 
leaders in New York City to understand how and why they began establishing relatively 
large, complex economic organizations that necessitated large bureaucracies to manage.  
These historians are concerned more with understanding the quotidian transformations of 
the “transition to capitalism” rather than the revolutionary forces that altered everyday 
lives.12   
This new historiographical trend spurred by Clark and Vickers continued to 
prevail through the period of economic turmoil of the so-called “Great Recession,” which 
spawned renewed interest in the economic changes of the antebellum era, birthing a 
“New History of Capitalism.”  Seth Rockman has recently explained that this movement 
“integrates a variety of subfields and methodologies under one capacious heading.  If 
nothing else, the study of capitalism has woven together business history, labor history, 
economic history, political economy, and the history of economic thought [and] has 
sought to revitalize subfields that...have fallen out of favor in the profession.”13  
Combining these subfields is designed to examine capitalism in innovative ways.  One 
major facet of the new history of capitalism is the focus on understanding the grass roots 
evidence of social change instead of looking for an indication of a broad theory in play in 
                                                 
11 Martin Bruegel, Farm, Shop, Landing: The Rise of a Market Society in the Hudson Valley, 1780–1860. 
Durham (NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 2. 
12Sven Beckert, Monied Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 
1850-1896 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Sven Beckert and Seth Rockman, Slavery's 
Capitalism: A New History of American Economic Development (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2016).   
13 Seth Rockman, "What makes the history of capitalism newsworthy?" Journal of the Early Republic 34 
(2014): 439-466.   
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a given study.  By applying this new perspective, these historians are now examining 
what society can tell us about capitalism rather than what capitalism can tell us about 
society.  The recalibration of focus comes from a deep sense of discontent with older 
studies of capitalism that obsess over the definitions and timing of the emergence of 
modern capitalism in the United States.  For decades, historians debated the 
characteristics of the economic system but emerged with little to show for it other than 
that certain models emerged in certain areas of the United States during the early 
nineteenth century.  Instead, by examining what society can tell us about capitalism, new 
research allows historians to connect the long history of capitalism into an interpretive 
framework that explains the relationship between increasingly entangled systems of 
modern economics.  Rather than understanding how capitalism took over the United 
States, historians are now using economic lenses of analysis like comparative advantage 
to understand the complex interplay of resources, inventions, infrastructure and 
individual choice upon the alterations of economic patterns. 
While there are significant problems with the theoretical underpinnings of the 
New History of Capitalism, this dissertation contributes to this new body of work by 
examining the development of the capitalist mindset in a western city, far away from 
viable river ways and ports.14  Indianapolis, Indiana, experienced a different evolution 
                                                 
14 The most glaring issue regarding the theoretical framework of the New History of Capitalism is that it 
assumes that capitalism has always existed.  These historians, and especially Rockman, argue that we 
should understand capital movements and market activity to comprehend society.  Under this 
assumption, capitalism existed from the moment that beings began trading with each other.  Ancient 
Persia, Medieval Europe, and Han China would operate under the same economic umbrella as 
contemporary New York City.  Understanding the economic history of the world is a fine goal but does not 
address the significant changes created by long-distance credit markets or investment practices that are 
the defining hallmarks of modern capitalism.  It would be wiser to call this new approach the “New 
Economic History” to alleviate the problems of the term “capitalism.” 
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than the eastern outposts and river towns that have attracted the attention of so many 
scholars of the market revolution.  One of the most important books on the topic, Paul 
Johnson’s A Shopkeeper’s Millennium, focused on how social relationships were 
challenged and remolded during the transition to capitalism.15  He argues that the 
economic changes of the early nineteenth century—accelerated by the introduction of the 
Erie Canal—caused a social restructuring of the city as employers separated their homes 
from their shops.  The resulting loss of social control by owners provoked a perceived 
breakdown in the moral order of the community and forced owners to adopt new forms of 
social control.  For Johnson, the Second Great Awakening was an indispensable tool for 
obtaining workers who would accept the new forms of labor and respectability. Studying 
religious and labor practices as well as community interaction allowed Johnson to 
examine the ways that social relations were recreated in an era of profound change.   
In the 1820s and 1830s, then, Rochester and its people were remade as capitalism 
took hold.  Though the particulars differ from study to study, this is the transition to 
capitalism on which much of the historiography has centered. But how did this transition 
play out in the Early West?  The best work on inland western cities remains John Mack 
Faragher’s Sugar Creek.  His excellent research on central Illinois describes development 
in the “western” frontier up to the Civil War and examines many aspects of social life 
away from major waterways including conflicts over development.  But Faragher’s work 
dates itself by noting that farmers “still committed to self-sufficiency” during the 1840s.16  
                                                 
15 Paul Johnson, A Shopkeeper’s Millennium: Society and Revivals in Rochester, New York, 1815-1837 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1978). 
16 John Mack Faragher, Sugar Creek: Life on the Illinois Prairie.  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986): 
178.  The work still has incredible value as a community study and should be a first consultation of any 
student of Midwestern development.   
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Historians have since done away with the concept of self-sufficiency and argued that they 
cooperated and participated in markets from the moment of earliest settlement.17  Frontier 
residents rarely, if ever, relied solely on their own skills and those of their families.  As 
shown through the works of Richard Bushman, Winifried Rothenberg, Daniel Vickers, 
Christopher Clark and others, complex trade and support networks existed that allowed 
frontier farmers to create an early economy buttressed by social bonds.  As a result, 
historians must re-examine older explanations of the transition to capitalism during 
pioneer settlement in the west to understand the character of nineteenth-century 
American expansion and development in the region that, in the 1800s, was the source of 
hope for the future of America’s republican spirit.18   
This study of Indianapolis and the surrounding Marion County, Indiana, seeks to 
understand how this transition played out in a western, land-locked city.  It is inspired by 
work by esteemed scholars like Paul Johnson and Christopher Clark and newer 
scholarship by historians like Sven Beckert, Seth Rockman, and Brian Luskey.  Given its 
location on America’s frontier in 1825, it owes a debt, too, to Frederick Jackson Turner 
whose “frontier thesis” has long spurred debate over the process of American 
development.  For Turner, the presence of the frontier and “the existence of an area of 
free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward 
                                                 
17 For a discussion of how the concept of “self-sufficiency” has outlasted its usefulness, see Richard 
Bushman, “Markets and Composite Farms in Early in America,” The William and Mary Quarterly 55 (1998): 
351-374. 
18 One of the best books on how early Americans envisioned western development is seen in Drew 
McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America.  Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1980.  
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explain American development.”19  He believed that understanding American identity 
required examination of the process of conquering “savagery” that altered cultural 
patterns as frontier settlers adapted to new environments in their travels across the east 
coast over the Appalachians, through the Midwest, across the Great Plains, over the 
Rockies and down the western slope to the Pacific.  For Turner, “American development 
has exhibited not merely advance along a single line, but a return to primitive conditions 
on a continually advancing frontier line…American social development has been 
continually beginning over again on the frontier.”20   
Turner’s thesis shaped the discourse of American history for decades and John 
Mack Faragher proclaims that “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” is 
“the single most influential piece of writing in the history of American History.”21  Some 
writers of western history argue that the frontier thesis is so pervasive that it paralyzes a 
deeper understanding of the meaning of the West in America by obfuscating the 
“unbroken past” that links the Old West to contemporary society.  For these historians, 
western history is victimized by Turner’s assertion that the West as “frontier” closed in 
1890 and, thus, limits our memory of the West to boomtowns, prostitutes, high-noon 
showdowns, cattle drives and rustlers.  As a result, contemporary western history shuns 
the concept of Turner’s frontier.  One historian has argued that this trend occurred 
because Turner’s disciples defended his thesis so strictly during the mid-20th century.  
                                                 
19 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in Rereading Frederick 
Jackson Turner: “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” and other Essays, ed.  John Mack 
Faragher. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1994), 31.   
20 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in Rereading Frederick 
Jackson Turner: “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” and other Essays, ed.  John Mack 
Faragher. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1994), 32. 
21 John Mack Faragher, Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: “The Significance of the Frontier in American 
History” and other Essays. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1994): 1.   
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When the New Left social history of the 1960s so emphatically showed the lack of 
uniformity in social development, contemporary historiography of the American West 
pivoted toward Walter Prescott Webb’s interpretational lens of the West as a “place” as a 
way to get past the intellectual obstructionism of Turner’s followers.  Webb’s method 
focused on the specific difficulties that settlers experienced on the Great Plains and 
argued that they caused a revolutionary break that Turner underemphasized.  For Webb, 
the arid, treeless, flat Plains region forced settlers to abandon most things they knew 
about North American settlement.  They needed to create completely new agricultural, 
economic and social institutions to survive in a region that was so drastically different 
from the well-watered eastern portion of the continent.  The theoretical framework of 
Webb’s West was attractive to historians looking for a unifying theory for their studies.  
Instead of analyzing how social processes evolved over time and space from east to west, 
historians began limiting their research to one geographical area and rejecting the idea of 
a single “process” of development that could tie the history of the nation together.   
Contemporary western historians focus on the “unbroken past” of the West to 
distance themselves from Turner’s assertion that the frontier closed in 1890, but this 
research is overwhelmingly limited to areas west of the Mississippi River.  The current 
methodology—while useful in creating temporal continuity of a region—limits the 
geographical scope of western history.  It ignores the temporal nature of borderlands in 
places like Appalachia or the Midwest—regions that were once as far removed from the 
majority of American economic activity as the Far West was in the 1880s. 22  This 
dissertation aims to revive particular components of the Turner thesis in order to 
                                                 
22 The major argument of this school is seen in Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The 
Unbroken Past of the American West (New York: W.W. Norton Press, 1987): 18-30.   
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reconnect the “many Wests” of the American continent abroad so that we can again 
search for meaning in expansion throughout a world increasingly connected by better 
transportation and communication infrastructure. 
New western historians are correct to label Turner’s “frontier thesis” as sexist or 
Euro-centric by contemporary standards.  They are also correct in criticizing Turner’s 
model, arguing that his description of a standardized process of development was too 
simple.  No two historical processes are exactly the same and not even a brilliant mind 
like Turner’s could account for the different progressions that took place across space and 
time.  However, critics go too far when arguing that studying the “process” of settling the 
West is irrelevant.   The settlement of the United States did occur as a process that 
generally moved from east to west.23  Environmental barriers to settlement did exist.  
They forced people to overwhelmingly choose to cross the Appalachians through the 
Cumberland Gap during the late eighteenth century.  They obliged travelers to sail around 
South America rather than cross the Great Plains to get to California.  They 
overwhelmingly required people to remain near major waterways when settling a new 
region during the early nineteenth century.  While this work is not environmentally 
deterministic, it argues that historians would be remiss to ignore the interconnection of 
environmental barriers and technological limitations that affected patterns of settlement, 
growth, and development in the United States that were repeated over and over, and are 
still repeated today.  It applies those same analytical aspects to other areas of the United 
                                                 
23 At least the settlement east of the Rocky Mountains, as mentioned in the following sentence.  The 
settlement of California does portray a different scenario than the one presented by Turner but presents 
the opportunity to offer a neo-Turnerian comparative perspective.  Understanding the west to east 
settlement of the West Coast may offer fruitful observations and counterpoints—as well as 
confirmation—of any ideas posited east of the Rockies.   
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States in order to understand how western development did occur as a process that was 
very much affected by the technological ability to get to different places.   
This dissertation seeks to reclaim the useful parts of Turner’s thesis and apply 
them toward our understanding of western development.  This “Neo-Turnerian” 
perspective jettisons the argument that the frontier made Americans special.  Instead, it 
combines the approaches of Turner and Webb to examine how the place affected the 
process of development the same way an environmental historian observes development.  
The legacy of Turner—one of the first environmental historians—emerges when using a 
comparative lens to draw conclusions about how the environment hampers or buttresses 
development of common institutions during a given period.24  The process of 
development is measured in this work as the emergence of key social institutions or 
economic markers.  For instance, the frontier existed in Marion County far after it faded 
in rural Massachusetts.  Things like wage labor, established banking houses, and the 
ability to acquire industrially made goods all existed in the Northeast long before they 
occurred in Marion County, but their developments caused similar consequences.   
The definition of place used here is equally important but more inclusive than 
Webb’s interpretation.  A Neo-Turnerian perspective on western history must necessarily 
examine the specific characteristics of place and account for its unique features.  
Historians must move spatially away from understanding the “West” as a place west of 
the Mississippi River in order to understand broader commonalities.  By examining how 
social, economic, political, religious, environmental, or other structures emerge in 
                                                 
24 Historians must be careful to judge “common institutions.”  This dissertation studies the mid-
nineteenth century, so judging when automobiles became everyday items would be useless.  Only by 
individual assessment of what represents a “common institution” can this type of research be done.   
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different locations over time, historians will be able to understand how place and process 
interconnect to describe American development, the American West and a wider history 
of frontier regions around the world.  The purpose, then, of seeking these processes of 
development are markers of frontier recession that historians can use to understand 
common themes between time and place.  Reflecting the spirit of the New History of 
Capitalism, this Neo-Turnerian perspective does not ask what the traditional definitions 
of the West can tell us about America.  Instead, it asks what American development can 
tell us about how we understand the West and frontiers.  This approach allows historians 
to draw new conclusions about frontier development and make comparative 
interpretations regarding development in modernizing regions across time, space and 
place.   
The same way that the New History of Capitalism is not really “new,” comparing 
frontiers and borderlands is not a completely original concept.  Earl Pomeroy, Walter 
Nugent and William Cronon have all considered how to compare frontiers and 
borderlands.  Nugent, specifically, compared the American West to other regions in the 
world that experienced similar patterns of development.  He has noted that the frontier 
“process” in the United States is remarkably similar to Third World Development in 
Latin America or to change in the Australian outback.  For him, “they are different 
processes but are almost certainly related.” Understanding processes of development are 
crucial to drawing conclusions in comparative topics like borderlands studies.  Scholars 
like Nugent or Walter Elofson are re-examining the value of Turner’s work and studying 
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comparative processes of development in order to understand broader trends in 
worldwide change over time.25   
This model can also be applied to a national level.  Transnational comparative 
history has provided unique perspectives on worldwide developments, but comparative 
history at the national level can also elucidate important conclusions.  This dissertation 
seeks to contribute to this scholarship by comparing the frontier experience of Marion 
County, Indiana, to other frontier regions of the United States.26  It examines the 
transformation of central Indiana to explain how development occurred in an 
environment that was inaccessible because of inadequate transportation networks until 
the mid-nineteenth century.  Those transportation barriers were so extreme that they 
made the one hundred miles of overland travel from Indianapolis to Cincinnati more 
expensive than the 1,400-mile trip from Cincinnati to New Orleans.  By examining this 
perspective and comparing it to developments in other areas that experienced similar and 
dissimilar growth patterns, this dissertation will shed light on the role of the environment 
and transportation networks on the recession of the frontier and the development of 
capitalism in the United States.  Rather than arguing that infrastructure was important for 
the development of capitalist institutions, it will examine how important those systems 
were in the evolution of the local economic system.  Tracking the development of 
                                                 
25 Walter Nugent, “Comparing Wests and Frontiers,” in The Oxford History of the American West, ed. 
Clyde A. Milner II et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994): 804.  A recent article has promoted a 
similar argument about comparing frontiers.  See Warren Elofson, “The Universality of Frontier Disorder: 
Northern Australia Viewed Against the Northern Great Plains of America,” Agricultural History 88 (2014): 
147-174.   
26 This researcher has considered using international perspectives in future work on this topic.  
Particularly interesting would be a comparative discussion of Minas Gerias or Manaus, Brazil or 
Toowoomba, Australia.   
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capitalism along different frontiers will allow historians to comprehend the importance of 
alterations in infrastructure networks for economic development.   
Comparing frontiers is a difficult task.  Research interests, source bases and other 
specific circumstances prevent standardization of research in comparative frontier 
methodology.  The United States, alone, is too large and diverse for a one-size-fits-all 
analysis.  However, recent scholarship, such as the edited volume Frontier Cities, 
provides multiple perspectives on comparative frontiers and urban development.  
Timothy R. Mahoney’s assertion that frontier cities are notoriously difficult to define is 
very useful to this study.  He notes that most cities exist on the frontier for only a short 
time, and that once the city becomes a central hub, it usually loses its frontier 
characteristics.  It ceases to be a part of the frontier altogether.  He argues that frontier 
cities have three distinct frontier phases: the establishment of an isolated outpost, the 
emergence of a commercial outpost, and its development into a central hub.27  This 
definition of frontier city works particularly well for Marion County.  There are distinct 
periods where Marion County demonstrates characteristics of all three phases which will 
be explained below.  In another Frontier Cities chapter, Elliot West argues that an 
additional characteristic of a frontier city in the United States is that it grew up at the 
same time as the transportation and communications revolution.  For West, these cities 
could create incredibly complex infrastructures in short periods of time because they had 
no previous infrastructure to demolish.  They could “build to suit” which had a major 
consequence for the trajectory of development.  As West notes regarding settlement 
                                                 
27 Timothy R. Mahoney, “Locating the Frontier City in Time and Space: Documenting a Passing 
Phenomenon,” in Frontier Cities: Encounters at the Crossroads of Empire, ed. Jay Gitlin et al. (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 153.  
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during the communication and transportation revolutions, “the effect…was to telescope 
their development” in a short period of time.28  Indianapolis unquestioningly exhibited 
the developmental path posited by West.  It was the emergence of the railroad that 
allowed Indianapolis to mature economically.  The lack of a canal prevented a powerful 
anti-railroad lobby from emerging in the Indiana legislature as occurred in other states 
with completed canal networks.  As a result, Hoosiers could quickly and efficiently build 
railroads to places that would allow them to maximize their profit potential.  Indianapolis 
was born in the river era but matured with the rail.  Combining the two methods of 
research promoted by West and Mahoney, it is clear that Indianapolis is a frontier town at 
least until 1847.   
This dissertation will examine several features of Indianapolis development and 
compare them to the experience of other regions of the northern United States. Land 
values, ratios of improved land, and agricultural output will be important yardsticks when 
determining the economic frontier.  Social features like the emergence of horse thief 
detective agencies will elucidate the limits of state power and the role that community 
organizations had in maintaining social order.  Other factors like availability of 
manufactured goods will show the edge of Atlantic World-oriented economic systems.  
In sum, these characteristics will show that change occurred along a barrier that reflected 
the ability of technology to overcome environmental barricades.  Far from a line that 
retreated from east to west, the economic frontier receded the moment when 
transportation technology allowed settlers to master the environment and efficiently 
                                                 
28 Elliot West, “Grain Kings, Rubber Dreams, and Stock Exchanges: How Transportation and 
Communication Changed Frontier Cities,” in Frontier Cities: Encounters at the Crossroads of Empire, ed. 
Jay Gitlin et al. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013) 113. 
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participate in a complex market economy.  After that point, local decisions like cultural 
preferences, social patterns and external market forces emerged as the driving factors of 
development.  Marion County, as a case study, will show that the transition to capitalism 
did not occur uniformly across the United States at one time.29  Large-scale factors 
determined the moment when Americans of each particular area could enter larger 
markets and local factors determined what they did afterward.   
The brief history of Marion County before the Civil War shows the profound 
effect that Elliot West’s “telescoped changes” had on local residents.  This dissertation 
relies heavily on the New Rural History to measure these changes. The New Rural 
History, mirroring the change in the New Left History of the 1960s, began focusing on 
the social aspects of rural society in the 1980s.  Instead of resting on agricultural output—
on which this dissertation also relies—to explain rural society, New Rural Historians 
began working toward understanding the daily rhythms of life and asking how 
agricultural output changes reflected individual, family, or community values. This 
approach is useful for studying western settings during the antebellum period.  In 1800, 
the vast majority of Americans lived in rural areas.  By 1860, when cities began to take a 
central role in American life, rural people still made up 80 percent of the nation’s 
population.  Agriculture also dominated the early national economy.  Local, state and 
national governments all used their power to construct transportation networks to 
increase the profitability of sending agricultural surplus to markets.  Merchants in the 
                                                 
29 This argument is often discussed when examining the coastal North and South in debates regarding the 
nature of the southern economy.  Often overlooked by those promoting that the South was pre-capitalist 
is that they were very reliant on a world-wide economy that tied them together, and also that they were 
deeply connected to Atlantic World trade unlike places like Marion County, who were relatively innocuous 
participants in the market economy.   
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early republic dealt overwhelmingly in agricultural products and farmers consumed most 
of the imported goods of the nation.  As one historian put it, “agriculture made the whole 
economy go” in the early national and antebellum periods.30  Rural society, then, is a 
better indicator of the hearts and minds of the vast majority of antebellum Americans.  By 
understanding rural society during this period, historians avoid teleological traps that 
focus too much on the urban world we live in instead of the rural world that historical 
agents experienced. 
The process of change occurred relatively quickly in Indianapolis.  The city’s 
transformation from backwater to central transportation hub demonstrates the type of 
telescoped development described by Elliot West.  Viewing Marion County through this 
lens shows that the city not only demonstrates its value to scholars of the new history of 
capitalism but is also a significant city for western historians understanding the 
differences from eastern urban areas from those in the West.  Indianapolis was designed 
as an eastern city, but the environmental and transportation barriers to city commerce—
along with the economic devastation caused by the Panic of 1837—forced it to develop 
using western-style urban planning and transportation styles.   
In order to show the profoundly Turnerian process of change, Chapter One will 
describe the society and economy of Marion County during the earliest years of 
settlement to establish a baseline of activity for the region arguing that the city was a 
woodland wilderness that prevented citizens from easily participating in any practical 
national market activity.  The site was chosen as the seat of the state capital in 1820.  The 
environment, however, did not allow settlers to achieve the aims they thought befitted 
                                                 
30 David Danbom, Born in the Country: A History of Rural America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2006), 69.  
22 
 
 
their new city.  In 1825, when the capital was finally moved to the new site, the 
environment still limited any potential access to outside markets.  Chapter Two describes 
the early efforts of residents to establish their city and create basic transportation 
networks.  Using Marion County Commissioner’s Office Records, election records, and 
newspaper articles, this chapter will show that Hoosiers provided almost no dissent to the 
construction of an economic hub that would supply residents with access to cheaper and 
better goods.  Chapter Three examines how Hoosiers handled the possible success of 
internal improvements.  It notes the development of Marion County in terms of 
establishing an Agricultural Society and the increased use of watches and clocks to 
regulate their society in expectation of national market connections.  However, in their 
quest for economic success, they ignored the dangers of linking into the national 
economy.  Newspapers, secondary sources, and a close reading of the Diary of Calvin 
Fletcher will show that their whole-hearted support of internal improvements led directly 
to the difficulty of the region after investing heavily in failed internal improvements 
caused by the Panic of 1837.31  Fletcher’s diary provides a look at the mindset of Marion 
County residents and probate records show the economic calamity that Hoosiers 
experienced.  Both sources suggest a profound sense of shock and anger at the situation 
in which residents found themselves.   
Chapter Four describes the effect of the Panic of 1837 on Marion County.  
Sheriff’s sale records, newspaper advertisements, and probates show the economic 
devastation depressed prices, wiped out family savings and prevented Hoosiers from 
                                                 
31 Calvin Fletcher’s diary is widely considered the best source on pre-Civil War Indianapolis.  Fletcher was 
a prominent farmer, lawyer and civic leader in the city and produced a nine-volume diary that provides an 
array of details of the city from weather and crop yields to the processes of economic decision making in 
times of crisis.   
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achieving their goals of economic relevance.  It also describes the steps taken by the state 
to escape its debts as a way to continue its quest to improve its transportation 
infrastructure.  Chapter Five uses agricultural census data to create a baseline of 
agricultural information to demonstrate the telescoped development of Marion County.  It 
will discuss the recovery of Indianapolis during the 1840s and how Hoosiers viewed the 
economic tragedy they had just witnessed.  It will also discuss the beginning of the 
railroad era of Marion County from 1847 through 1852.  In 1847, the Madison and 
Indianapolis Railroad directly connected the city with the Ohio River.  The arrival of the 
railroad was widely regarded as a magnificent success for the city, but the unforeseen 
externalities were less well received.  Hoosiers were confronted with challenges to the 
perceived social order by German, Irish and African-American laborers as well as 
undesirables like horse thieves who threatened the economic well-being of family units.  
The chapter will examine how Hoosiers reacted to the increasingly tumultuous social 
atmosphere that rapidly descended on the region.  Chapter Six will examine the city from 
the mid-1850s through the eve of the Civil War.  It examines agricultural census data to 
show the telescoped nature of development caused by the arrival of the railroad and 
examines the social developments mentioned above.  It also shows how prices for 
agricultural land and goods caught up to market rates, which is the strongest marker of 
regional economic stabilization.  It will also examine the creation of formal social 
institutions like police departments and civic organizations to show the regression of 
frontier characteristics seen in the early chapters of this work.  Chapter Seven will discuss 
the role of Indiana in the Civil War Era.  After the railroad connected Indianapolis to the 
rest of the market economy, the city and the state took a distinctly northern pattern of 
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development and accepted the Free Labor argument of the fledgling Republican Party.  
The lack of slavery in the state allied it with the Union during the war which fostered a 
new set of problems unrealized in the earliest years of settlement.  Instead of 
environmental limits to market participation, by 1861, Hoosiers were prevented from 
participating in a free market by the United States government embargo that outlawed 
trade with southern states.  Hoosiers enjoyed unparalleled access to eastern markets and 
opportunities to feed the Union Army which increased their economic success; however, 
they were forced to deal with the military policies of Governor Oliver Morton, an ardent 
Union supporter, who volunteered Indianapolis as a major military hub and prisoner of 
war camp, and made it a target of rebel invaders.  Soldiers, rarely known as pleasant 
house guests, were forced on Hoosier residents and caused social tensions among 
residents.  By the time the war ended, Hoosiers were so embroiled in national economics 
and politics that they had fully surrendered the individual independence they craved as 
the region was settled a half-century earlier.   
The story of Indianapolis is critical for understanding the antebellum United 
States for many reasons.  Its location in the Early West allows historians of the new 
history of capitalism to get away from the commonly studied northeastern United States.  
Historians of this budding field will be able to gain valuable comparative insights into the 
relationship between the vast regions that participated in the Atlantic World economy.  
The city is also not located on a navigable river.  The focus gets away from the few 
studies on Ohio River cities such as Cincinnati done by Daniel Aaron and Walter Glazer, 
and applies the principles of infrastructure improvement put forth by George Rogers 
Taylor and Daniel Walker Howe in a region that can offer new insights into old 
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questions, including whether or not Americans promoted capitalist forms of development 
throughout their history.32  A third, related point, is that the city is one of the first to 
emerge nearly out of nowhere to become the state capital.  The unpopulated site was 
chosen due to its environmental and geographic location in the center of the state.  This 
unique setting provides a site from which to study the locus of settlement, infrastructure 
improvement and the transition to capitalism in a way that few other cities in the United 
States could.  The lessons of the transition to capitalism will be unique in their own way, 
but the advantage to studying this historically specific site lies in its ability to compare 
developments of a city that is relatively tabula rasa to those along the Hudson River, or 
in other well-researched locations.  Understanding the various factors that caused the 
specific history of early Marion County gives us insight into the development of the Early 
West.  More important, understanding how the development of this region compares to 
places across time and space will allow us to recreate a broader narrative of development 
that give meaning to our collective experience in a world that is increasingly 
interdependent.   
  
                                                 
32 Daniel Aron, Cincinnati: Queen City of the West (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1992); Walter 
Glazer, Cincinnati in 1840: The Social and Functional Organization of an Urban Community during the Pre-
Civil War Period (Ohio State University, 1999); George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution: 
1815-1860 (New York: Rinehart, 1951); Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The 
Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).   
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CHAPTER 2: “THERE WERE NO ROADS: TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMY 
AND COMMUNITY IN MARION COUNTY, 1819-1828” 
 
In 1821, the hot, humid summer and swampy conditions in Marion County, 
Indiana, fostered the birth of millions of mosquitoes.  The malarial pests swarmed the few 
white settlers who had just recently moved to the newly selected site of the Indiana state 
capital at the confluence of Fall Creek and the West Fork of the White River.  
Unsurprisingly, the epidemic overwhelmed the two resident frontier doctors who were ill-
supplied with the necessary knowledge or provisions to handle such ailments.  By the 
time fall temperatures killed off the mosquitoes, one in eight settlers were dead, as were 
the hopes of promoting Indianapolis as a “healthy land.”  The memory of the “great chill” 
prompted one resident to recall a half-century later that the city suffered from the “ill 
repute of the universal prostration of 1821” and caused potential settlers to avoid the 
region.33  The threat to settlement did not end with malaria.  Hostile Native Americans 
also threatened the lives of local residents.  George Pogue, one of the first permanent 
settlers to the region, went into the woods around his cabin looking for lost—or perhaps 
stolen—horses and never returned giving rise to the local legend that he was murdered by 
Native Americans.34  Natural wildlife also consternated pioneers in their quest to 
construct settlements.  In 1823, Marion County suffered a gray squirrel infestation that 
                                                 
33 Jeffrey Tenuth, Indianapolis: A Circle City History (Charleston: Arcadia Press, 2004), 29-30; William 
Holloway, Indianapolis: A Historical and Statistical Sketch of the Railroad City (Indianapolis: Indianapolis 
Journal Print, 1870), 21; for a discussion of how settlers thought of mosquitoes and disease see, Conevery 
Bolton Valencias, The Health of the Country: How American Settlers Understood Themselves and Their 
Land (New York: Perseus Books, 2002), 79-82.   
34 David Bodenhamer and Robert Barrows, The Encyclopedia of Indianapolis (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), 1120.   
27 
 
 
destroyed the corn crop.  Calvin Fletcher, an early resident and young Indiana lawyer, 
noted in his diary that there were so many rodents that “one man killed round one corn 
field 248 in 3 days.”35  The settlers of Jamestown wouldn’t have wished the Marion 
County experience on their worst enemies.   
The struggles of early settlers in Marion County represent one of the most slow, 
difficult, and ever-present problems of development in the Old Northwest.36  The 
difficulties emerged from the foundation of the county which was created by politicians 
looking to satisfy the disparate constituencies of the Whitewater, Ohio, and Wabash 
River valleys in the east, south, and west sides of the state.  Officials looked for a central 
setting for the new capital to assuage accusations of favoritism and, in 1820, the 
commissioners to the legislature noted that the new location was chosen to “connect with 
an eligible site the advantages of a navigable stream and fertility of soil [and] they have 
not been unmindful of the geographical portions of the various portions of the state.”37  In 
1833, Hugh McCulloch, future Secretary of the Treasury, stated flatly that 
“Indianapolis…had been selected for the capital, not because there was anything 
attractive in the situation, but because it was near the geographical center of the State.”38  
The quest for centrality, water transportation and fertile soil drew the commissioners to a 
site in the central, as yet unsettled, portion of Indiana.  Balancing the needs of the states’ 
                                                 
35 Gayle Thornbrough, comp., The Diary of Calvin Fletcher, Vol. 1 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 
1972), 88.   
36 By frontier, I mean the outskirts of Euro-American cultural, economic and social hegemony.  This 
profoundly Turnerian definition does not suggest cultural superiority as some critics have argued.  
Instead, it promotes the idea that residents of this region were in a borderland where they were forced to 
re-evaluate the patterns of daily life, especially regarding market orientation.   
37 Jacob Piatt Dunn, Greater Indianapolis: The History, the Industries, the Institutions and the People of a 
City of Homes (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Company, 1910), 7.   
38 Shirley McCord, Travel Accounts of Indiana, 1679-1961 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1970), 
142.   
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constituents, the capital was laid onto a landscape that could not immediately meet the 
needs of a political center.  Indianapolis—as the site was later named—was a place where 
few Europeans had ever set foot before 1820.  While compromise obtained a central 
location for the capital and prevented immediate political conflict in the young state, the 
issue of transportation emerged as the primary problem of residents during the first 
generation of settlement.  Surveyors overestimated the value of the White River as a 
transportation system for getting goods to and from the new city.39  Unlike residents of 
river towns such as Cincinnati or Albany, port towns such as New York City, 
Philadelphia or New Orleans, or those with easy road access to major town centers in the 
1820s, settlers of Marion County were forced to deal with the lack of an economically 
efficient connection to established markets.  These settlers moved to an area where the 
process of building a specialized, complex, connected economy and society was in the 
distant future.   
The issue of transportation is an important one for this dissertation.  Settling 
Marion County—and all along the American frontier—recalibrated the experience of 
time and space for many settlers.  For some Americans, it meant elongating the period 
that allowed individuals to obtain land and pass it down to their children before 
population pressures forced the emergence of wage labor.  Jeffersonians—echoing 
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers like David Hume—labeled this the “agricultural” phase 
of civilization.40  Marion County settlers were able to obtain cheap land on the frontier 
                                                 
39 George Cottman, "River Navigation in Indiana" The Indiana Quarterly Magazine of History 2 (1906): 89-
95. 
40 An excellent, brief overview of this strain of thought in the Early Republic is seen in Tamara Thorton 
Plakins, Cultivating Gentlemen: The Meaning of Country Life Among the Boston Elite, 1785-1860 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 2-9.  For another brief discussion of the “four stages theory” see, 
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that allowed them to escape the rising cost of farms in longer-settled areas like the valley 
towns of western Massachusetts.41  Other settlers experienced a more profound change.  
Men like James B. Ray or Calvin Fletcher experienced less developed Euro-American 
settlement as they moved from longer-settled areas such as Cincinnati or Connecticut to 
the relative wilderness of Marion County.42  If the process of development is defined as 
an increase in economic specialization to meet family needs, these settlers found 
themselves moving backward in time.  Instead of gaining the advantages of markets that 
were emerging in eastern towns and cities, emigration to Marion County forced—or 
allowed, depending on one’s perspective—settlers to revert back to the small, 
independent “composite farms” of the pre-industrial age where families produced a 
significant portion of their own goods and were not reliant on burgeoning regional, 
national or international markets for their living.43    
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These composite farms used pre-capitalist modes of production to provide a 
competency for families.  Families produced most of what they needed for survival and 
sold any excess to neighbors or to merchants in exchange for imported goods.  Market 
capitalism—by contrast—is often characterized by three features: a desire to accumulate 
capital for further investment, the heavy influence of markets on economic activity, and 
the rise of “free” wage labor based on the job market.44  At the time of settlement in 
Marion County, these characteristics were emerging in major urban centers throughout 
the northeastern United States.  Workmen’s parades, improved transportation networks 
that fostered standardized prices across community boundaries, and a spirit of investment 
permeated the northeastern United States.  These changes showed an increasing transition 
to capitalist structures in many parts of daily life.45   
Hoosiers were too secluded by environmental barriers to integrate into national 
agricultural markets as much as places like Cincinnati, New Orleans or Albany, and the 
availability of unoccupied land parcels prevented the rise of a mature system of wage 
labor.  As working class artisans began to feel the pinch of what a specialized economy 
could do to individuals in New York City, Baltimore, Boston or Philadelphia, Marion 
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County families remained far more reliant on their own hard work for family success.  
Owners, managers and markets held almost no power over frontier composite farmers.  
The only factor of modern capitalism that was noticeable in Marion County from the time 
of settlement was the desire to invest in infrastructure that would allow residents to 
partake in market interaction.  However, these occurred within a state-wide atmosphere 
and are not the clearest markers of local mindsets.  Not until the 1830s did local Hoosiers 
begin investing as speculators in fire insurance or canal companies.  The 1820s were a 
period of searching for residents of Marion County as they examined the various options 
available to them to achieve their quest for family success.   
This chapter argues that the unique and challenging local environment of central 
Indiana forced Hoosiers to revert back to pre-capitalist economic strategies.  To 
demonstrate that the chronological process of development in Marion County was 
affected by its geographical place, it first gives a brief geographical history of central 
Indiana and describes why the region was settled later than other portions of the state.  
The second part discusses the transportation problems during the first decade of 
settlement including poor road conditions and the difficulty of river navigation to show 
what Hoosiers were worried about and provide insight into what they hoped to 
accomplish in the future by building their city.  The transportation hardships forced early 
settlers to adopt a pre-capitalist focus in the local economy during the first decade of 
settlement.  We can construct the everyday life of Hoosiers during this era by looking at 
different styles of newspaper advertisements, diaries and travel accounts, and what they 
suggest about daily life in early Marion County.  The final section examines the social 
construction of the region and argues that central Indiana was settled by a cross-section of 
32 
 
 
Americans from the Northeast and Upland South.  These settlement patterns demonstrate 
that no single cultural pattern can explain the developmental strategy of the city, which 
makes it an ideal setting to examine how western cities chose to develop during a period 
of rapid economic and technological change.  Most significantly, this chapter sets a 
baseline of development.  The Hoosier capital quickly transformed during the antebellum 
era from a relative backwater to a major Union staging point during the Civil War that 
bypassed its frontier days and was fully integrated into the national economy.  Examining 
the early foundations of Marion County gives insight into the patterns of development 
that defined Indianapolis during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
The earliest struggles of settlement in Marion County were caused by the 
environment.  Most of the modern geographical features of central Indiana were created 
during the most recent ice age as shallow seas retreated and glaciers smoothed the land, 
deposited till and outwash and created riverbeds.  Most recently, the Wisconsin Glacier 
covered the northern two-thirds of the state, giving it the flattened landscape the region is 
known for.  The central third of the state, called the Tipton Till Plain, holds 10,000 square 
miles of fertile soil that include several end moraines along the eastern and western edges 
of the state that mark the furthest extent of the glaciers.  The Greenwood Moraine south 
of downtown Indianapolis marks the southernmost terminus of the Wisconsin glacier.  
The regression of the Wisconsin Glacier from central Indiana and the subsequent melt 
created the pro-glacial lake system in what are now the Great Lakes.  In Indiana, the 
drainage of Lake Maumee created the Wabash River Valley and its system of tributaries 
that funneled water through the northern part of the state.46  The direction of glacial 
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outwash and the specific features of Central Indiana left Marion County, for all intents 
and purposes, landlocked by natural geologic processes that fostered the shallow, 
southwestwardly flowing White River as the only aquatic route to the larger river systems 
of North America.47   
The fertile, flat soil of Central Indiana left behind by the glaciers played an 
important part in prehistoric settlement.  The woodland period, around 1000 BCE, saw 
the emergence of societies who used ceramic vessels and showed increased signs of 
sedentary settlement.  Burial mounds, such as those found in southeastern Ohio and 
southern Indiana, and evidence of long-distance trade suggest that the prehistoric people 
of the Tipton Till Plain had relatively complex economies and trading patterns that the 
fertile soil supported.  The Mississippian period signified the height of prehistoric 
population density in Central Indiana with intense slash-and-burn maize agriculture, 
fishing, and hunting.  Native Americans including the Delaware, Miami and Shawnee 
tribes all lived in the Tipton Till Plain during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
and traded the abundant animal pelts with French fur trappers.  These Native American 
tribes valued the land for the same reason that settlers did—it provided them with enough 
crops to obtain a competency.  As Hoosiers sought to expand into the interior of the state, 
they needed to remove Natives from the region.  The decline of the Tecumseh-led Native 
confederation after the Battle of Tippecanoe forced Natives to sell the land of Central 
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Indiana to white settlers in the Treaty of St. Mary’s in 1818 and cleared land for white 
settlement.48 
Although the newly-opened, fertile soil certainly presented opportunities to 
potential European settlers in Marion County, it also presented significant obstacles.  
Most important, rivers were not effective modes of transportation.  The White River 
Valley that formed from the frequent surges and contractions of the Wisconsin Glacier 
during the last Ice Age resulted in distinctive features within relatively short stretches 
along the river.  High stone bluffs and shallow earthen walls exist just a few miles apart.  
While providing beautiful scenery and extremely fertile soil, the remnants of glacial 
formation kept the bed of the White River shallow and swampy.49  The resulting drainage 
basins formed natural, although shallow, connections with the Mississippi River 
watershed.  The Wisconsin Glacier formed the Wabash River Valley to the north of the 
White River Valley and the Ohio River Valley existed to the south.  Thus, a vast majority 
of the state’s water flowed around the White River Valley, leaving flat land and shallow 
riverbeds.  As distinguished Indiana historian Donald F. Carmony has noted, “until east-
west railroads crossed this mountain barrier in the 1850s, the Ohio-Mississippi waterway 
was Indiana’s [and Indianapolis’s] most important artery for trade.”50  The orientation of 
the river also caused hardship.  The White River flows in a southwesterly direction and 
connects with the Wabash River just south of Vincennes before connecting with the Ohio 
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downriver of Evansville.  The West Fork of the White River was less attractive to early 
settlers because it was shallower than the Wabash and further away from the Ohio than 
the eastern fork of the river, which was closer to the community structures of the longer-
settled in the southern portion of the state.  Thus, any settlers going to Marion County 
before the National Road or railroad arrived were forced to go against the current of river 
travel to a region that was incredibly secluded by environmental barriers and a dearth of 
efficient transportation technology.   
River orientation made travel to Marion County difficult, but the region also 
experienced European settlement much later because of land availability along the Ohio 
and Wabash River Valleys.  Carmony states that “most settlers lived within the area 
drained by the tributaries of the Mississippi [and] the preponderance of imports and 
exports were conveyed on this river system.”51  The Ohio-Mississippi river system cited 
by Carmony was certainly the most important artery of trade.  The settlement of Marion 
County, even as a part of the system, was more difficult because it was at the farthest and 
shallowest edge of the tributary system.  It was significantly more rational to choose a 
farm site further down river or on another tributary than to move all the way up to central 
Indiana.  
Transportation technology during the early nineteenth century provided a related 
barrier to settlement of central Indiana.  Steam power was still a relatively new enterprise 
when Indiana became a state and the cumbersome engines were only practical in deep 
water.52  The shallow rivers of central Indiana were a disaster for boat traffic when 
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compared to the deep waters of the Ohio or Wabash.  The shallow, obstructed rivers of 
central Indiana were not useful to the emergent technology of the period.  Steam power 
was excellent for the Ohio or lower Wabash, but smaller rivers remained as secluded as 
ever.53  The site of the territorial capital, at Vincennes, and the first state capital, at 
Corydon, both suggest the importance of river trade.  The basic geographical and 
technological boundaries of the time kept the population in the southern river valleys and 
made Marion County relatively inaccessible, even by nineteenth century standards.   
Early settlers of the Old Northwest also avoided Marion County because they 
sought out geographic features that were absent in central Indiana.  They immediately 
appropriated lands that provided as few obstacles as possible to river trade.  Henry Clay, 
commenting about opportunities for trade upon seeing the Ohio River, proclaimed he had 
never seen a “section for which God had done much and man so little.”54  The deep river 
valleys were excellent for early settlers because it saved labor during travel.  Other land 
settlement opportunities along the Wabash, Ohio, or Whitewater Rivers—the “crescent of 
settlement”—were still available and made land away from major rivers less attractive to 
potential settlers.55  Before the advent of the railroad, farmers focused on obtaining 
access to land near waterways so they could get their crops to market as efficiently as 
possible.  The Ohio River Valley was a known quantity to these Americans.  It provided 
them the easiest access to the major artery of trade and the increasingly economical, 
steam-powered transportation system emerging in the 1800s.  For these settlers, rolling 
landscapes were ideal.  They were familiar with the Upcountry South and European 
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landscapes from whence they came and distrusted flat land.  They believed that the rivers 
of southern Indiana would carry their crops to market through the prohibitively dense 
forest.56  Southern Indiana Hoosiers had ample room to spread throughout the lower 
portion of the state.  Without any reason to bring settlers to a specific area, settlement 
away from major rivers lacked density.  The only impetus for change emerged from 
added incentives such as decreasing opportunities for land ownership along major rivers 
or placing the state capital in Marion County, which occurred in 1820.   
The desire to move the capital of the state to a central location came from bitter 
intrastate rivalries.  Vincennes—on the Wabash River—was the territorial capital 
beginning in 1800.  When Indiana became a state in 1816, Hoosiers decided that 
Corydon—on the Ohio River near the center of the state—should be the new center of 
political power.  Calls for a more central capital emerged as residents moved into the 
young state and envisioned future northward settlement.  Most notably, Governor 
Jonathan Jennings promoted a central location to allow for easier travel to residents 
wherever they lived in the state.  Some opposition from Corydon and other river towns 
emerged, but Jennings’ plan ultimately won out.57  Surveyors from nine of the ten 
counties were sent out to examine potential spots in the central portion of the state and 
placed the new capital at the confluence of the West fork of the White River and Fall 
Creek.  When Hoosier leaders chose to move the state capital to Indianapolis in Marion 
County in the central plain, they were choosing an unsettled area that lacked any 
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transportation access heavier than foot trails carved by Native Americans and early 
European traders.  This decision situated the state capital in an area that was 
fundamentally different than any other settled area of the state.   
Walter Prescott Webb described the Great Plains as a natural barrier that forced 
settlers to transform their lifestyles because it was arid, treeless and flat.58  Central 
Indiana, while possessing trees and adequate rainfall, was flat.  This feature made Central 
Indiana one of the first regions to require a mode of transportation other than rivers, much 
like the arid Far West.  Most cities in the Early West were founded on major 
transportation routes.  Cincinnati and Louisville on the Ohio, Pittsburgh at the confluence 
of the Allegheny and Monongahela, and Albany on the Hudson all show that inland cities 
were dependent on river travel.  Indianapolis, by contrast, emerged as a planned city that 
sprouted up without adequate transportation connections, a factor that would play a 
significant role in its development on the frontier and shed light on the experience of 
other frontier towns.59  Much like Walter Nugent suggests, frontiers share specific 
characteristics that historians can compare.60  In the United States, by the time Indiana 
achieved statehood in 1816, country roads connected communities from Maine to 
Georgia, urban industrialization was burgeoning in Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia and 
New York, and market-based exchange was emerging in rural communities throughout 
the longer settled regions of the Northeast.  Even Cincinnati was beginning to see the 
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emergence of a class structure based on wage labor and property ownership.61  Central 
Indiana was on the outskirts of the infrastructure system of the nation in 1816.  By 
comparing the experience of Marion County to other frontier regions in the United States 
and the world, historians will be able to highlight further commonalities across 
developing regions and place them into a broader perspective.   
Marion County existed on the economic frontier, secluded from any regular 
market interaction.  Margaret Duden notes that “Indiana…was hindered by its poor 
facilities for getting to market its surplus products.  The only market open to Indiana was 
that of the South…Those countries bordering on the Ohio river were the fortunate ones, 
for the interior settlements were practically cut off from any market, except in the fall and 
spring.”62  Settlers always had the ability to use keel or flatboats to transport goods to and 
from the river during spring freshets or the occasional fall rush.  As early as 1821, boats 
were coming up the White River from the Ohio carrying goods to feed the newly arrived 
settlers.  That year, future resident Matthias Nowland and his partner Elisha Herndon 
loaded a keelboat in Frankfort, Kentucky, with all manner of staple goods including 
bacon, flour and whiskey and brought them to the new city.  The next May, the “Eagle” 
came to Indianapolis bearing 15 tons of goods and the “Boxer” brought 33 tons of 
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merchandise to the city.63  Residents of Marion County also sent goods to the Ohio River 
market from the earliest days.  After the initial crops were produced, residents would 
construct flatboats from the widely available timber in the area and ship their crops to 
destinations on the Ohio or Mississippi River.  These boats used the current as the main 
transportation power, but the amount of wood available also allowed residents to 
construct long side and steering oars to increase the speed of their descent down the 
White River.  These boats, like others in the Old Northwest, initially carried wheat and 
pork to the market but soon grew to include whiskey, oats, corn and hay.64  Calvin 
Fletcher, in a letter to his brother, noted that “there were some boats started from here last 
fall with hogs and cattle in flat bottomed boats and there are other boats about to start 
load with lumber.”65  But even those were not sure transports.  Fletcher stated that New 
Orleans flatboat trips “make many a poor widow here and leave many a mother to lament 
the loss of her son whose homes know them no more.”66   
Hoosiers also had trouble when trying to transport goods to or from the Ohio 
River.  The site of the new state capital was chosen because a congressional surveying 
group labeled the route to the Ohio River as a “navigable stream.”  Reality, however, 
proved that the White River was anything but navigable.  On June 5, 1820, Tipton, 
describing the White River just southwest of Indianapolis, noted that “the river turns to 
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the west making a verry short Bend runs hard against the w shore and seems [to] be a 
verry difficult pass for Boats of Burthen.”67  Two weeks later he noted a family trying to 
move up the White River, declaring “at 45 p 6 the Boat landed that ever was Seen at the 
seat of Government it was a small Ferry Flat with a cannoe Tied along side boath loaded 
with the household goods of 2 Families mooving to the mouth of Fall Creek they came in 
a keel Boat as farr as they could get it up the river then unloaded the Boat and Bt 
[brought] up their good in the F & Canoe.”68  This example, repeated constantly through 
the period, was a regular difficulty to the establishment of an efficient economic 
infrastructure and forced Hoosiers to debate the riskiness of growing market crops and 
sending them on the hazardous trip downstream.  Most residents of Marion County felt 
more secure maintaining a composite farm and trading for the limited amount of goods 
their surplus would purchase at the local merchant stores.   
The difficulties of Marion County residents echoed those of many other frontier 
communities in different times and places.69  For settlers of Indiana’s new capital, the 
lack of pre-existing roads naturally caused frequent complaints.70  Cries resonated 
throughout the region about the terrible conditions of roads, rivers and trails that 
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prevented Hoosiers from easily connecting the larger market towns of Louisville, 
Cincinnati, St. Louis or New Orleans.  John Tipton, while surveying potential sites for the 
new state capital, noted the difficulty of travel by saying, “the under groth at this time 
mostly Prickly ash and very thick which made verry difficult for us to ride through.”71  
The same journey saw a horse “cripled” in a “very Bad Swamp.”72  Jeff Bremer argues 
that rivers were the way for frontier communities to forge economic ties to the rest of the 
nation.  Marion County residents, however, found no solace in selling their timber to 
passing steamboats or selling fish to inland residents.  Instead, they faced economic 
hardships that prevented them from establishing a strong economy until they could 
connect to exterior markets.73 
Another early difficulty lay in cutting paths to the city.  In 1822, the state paid for 
a road from Vincennes to Indianapolis.  The trail, “was marked out by dragging a log, or 
brush…with an ox team over the entire distance of 120 miles, through the woods, prairies 
and marshes.  The thick, high grass on the prairies and the wild pea vines in the woods so 
obstructed progress that the dragging of this log or brush was considered the best and 
cheapest way to mark the route, as mowing would have been too slow.”74  Roadbuilding 
was equally difficult when settlers expanded footpaths to accommodate heavy wagons 
and ox teams.  When Samuel Merrill moved the government offices from Corydon to 
Indianapolis, it was noted that “one day the wagons accomplished but two miles, 
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passages through the woods having to be cut on account of the impassable condition of 
the road.”75  William Holloway’s history of the city from 1870 flatly stated that in the 
early days “the means of communication between [Indianapolis] and other portions of the 
state were no better than those between neighbors in the town.  There were no roads.”76  
Hoosiers, like most others on outskirts of the American infrastructure system, 
experienced one of the major difficulties of frontier life—establishing a basic system of 
roads so that they could travel through their chosen settlements.   
Other voyagers described the difficulty in using roads during the first decade of 
settlement.  Sarah Fletcher, Calvin’s wife, noted that their initial trip to Indianapolis 
“proceeded with much difficulty,” and that the “fatigues were much greater than I could 
have imagined therefore would advise every body who have a good situation in Ohio, to 
be contended.”77  Her husband described a journey from the city to visit his cousin in 
Vermont.  On his trip north out of the small village, Fletcher had to swim across Fall 
Creek, and “with some difficulty” got his horses across the White River.  A few days 
later, Fletcher noted that he “had great difficulty in crossing” the “Marais de porche” near 
the headwaters of the Wabash and Maumee Rivers and “here lost my Spanish blade.”78  
After five days of travel, they arrived at Fort Wayne “dirty and hungry…in which time 
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we made not far from 175 [miles] distance.”79  Although Fletcher himself noted that he 
was “fond of being in the woods,” he would have almost certainly appreciated a path that 
would not have cost him his knife or left him tired and hungry.80   
Like most people living in the well-watered Midwest, Hoosiers quickly realized 
that rain and melting snow were hazardous to any potential travel plans.  An 1829 article 
in the Indiana State Gazette described part of the transportation network, stating that “for 
a few months past, the roads leading to this place, have been unusually bad for the 
season.  Last week a considerable snow fell, which has disappeared, and the rain which 
followed it has rendered them still worse than ever.”81  The lack of sound roads caused 
disruptions in another integral part of life when, in February of 1828, the Indiana Journal 
had to print an apology to its subscribers noting that “no paper was issued last week, on 
account of a failure to receive paper, owing to the extreme badness of the roads.”82  For 
Marion County residents, the poor quality of the roads was not just a burden on 
economics.  Major social institutions like newspapers could shut down due to 
environmental factors on the frontier.  Natural occurrences created severe burdens on 
frontier society by straining the capacity of rudimentary transportation infrastructure 
systems to accommodate social institutions.   
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The lack of efficient river or overland transportation networks also slowed city 
growth during the early days of settlement.  Unlike Cincinnati or Louisville, Indianapolis 
did not have easy access to the powerful currents and deep waters of the Ohio River.  The 
first general store opened in 1823 and, as late as 1825, there were only five store or 
tavern applications to the Marion County Commissioners.83  In Cincinnati, by contrast, 
there were 187 people listed as merchants in the 1825 city directory.84  Hoosiers had 
difficulty transporting goods to market and profits were gobbled up by expensive 
transportation costs.  Traversable roads, rivers, and rails were absent from the city, which 
prevented Hoosiers from using the comparative advantages provided by manufacturing 
centers like Philadelphia, New York, Boston or even Cincinnati.  As a result, the 
overwhelming feature of the economy of early Marion County was a lack of 
specialization.   
This lack of specialization is noted in a local census from 1828.  It shows that of 
the 203 families in Marion County, only 16 were listed as having a “farmer” as its head 
while there were 20 households listed as “carpenters.”85  Many other heads of household 
were engaged in the various occupations needed in a small town including blacksmith, 
wheel wright, wagoner, shoemaker and other occupations.  Only 14 families were headed 
                                                 
83 David Bodenhamer and Robert Barrows, The Encyclopedia of Indianapolis (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), 1479; Commissioners’ Record, Vol. 1, 1822-1827, Marion County, Indiana 
(Indianapolis: The Indiana Historical Records Survey, 1941).   
84 Harvey Hall, The Cincinnati Directory for 1825 (Cincinnati: Samuel Brown, 1825).  The total number only 
included those listed as merchants.  Including the number of the various grocers, barkeeps, shop owners 
and clothiers would bring the total considerably higher.   
85 Indiana Journal, Nov. 20, 1828.  The people listed as “farmers” most likely consisted of those residents 
who shipped large amounts of corn and hogs to the Ohio River for export as a major portion of their 
income.  The distinction between the other varying professions shows additional skills on top of 
composite farms.   
46 
 
 
by “laborers,” which, when coupled with the reality of low population density and 
available western land, suggests that the opportunity to obtain an independent living was 
readily available.  Hoosiers could choose to visit the shop or store that could give them 
the best deal or fulfill their social obligations while, at the same time, suggests that 
Hoosiers felt little impetus to push themselves to improve their economic footing as 
described by Daniel Vickers.86  In sum, Hoosier family units were not were not yet 
competing over specialized markets.  The labor system in place was far more communal 
than market oriented because of the lack of transportation to external economies.  
Everyone farmed and most did other duties in the community, and economic conflict was 
absent because large profit margins were not accessible.   
Lack of specialization does not mean that Hoosiers were self-sufficient.  Richard 
Bushman argues that farmers were never self-sufficient during the eighteenth or 
nineteenth century.87  They were forced to produce a large amount of their own goods but 
also relied on a system of production that was outside of their own control.  They were 
responsible for a sizable portion of their own material goods and controlled the means of 
production including labor and most material, but they needed assistance to raise barns, 
build houses, and plow fields.   
Evidence that Hoosiers were secluded from the rest of the United States and 
overwhelmingly responsible for their own produce is available from the earliest 
newspapers in Marion County. Newspapers represent the most basic level of information 
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exchange in nineteenth-century communities.  Information printed in them reflects the 
values of the readership.  If only a few people produced butter or beer, residents could 
spread improved methods by word of mouth or a simple letter passed from one person to 
the next.  Taking the time to set type, and pay for publication of articles suggests that 
newspaper advertisements were the quickest method to disseminate information to the 
largest number of residents and was valued by the community.88  One early article 
described the “Sale of Sheep” in Boston, arguing that “It may be expected…that these 
choice animals distributed thro’out the country, will, in a few years have a material effect 
in improving the quality of our flocks.”89  Clearly, the author wanted readers to know of 
the improved breeds, but the resignation that those improvements would take multiple 
years shows the exclusion of Marion County residents from the immediate effects of new 
breeds.  Informative articles on how to improve goods locally filled newspapers in early 
Marion County.  One article in The Farmer gave details on how to make “good harvest 
beer,” another article explained “how to churn butter in dog days,” and another in the 
Indiana State Journal provided “A most excellent method for preserving butter from 
becoming rank” and how to make butter easier and that “comes sooner and saves much 
labor in working out the buttermilk.”90  It was not that Hoosiers did not want access to 
better or cheaper goods.  These newspaper advertisements clearly show that they were 
concerned with producing improved products.  Residents of Marion County were forced 
to produce their own beer or butter because the environment and available transportation 
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technology insulated them from acquiring goods from areas that could produce them 
more efficiently.  Instead, they made their own products and used any available 
information to improve the quality.  The publication of these articles in the general 
newspaper instead of a trade journal supports the position that Marion County had a lack 
of specialization during the 1820s, as did many other regions that were on the edges of 
the United States economy.   
Emigrants migrated to central Indiana using community networks as another 
strategy to assuage the difficulty of living on the frontier.  Paul Salstrom argues that 
movement to the frontier following the Panic of 1819 slowed to a crawl because 
depressed land prices made it difficult for easterners to raise enough money to move 
west.  He argues that emigrants moved West when prices were high in the East, as 
demonstrated by the influx of people during the good times of the late 1820s and early 
1830s.91  He notes that settlers who moved to Indiana during the hard times of the early 
1820s did so by using chain migration or moving in groups.  Early records of settler 
activity in Marion County support this theory by showing strong connections based on 
family or community networks.  Three examples represent different strands of common 
emigration patterns elucidated in John Mack Faragher’s Sugar Creek and other works on 
emigration which were repeated in Marion County.92    
The first type of migration pattern show that men preceded their families.  The 
best example of this pattern is George Pogue, who moved into central Indiana in early 
1819, built a small cabin, established a sugar camp, began girdling trees and sowing 
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crops before his family came a few months later.  John McCormick blazed a similar path.  
Around the same time, he and his two brothers, along with axemen and teamsters, cleared 
some land and built cabins to establish a base for their families.93  This pattern of 
development, as occurred in Sugar Creek, was the earliest method of settling the new 
region.  It was hard work but provided Americans with the opportunity to obtain land for 
free as squatters’ rights were not yet firmly established in the new country.94   
The second, and most common, method of migration was through family groups 
that migrated sequentially.  The receipts of the first land sale of Marion County land in 
1821 show that of the 28 surnames with multiple given names listed in the land record, 
22 settled within one mile of each other.95  David Stoops of Franklin County, Indiana, 
purchased 160 acres of land in Wayne Township in November of 1822.  Robert and John 
Stoops each purchased 80 acres two miles from David.  In October 1824, William 
Stoops, also of Franklin County, bought 80 acres adjacent to David.  Even speculators 
bought land near each other during the earliest years, presumably to allow one to prevent 
squatters from settling.  Brothers Noah and Levi Wright of Washington County, Indiana, 
purchased a total of nearly 1,400 acres of land near each other in south central Marion 
County in November of 1822.  While Levi remained in Washington County throughout 
his life, Noah moved to Marion County during the 1830s. 
                                                 
93 Edward Leary, Indianapolis: The Story of a City (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company), 7-8; William 
Holloway, Indianapolis: A Historical and Statistical Sketch of the Railroad City (Indianapolis: Indiana 
Journal Print, 1870), 8.   
94 Donald Carmony, Indiana, 1816-1850: The Frontier Period (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 
1998), 558.   
95 This was compiled from Jane Darlington’s Indiana Records Miscellanea which listed the original location 
of land purchasers and referenced in reproduced land plat maps in Maps of Indiana Counties in 1876. Jane 
Darlington, Indiana Records Miscellanea (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1968).   
50 
 
 
Another example shows the community-oriented chain migration nature of 
settlement.  Land receipts show that immigration patterns maintained connections from 
previous regions.  Residents from Monroe, Indiana—100 miles to the Northwest of 
Indianapolis on the Wabash River—settled in the southwest corner of the county.  On 
July 20, 1821, James Culley bought 160 acres in Perry Township.  The same day, Elijah 
Elliot bought a similar plot nearby in Decatur Township.  Two days before them, Samuel 
Dodds acquired 240 acres also in Decatur.  On July 23, 1821, John Cutler purchased 
nearby land just inside the boundary of Centre Township.  The next year, Jasper Coons 
obtained 80 acres adjacent to Dodds.  All of these plots are only a few miles from apart, 
and most were purchased within days of each other, suggesting that these settlers were 
planning on living near one another before they got to the land office. When Jasper 
Coons bought land the following year, he likely received a tip from a former resident of 
Monroe.96   
Similarly, Reuben and John Houghton of Fayette County, Kentucky, each bought 
240 acres next to each other in Wayne Township on November 22, 1822.  On October 4, 
1822, Hans Murdough also of Fayette County bought a plot in the adjacent section to the 
north.  On June 20, 1825, Aaron Masterson joined the Houghtons by buying a plot less 
than a mile away from his former neighbors.  On July 21, 1821, Armstrong Brandon of 
Harrison, Indiana, just across the river from Louisville, bought 80 acres of land in Centre 
Township.  He was accompanied by James Bell and James Pell, also from Harrison, who 
bought plots in adjoining corners of the same section of land.97  On December 31, 1821, 
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John Stevens joined his former neighbors, buying 66.15 acres near Brandon and later 
enlarged his holdings on February 25, 1822, by purchasing 73.20 more acres in the same 
area.98  Clearly, in Marion County as in many other frontier regions, relationships 
determined settlement patterns.   
The final pattern of settlement during the early period of Marion County occurred 
through complete family settlement but was rarer than the community or family chain 
migration patterns.  Calvin Fletcher, the prominent lawyer, moved to Indianapolis on 
October 1, 1821.  It was not his first trip to the new capital as he made a brief trip to 
survey lots in July, but he permanently moved to the city without prior investment.  He 
obtained a “small house to go into” in which he lived for a year while he built a new 
home for his family.99  For Marion County, the varied settlement patterns show that 
settlers were following the same emigration patterns seen in other parts of the United 
States and suggests that the people coming to the region were carrying the same cultural 
patterns as the rest of the nation.  They were not a group of like-minded people of 
conservative Germans, capitalist Yankees or individualist southerners.  These settlers 
represent a cross-section of American society and suggest that the changes that occurred 
over the years were not caused by any imported regional cultural factors.  Hoosiers as 
early as 1823 showed a diverse cultural background when Nicholas McCarty, a coastal 
Virginian, joined Calvin Fletcher, a former Vermonter, in leading city affairs.  In 
addition, the arrival of Whitewater and Kentucky factions on opposite sides of the slavery 
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debate further distorted the cultural homogeneity of the area.  As Indianapolis historians 
David Bodenhamer and Robert Barrows have noted that “from the very beginning, 
Indianapolis clearly had a diverse population.”100  As one author notes, the environment 
presented a “land of challenges and opportunities” to early settlers of Marion County.101  
The demographics of settlement in Marion County are significant because it suggests that 
what happened in central Indiana happened all along the Early West as the spread of 
settlement moved away from rivers.  Marion County was certainly landlocked during its 
early development, but the developmental pattern caused by specific environmental 
barriers allow for an analysis of what a broad cross-section of Americans decided to do 
when confronted with transportation difficulties.   
Settlers moved to Marion County because the region gave settlers the opportunity 
to obtain good agricultural land at a relatively cheap price.  Northeastern areas were less 
feasible to family units because the higher population density and declining land fertility 
eliminated the option of splitting farms amongst children.102  In central Indiana, potential 
emigrants could obtain land at the government price of $1.25 per acre at a minimum of 
80 acres, but the price barrier certainly prevented some from obtaining land directly from 
the government land offices, even after the price was lowered in 1820.  Speculators have 
been blamed for the lack of cheap land in the West by prominent historians.103  Paul 
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Gates stated that “In Indiana the dead hand of the speculator created many problems 
which were to stunt the growth and waste the resources of some sections of the state.”104  
However, new scholarship is challenging the stereotype of speculator greed.  In Indiana, 
as Richard Nation argues, many families were not able to foot the bill for expensive 
initial investments, as such, “the role of speculators cannot be dismissed.” In fact, 
“speculative activity was not always a hindrance to settlement.  Speculators sought profit, 
of course, but they were often willing to grant credit, before 1820 on more liberal terms 
than the government and after 1820 as the sole source” when purchasing land.105  In 
Marion County, speculators like George Smith provided these benefits to Hoosiers.  His 
advertisement in The Farmer proclaimed that he had “ten lots in good situations in 
Indianapolis, which I will sell low for cash in and or on a credit of from nine to eighteen 
months.”106  Ultimately, the central Indiana frontier provided opportunity to both those 
with and without money.  Smith was able to exploit the disconnect between government 
land sale policy that all funds be paid up front, while poorer settlers were able to get 
access to land that they wanted.  This disconnect could only happen in a place where 
established markers of a modern capitalist society were absent.  In the Northeast, 
speculators had a far more difficult time profiting because land values were more stable, 
which decreased potential profit margins, and families were less willing to sell land 
because of the cultural and social capital of farmers in early American society.107   
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After obtaining land, families quickly turned to the business of creating and 
running a farm in the relatively unbroken forest.  The prior ties used when emigrating 
were important for surviving the first few years of settlement on the disconnected frontier 
in Marion County.  Much like embryonic farming communities in other parts of the 
United States, community connections could be the difference between success and 
failure during the early years of settlement.  In Marion County, house raisings, apple 
parings, quiltings and other similar work-oriented social gatherings were necessary for 
the construction of a functional farmstead.  Far from the independent pioneers who pulled 
themselves up by their bootstraps, most settlers in Marion County and the rest of the 
American frontier had significant amounts of help establishing their farms.  One telling 
communal function was the annual “log rolling” that was relatively specific to Marion 
County as a functionally land-locked region.  The dense forest was a deterrent to decent 
European farming during the 1820s, and Hoosiers spent the first few years of settlement 
clearing land to grow their crops.108  Stephen Visher stated that “many a man bragged of 
how many acres of land he had cleared by cutting and burning the timber, thinking not at 
all of the wastefulness of the destruction.  Trees seemed to be so abundant that little value 
was attached to them…However, if fields were to be obtained in Indiana, the timber had 
to be cleared, and since there was no market for it, to burn it was logical.”  Oliver 
Johnson noted that, when recalling log-rollings, “sometimes I think those rollins was 
more for a general neighborhood get-together of talkin, banterin, eatin, and maybe a little 
whisky drinkin throwed in, than it was for jist rollin logs.”109  As Johnson’s reminiscence 
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suggests, for Marion County settlers during the first few years of the 1820s, building a 
stable community network was at least as important as constructing homes and barns. 
Reciprocation and future need demanded that communities self-police and maintain 
social order, and characterize a major feature of a “pre-capitalist” society.   
Public activities were not unique to central Indiana.  They did, however, take on a 
special role in Marion County because they fostered community connections and served 
as a way to create community.  John Mack Faragher has noted that “freeholds in Sugar 
Creek were linked through a reciprocal network.  The cabin raising inducted newcomers 
into the neighborhood system by creating a web of common obligations.”110  For settlers 
of Marion County, the earliest bees and raisings were more important than any in a long-
settled region because they helped foster the community connections that would make 
living on the frontier possible.  Communities could not welcome people into Marion 
County in the same fashion that they could in Sugar Creek, Illinois, simply because no 
community was established.  Community-oriented work was the first in which farmers 
could meet, greet and commune with each other to foster the kind of society necessary to 
succeed on the frontier.  When George Pogue arrived, he built his lean-to and waited to 
build a larger dwelling until other farmers arrived.  The early residents of Marion County 
population clusters, rather than immediately going into social debt to the surrounding 
community, gave credit to the community and trusted that they would get a return on 
their investment.   
The need to create stable community networks emerged because Marion County 
existed on the outermost fringes of a Euro-American society during the 1820s.  The 
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region lacked the capital and pool of available wage-labor for residents to depend on 
anything other than community ties.  Money could buy the limited goods available in 
stores in Marion County, but labor was more expensive than anyone could afford.  While 
eastern cities like Boston, New York or Philadelphia were quickly evolving into wage-
labor systems and using capital investment to increase monetary wealth, the availability 
of land in Marion County created a different socio-economic landscape.  Land allowed 
settlers to acquire their own access to food and goods, prevented the rise of a wage-labor 
system and allowed workers to maintain their access to the tools of production long into 
the nineteenth century in central Indiana.  When compared to eastern cities, 
advertisements from Marion County clearly show that a lively barter economy held a 
strong presence in the Early West longer than it did in the East.  They show that as the 
East Coast was drawing into the Atlantic World economic system, Indianapolis had not 
yet experienced the transformations—specifically the ubiquity of cash-for-commodity 
exchange—caused by the transition to wage-labor fostered by modern capitalism 
occurring on the East coast.   
In eastern cities like New York, the age of barter was coming to an end during the 
first decades of the nineteenth century.  As late as the 1810s, residents could build 
accounts based on barter in turkeys or gold watches.  By 1825, however, the changes 
related to industrialization, transportation improvement and capital accumulation—most 
important, wage labor systems—were replacing the older, established artisan system of 
production with a wage labor system that promoted cash-based systems of exchange.111  
In Indiana, advertisements clearly demonstrate that economic interactions were rarely 
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cash-based by 1825.  Although some advertisements publicized “six cents a pound in 
specie” for fresh ginseng or that purchased wood “will be paid for by the day,” most 
promoted barter.112  When Harvey Gregg posted his personal advertisement noting the 
sale of household goods, he stipulated that “[h]e would exchange all or part of [them] for 
horses, and allow a good price.”113  Robert Morrison, a Richmond, Indiana, merchant 
dealing in dry goods, announced that he “keeps a supply of the best quality Bolting 
Cloth…He also has on hand, a large quantity of Soal and Upper Leather, which he will 
exchange for good horses.”114  Non-cash exchange was not limited to horse trading.  In 
1827, James Givan placed an advertisement noting the sale of peach trees for three cents 
each, payable in “Cash, Country Produce or Labour.”115  Another ad entitled “Corn! 
Corn!” stated that the “undersigned wish to purchase corn, for which they will give in 
exchange Merchandise, Saddlery or Tayloring…They will also give goods, &c.. for any 
quantity of small white beans.”116  Residents could also trade goods for a newspaper 
subscription.  Editors of the Indiana State Gazette stated that “corn will be received for 
debts due at this office” and that “[produce will be received in payment “for subscription] 
if delivered at the office.”117  Indiana’s economy was not developed enough to rely on 
such non-utilitarian abstractions such as monetary worth.  Cash was not the best form of 
currency because, in a pinch, you could not eat it.  Farmers were happy to pay in corn 
because they had it on hand, and merchants were happy to accept it because it lowered 
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their families’ risk if a shipment of goods was late or a drought increased the demand for 
corn and put them at a market disadvantage.  Thus, when local tailor John Masey noted 
that he would perform tailoring services “on terms as reasonable as the state of the times 
will admit,” he was proclaiming his right to potentially refuse cash or to request payment 
in goods in case of a financial hardship.118   
Frontier societies like the one in Marion County needed barter exchange because 
of the low population and style of relationships.  Farm work in the early nineteenth 
century is often romanticized as a period when neighbors looked after each other and 
would accept payment when their debtors could afford it.  However, Christopher Clark 
has noted other reasons for the seemingly imbalanced trade that rural people often 
participated in.  He states that “local exchange created networks of obligation alongside 
those already created by kinship or neighborhood.”119  But whereas residents of western 
Massachusetts “tried to harmonize local exchange with the fluctuating rhythms of distant 
markets” beginning in the 1820s, Hoosiers in Central Indiana had no hopes of meeting 
distant markets in the earliest days of settlement.120  The lack of transportation networks 
kept the non-cash economy at full-strength during a period of transformation in the 
Northeastern United States that would not reach a tipping point in Indianapolis until the 
mid-nineteenth century.   
At the same time, banking during the first decade of the state’s existence was 
under heavy duress.  The limited economy and population of the state made it difficult for 
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banks to acquire the legally necessary $30,000 in specie required to open its doors.  
Various unchartered banks existed in the state during the early years of settlement, but 
they were expressly put out of business in the 1816 Constitution.  Even after the State 
Bank of Indiana was founded in March of 1817, the institution was located at the 
territorial capital at Vincennes, roughly 150 miles from the new Hoosier capital.  That the 
State Bank was housed in Vincennes meant that Marion County residents would have to 
go without access to specie.  They could accept bank notes, but the long trip to the State 
Bank made barter a much more feasible option for exchange during the early years of 
settlement.121  The Hoosier capital was on the frontier of the American commercial 
system as well the banking system in its own state.   
The earliest history of Marion County is demonstrative of the experiences of 
many frontier regions.  American families struggled to build homes and farms far 
removed from markets and skilled laborers.  They established communities based on 
family and regional migration patterns that were repeated throughout the Midwest.  They 
worked to improve the output of their home production so they could have a better 
quality of life, and they wanted to improve their economic situation by exporting any 
available surplus to distant markets.  Ultimately, as Hoosiers moved back in time relative 
to the long-settled East Coast, they sought to rebuild the structures of society that they 
left in their original homes.  They relinquished some of the gains made by industrial 
society in the hopes that they could increase their families’ economic outlook. 
Marion County, however, is also unique because it was one of the first times that 
settlement in the West occurred away from navigable river traffic.  In 1825, the region 
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was as secluded as any other area east of the Mississippi River because of a shallow river 
and technologically limited transportation technology.  When politicians decided to move 
the Hoosier capital to central Indiana, they overestimated the viability of river transport.  
The result was a region that had a different settlement pattern than cities such as 
Cincinnati, Louisville or St. Louis.  Instead of having the transportation benefits of the 
well-watered Midwest, they were forced to elongate the period of economic seclusion 
typified by life on the frontier.  Residents were forced to maintain composite farms and 
rely on the barter system.   
Hoosiers did not simply give up in their quest for economic success.  The 
significance of Hoosier seclusion in 1825 provides a useful starting point for examining 
the mindset of Early West Americans when confronted with environmental barriers.  By 
every measure, Marion County was the definition of what Timothy R. Mahoney called an 
“isolated outpost.”122  However, instead of caving, these Hoosiers applied the tools they 
knew to achieve their goals.  While they struggled during the earliest years of settlement, 
they maintained a vision of success that would shape the history of the region and the 
state.   
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CHAPTER 3: “SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR GROWTH: 
ESTABLISHING A LOCAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, 1828-1833” 
In December 1827, Indiana Governor James B. Ray addressed his constituents in 
his annual Governor’s Message about the prospects of improving the state.  Although he 
discussed myriad issues including education, social regulation, and the moral superiority 
of farmers, he focused most of his remarks on the issue of internal improvements.  
Building off the perceived connection between rural life and republican virtue, Ray 
proposed methods to improve the transportation networks of the young state.  He wanted 
to support “those whose whole industry is identified with their country’s [soil].”123  He 
asserted that previous state legislatures “have been engaged in theoretical disquisitions 
into the expediency of making considerable commercial improvements in the interior of 
the state; but not having the means within their grasp…no decisive step has been yet 
taken.”124  Ray, however, suggested to his listeners that the time was upon them to use 
the power of the government to improve the state’s infrastructure and economy.  He 
argued that the land grants provided by the federal government to establish roads in the 
state presented an opportunity to turn a theoretical discussion of internal improvements 
into a practical one, thus initiating one of the most significant discourses in Indiana—and 
national—history.   
Historians have noted the debates over tariffs, abolition, temperance, republican 
virtue and other issues revolving around the economic transformations of the United 
States in the early nineteenth century.125  The massive economic changes of the period 
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compounded with issues of western expansion to create one of the most tumultuous 
periods in American history.  The most significant debate in early America centered on 
national investment for internal improvements.  American regions fractured over the 
question of whether the national government should involve itself in what many people 
viewed as state issues.  Coastal residents of Massachusetts and Virginia—relatively 
developed areas—bristled at the thought of higher taxes to pay for road building projects 
in western states like Indiana, Kentucky or Tennessee.  Developed areas were loath to 
raise taxes on themselves to pay for improvements in hinterlands.126  National debates 
were echoed on the state level.  In Indiana, developed regions like Vincennes, 
Lawrenceburg and Jeffersonville—all near major rivers—were wary of taking on large 
internal projects because they would benefit less directly from improved market-access 
for interior farmlands.127  Unsurprisingly, the pro-internal improvement faction emerged 
victorious in Indiana.  The increasing number of people who lived away from easily 
accessible water transportation forced politicians to side with the farmers who supported 
internal improvements.  As late as 1850, ninety-five percent of the population of the state 
lived on farms.128  Like most westerners in the early nineteenth century, Hoosiers were 
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focused on improving the effectiveness of their overall commercial networks.  They 
envisioned their farms as outlets for republican virtue and economic success.129   
As an ever-increasing number of Hoosiers trickled north away from the Ohio 
River and its tributaries, the political power of the river valley cities waned and 
politicians adapted their rhetoric to capture the new constituency.  As such, Governor 
Ray’s 1827 message represented a common theme during this period.  In the new vision 
of the state, Hoosier farmers would feed into the growth of industrial cities in the 
Northeast and abroad.  Cathy Matson notes that scholars who have studied republicanism 
have found a wealth of sources when examining debates over internal improvements, but 
in Marion County, hardly any debates on whether or not to conduct internal 
improvements existed at all.130  By the 1820s, Hoosiers did not debate the merits of 
internal improvements or whether the desire to connect to the market threatened the 
legacy of the founding fathers.  Instead, the discussions of internal improvements focused 
on what to build and how to pay for improvements.  As such, the story of Indianapolis, by 
1820, suggests that people emigrating to the West were looking for opportunity rather 
than seclusion.  Like people in other parts of the nation, Hoosiers altered the vision of 
republicanism to fit their objective of providing a competence to their family through 
commercial achievement.131  They did not worry about the same questions of 
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republicanism as those who remained in the East, who worried about the burgeoning 
class stratifications caused by wage labor.132  The availability of land did not strain social 
relationships between large and small landholders in the Early West.  This absence of 
tension allowed a vast majority of Marion County residents to work in lockstep toward 
integrating into markets as quickly as possible during the first decades of settlement.   
The previous chapter argues that Central Indiana pioneers were forced to adopt 
non-specialized economic strategies like those seen in Northeastern communities in the 
18th century.  The combined challenges of limited transportation technology and 
environmental realities prevented Hoosiers from recreating their previously established 
economic routines.  The setting was similar to the rest of the eastern woodlands, but 
developed in a different economic style than regions with better access to water 
transportation.133  As many other historical works show, however, Americans have 
altered the natural world to fit their aspirations and needs.  In the case of Central Indiana, 
Hoosiers quickly moved to alter the landscape to fit their visions of economic success.  
Hoosier efforts to quickly connect to outside markets is a significant marker of intent that 
sheds light on a large historiographical debate regarding the transition to capitalism.   
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 To date, the analysis put forward by Clark stands relatively unassailed by rural 
historians, especially in the Early West.  While this is a testament to earlier work, it has 
hampered further research.  While prominent historians like Christopher Clark offered 
new perspectives on the transition to a modern market economy, his analysis focuses on a 
region that was settled long before the stirrings of the so-called Market Revolution 
occurred.  The Northeastern part of the United States had a significantly different 
settlement pattern than that of the Old Northwest.  Settlers moved into western 
Massachusetts long before the transition to capitalism emerged.  The long-standing ties 
created during the pre-transition era provided Americans in the Northeast with a 
community safety net that alleviated some tensions and exacerbated others.  Churches, 
the entrenchment of generations-deep kin networks, and strong community bonds created 
relatively stable social security networks when economic times got tough.  Marion 
County, however, shows a significantly different perspective.  These networks were 
absent on the early western frontier simply because social institutions did not have time 
to emerge before the transition to capitalism emerged in the 1820s.  Whereas Christopher 
Clark examines evolving social relationships during the transition to capitalism, this 
dissertation seeks to enlighten the establishment of those relationships on the frontier 
during that same transition.  It examines the strategies used by residents in the Early West 
as they carved out lives for themselves and compares them to those in other parts of the 
nation to understand the spread of capitalism.  In order to understand the values and 
mindsets of ordinary Americans, historians must get away from the East and examine the 
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ways that western communities reacted to the changes associated with the transition to 
capitalism.134   
 This chapter argues that by the 1820s, Marion County residents were firmly 
pushing to connect to markets and argues that perceptions of market orientation in the 
American psyche were established by 1820.  These Hoosiers immediately sought to 
implement strong local government structures and to establish roads that would allow 
them to sell their agricultural goods to markets outside central Indiana.  The construction 
of these networks would allow residents to obtain higher prices.  While some Americans 
sought to remain secluded from markets—the Owenites being the most famous example 
in Indiana—the prevailing spirit of the age suggests that most Americans in the West 
thought they were better served by market connection than by seclusion.  Whether they 
believed they could alter the market to fit their culture or simply ignored the possibility 
that economic integration could force change upon them, Hoosiers were solidly in favor 
of establishing stronger market connections.  Ultimately, the actions of Hoosiers during 
this period show that American westerners were firmly looking to invest in infrastructure 
to achieve future economic gain.  That they strove so vociferously to join capitalist 
markets by the 1820s allows historians to speculate when a major aspect of the “capitalist 
mentality” became a central part of American society in the Early West.   
The chapter begins by examining the early attempts Hoosiers took to establish 
contact with the rest of the American economy.  Hoosiers had an extremely bullish view 
of their new homes during the first years of settlement.  With little hesitation, they built 
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roads and attempted to improve their market advantages in the increasingly 
interconnected, industrializing American nation.  Most importantly, Hoosiers did not 
experience conflicts over market connection in the way that other historians have stated.  
Unlike previous arguments—overwhelmingly focused on the northeast—that suggest 
some Americans were resistant to the arrival of the market, Marion County shows that 
people looked to quickly jump into regional, national and international market economies 
even as they heard about the rising problems of urbanization from eastern newspapers 
and reform organizations.135  Hoosiers believed that they would escape the failings of 
modernization occurring in eastern cities because of their reliance on the republican 
virtue bestowed on farmers.  For residents of central Indiana, the debate over internal 
improvements was one of debt.  They debated how they would pay for the widely-
accepted improvements.   
 In Marion County, the secluded environment led to strong support for internal 
improvements from all groups.  Reflecting the changing dynamics of state settlement 
patterns annual messages from Governor Ray promoted internal improvement programs 
throughout the state and in Marion County specifically.136  As early as 1825, the Indiana 
Journal summarized his promotion of internal improvements.  The editor noted that the 
Governor pushed to remove obstructions from the White River which would “afford, at 
certain seasons, a safe passage for boats, and thus would be opened a channel for the 
exportation of the produce of an extensive body of country.”137  In his 1829 address, Ray 
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continued to note the value of improvements on the White River.  He stated that “no 
doubt is entertained that steamboats may traverse the White River if well improved…and 
that the seat of government, will ere long be visited by these messengers of Fulton’s 
genius.”138  For Ray and other local leaders, connecting the new state capital would allow 
residents to exercise the full potential of their individual labors through steamboat travel 
up and down the only water channel in the region.   
Regional politics certainly were an issue at the state-level, and were made clear 
during the 1824 presidential election.  Hoosiers in the southern third of the state were 
ambivalent toward internal improvements.  Dearborn County, on the border of Ohio near 
Cincinnati, voted overwhelmingly to support Andrew Jackson and his stance against a 
national debt.  Henry Clay, the perennial champion of internal improvements, was a 
distant third with less than ten percent of the vote.  Marion County, by contrast, gave 
nearly two-thirds of its support to Clay while Jackson and Adams came in second and 
third respectively.  The 1828 election seemed to reflect this trend as well.  Dearborn 
County continued its support for Jackson, albeit with a much smaller margin of victory.  
Marion County turned its allegiance to Adams in large part due to Jackson’s noticeable 
lack of support for internal improvements.  They gave over sixty percent of their support 
to the incumbent.139  Calvin Fletcher described his personal feelings regarding the 
election in a letter to his brother Elijah. “As long as I regard the interest and welfare of 
my country…I cannot support any man for president who goes heart and with the friends 
of General Jackson; for no state in the union is more deeply interested in the success of 
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the leading measures of the present administration than Indiana.”  He continued by noting 
that “two of the electors on the Jackson ticket at our last presidential election and one of 
our electors [in the 1828 election] have wrote to him of late, demanding an unequivocal 
answer as to his sentiments in relation to the present system of internal improvements and 
informing him that on his answer being unfavorable thereto they cannot give him their 
support.”140 
Those sentiments were echoed by local newspaper editors who reported favorably 
on internal improvements in central Indiana.  The Indiana Journal had the “pleasure of 
announcing to our readers the passage of the bill by Congress which authorizes the 
continuation of a National Road, that which empowers this state to construct the road 
from Lake Michigan to the Ohio River.”141  Another insightfully argued that the policy of 
the state should be “not only to sustain the East, who have capital, in the establishment 
and encouragement of domestic manufactures for the sake of obtaining a market to go to, 
but to encourage a general system of internal improvements for the purpose of obtaining 
a conveyance for our property to that market.”142  The author believed that supporting a 
system of manufactures and internal improvements would build a natural advantage for 
the entire nation.  Easterners could construct industrial networks to escape the 
monopolistic clutch of England while westerners could focus on providing food surplus 
to those industrial centers.  Finally, the article noted that “it is only by this means that the 
Western can ever expect to be put upon a level with Atlantic and Southern states.”143 
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These feelings were prevalent in Hoosier papers during the early years of settlement and 
show that residents, far from distrusting internal improvement, were staunchly in favor of 
them.  Internal improvements were the tool that early westerners would use to launch 
themselves into the national economy.   
While some Hoosiers wanted to bolster the economy by solidifying national 
transportations systems, other internal improvements aimed to diversify the local 
economy of Marion County.  The Journal argued “the time must soon come, when the 
exertions of only a small part of our number will be required for building houses.  Then 
unless other employments are sought out, the industry and economy of the present and 
past will be succeeded by idleness, poverty and vice.” For the author, the city of 
Indianapolis and the surrounding community would suffer from lack of work unless they 
diversified the economy to include jobs less reliant on the booming housing market.  The 
author continued by arguing that “at least $10,000 annually has been paid by citizens of 
Indianapolis for [goods] imported from abroad.”  He ultimately concluded that they must 
improve the local economy by adopting new technology, noting that “we can hardly 
expect in the present age of improvement to be able to compete with others without the 
aid of steam.”144  The writer was aware that only the use of steam power could create the 
kinds of mills and factories that were necessary to provide stable employment to the 
population and begin the exporting goods from the city instead of relying on imports.   
Newspapers also discussed the advantages of internal improvements in other parts 
of the nation and described how similar investments could improve the local economy.  
An 1827 article in the Indiana Journal described the formation of a Baltimore company 
                                                 
144 Indiana Journal, Nov. 20, 1827.   
71 
 
 
“chartered by the Maryland Legislature, for the purpose of making a Rail road from the 
Chesapeake to the Ohio…When completed, it will not be of less advantage to the 
Western country than the Ohio and New York canals.”145  Another article published two 
weeks later discussed the benefits of rails over canals, stating that railroads would save 
seven million dollars in construction costs as well as time and money on each trip.  The 
author’s excitement over the possibility of saving so much money and time was evident 
when he exclaimed that the rail will “mightily tend to increase the transportation of the 
commodities of every description from one part of the United States to another…Thus 
will scientific power conquer space, and even the Alleghenies sink, as it were, beneath 
the pressure of unconquered steam, may the laws of gravitation give way before the 
march of mind!”146  Clearly, the editor of the Journal was a proponent of railroads and, 
even though he may have overstated reality, he certainly reflected the enthusiasm 
Hoosiers held for transportation network improvements.  Significantly, the enthusiasm 
for internal improvements was not limited to the Indiana Journal.  The Indiana State 
Gazette—a reliably Jacksonian paper—proclaimed in a positive manner that “the 
Chesapeake and Delaware Canal was opened on Saturday the 17th October, amidst the 
greatest demonstration of joy from an almost innumerable multitude assembled on the 
occasion.”147  That both Whig and Democratic newspaper editors reported favorably on 
the installation of projects in the East suggests that both groups were inclined toward 
promoting internal improvements and that political debate in the region focused on 
different issues.   
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The records of the Marion County Commissioners also show that there was very 
little conflict over internal improvements in the region.  As shown in chapter one, the 
geographical limitations of Central Indiana prevented Hoosiers from easily connecting to 
markets.  However, residents of Marion County immediately sought to remedy the 
situation by promoting internal improvements in the state that would connect them to 
cities on the Ohio River and, thus, the wider economic world.  These actions suggest a 
different story than older narratives posed by historians of the West during the transition 
to capitalism. John Mack Faragher’s Sugar Creek has been the standard interpretation of 
the transition to capitalism in the Old Northwest region because of its incredibly detailed 
reconstruction of a frontier community that struggled with transportation issues and the 
tensions of an ever-encroaching market economy.  For Faragher, however, transportation 
improvements postdated economic incentives for economic exchange.  While residents 
only sought twelve road permits before 1846, he notes that “from 1846 to 1860 Sugar 
Creek men filed sixty-one petitions for the relocation and improvement of old roads and 
for the laying out of new ones.”  The filers of these petitions were, moreover, 
increasingly landowners and landlords.  They began petitioning for roads after the 
transition to capitalism fostered landlord-tenant sharecropping relationships between 
community members.148   
For Faragher, the Panic of 1837 was a significant event in the development of 
transportation infrastructure.  The families who were able to weather the economic storm 
during the late-1830s were able to purchase land at low rates and then rent to new arrivals 
or those who lost their land.  The sharecropping surplus drew wealthy men to push for 
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roads because they had more crops than they could use to sustain their family.  But they 
would only do so when profits were available.  The Panic depressed crop prices to a point 
where exporting agricultural goods was not a profitable endeavor.  Thus, they sought out 
external markets to dispose of their excess goods only after the rise of crop prices in 
national and international markets during the mid-1840s.   
In contrast, the Marion County Commissioners’ Record shows an immediate and 
sustained push to build roads and establish local transportation networks that would allow 
residents to move goods more efficiently.  The first six years of the Record show fifty-
one petitions for roads in Marion County which dwarfed any other business undertaken 
by the committee.149  In Marion County, settlers planned to immediately market surplus 
crops.  They did not—as in Sugar Creek—wait for the economic conditions to draw them 
into national commerce.  The first meetings of the County Commissioners met in 1822 
and focused on establishing government institutions including a courthouse, tax rates, 
officers, jails and a public well.  However, they quickly turned to road construction.  At 
the May 13, 1822 meeting, the commissioners heard a petition from local farmer 
“William Townsend, signed by a number of resident citizens and free holders of this 
County, praying for a new road to be viewed ‘Beginning at the north end of Pennsylvania 
Street in the Town of Indianapolis, thence the nearest and best way to the Mills at the 
Falls of Fall Creek.’”  The commissioners appointed local farmers Joel Wright, John 
Smock and Zadock Smith to view the road and comment on its potential effectiveness.150  
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At the next session in August, Wright, Smock and Smith stated that the road would serve 
the public interest and it was approved as a public thoroughfare.  
This simple government business was a major aspect of development in Marion 
County during the first years of settlement.  Establishing a basic road system allowed 
Hoosiers easier access to various local necessities including mills, brickyards and 
tanneries and was crucial for accomplishing the goal of being the economic hub of the 
Old Northwest.  When Isaac Pugh, James Miller and Martin Martindale viewed a road 
“running south and crossing Big Eagle Creek a few rods below David McCurdy’s 
[residence], thence as high and good ground as could be found to Little Eagle Creek a 
few rods west of John Fox’s [residence], thence intersecting the Barnhill road a short 
distance above Captain Anderson’s,” they were constructing an economic network that 
allowed their neighbors access to the necessary community structures that would permit 
them to increase their profitability when shipping their goods to mills or downriver.151   
The same goes for Isaac Pugh’s petition for a road from “the South East corner of 
Isaac Pugh’s farm, thence north to the corner of said Pugh’s sugar camp thence west 
through said Pugh’s land till near the line between said Pugh and James Miller, thence 
nearly north to the said Pugh’s northwest corner, thence north west to the north east 
corner of Jerry Johnson’s farm…thence west through Samuel Barnhill’s new wheat field, 
thence N. West to Samuel Barnhill’s saw mill.”152  The language of the petition shows 
the economic focus of these roads.  The road starts at Pugh’s farm, continues past his 
sugar camp, to the Johnson farm, to the Barnhill wheat fields and finally to the lumber 
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camp.  These were not roads connecting farms for the sake of strong personal bonds—
although community building was almost certainly part of route planning.  They were 
designed with efficient agriculture in mind.  Building a road to Barnhill’s mill would 
make it easier for the farming community in the western portion of Marion County to 
obtain lumber for fences, barns and homes without having to struggle through forest land.   
Road building was so popular in Marion County that disagreements over a 
particular road were rare.  Out of the fifty-one petitions from 1822 through 1827, only 
nine were challenged.  Five were rejected by the County Commissioners for various 
reasons including lack of appropriate notice or being deemed “unfit for a road.”153  The 
remaining four contests over road building were remonstrated against by local citizens 
and only one was a serious debate over the placement of a road.  David Pattingale’s 
petition for a road was argued against by James Fivan and Harris Tyner and ordered to be 
viewed anyway in May 1824.  Another remonstrance by Isaac and Jacob Pugh was laid 
over in August 1824.  And in July of 1825, the petition by S.G. Michaels was argued 
against and reviewed for utility.  Through 1827, the vast majority of road petitions that 
were not accepted were done so with public utility in mind.154  Successfully blocking 
construction of local roads shows that Marion County officials did not rubber-stamp 
projects or push them through without thought.  They took a measured examination of 
proposed roads and appointed local residents to view them for the purpose of utility and 
propriety.  The elimination of particular roads shows that Marion County Commissioners 
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looked at individual road projects and believed each to be necessary for county function 
and highlights the community support for the roads that did get built.   
The only major remonstrance came in May 1823 when Robert Brinton, Henry 
Brinton and Peyton Bristow petitioned the County Commissioners to disallow a road 
proposed by John Smock on November 11, 1822.  The remonstrators hired a lawyer to 
prevent a construction of a road “likely to be useless furthersome to the Township.”155  It 
is not stated why the remonstrators did not want the road, which would have passed 
through their land.  Perhaps they did not want to pay taxes for it or, more likely, they did 
not want a public road cutting through their acreages.  In May 1824, the commissioners 
read a report that attested that “the road will be of public utility” and established it as a 
thoroughfare.  The original remonstrators were charged $7.75 in fees for the extra costs 
of viewing the road.  In November of 1824, Robert Brinton applied to have the road 
vacated, which was ultimately rejected by the Commissioners.156  Overall, the Marion 
County Commissioners’ Record paints a different picture of development in the West 
than the one described in Sugar Creek and suggests that, by 1820, Americans had market 
orientation in mind.   
The establishment of roads was very important for Marion County as an economic 
unit.  It also served as a way for early local residents to make extra money.  Farmers were 
paid to view and lay out roads, which helped them acquire cash to pay down debts or 
acquire goods in the earliest days of settlement when access to markets was very limited.  
Like the northeastern farmers discussed by Daniel Vickers, midwestern farmers also 
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looked for other ways to obtain cash and maximize income during their free time.  In 
Marion County, farmers were required to participate in road construction and 
maintenance for two days annually.  They were also paid seventy-five cents for each 
additional day worked on county projects.  These were paid out of the county treasury 
and surely helped pay for store-bought necessities in a society where cash was a 
relatively scarce material.157   
Farmers were willing to use the government as a source of income because there 
was an absence of cash in Marion County.  Jacob Piatt Dunn states that “There was 
comparatively little money in circulation, and what there was of specie was silver…There 
were no banks of any kind until the internal improvement period opened, and people who 
had money carried it when necessary and stowed it away about their houses when not in 
active demand.”158  Nicholas McCarty’s account books shows that there were few ways 
to get paid in the early days of settlement.  In the mid-1820s, he made trips to 
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Cincinnati to acquire goods to sell at his shop on 
Washington Street.  Even when McCarty did get goods back to Marion County, he was 
forced to barter because of the absence of specie.  His account book shows that in 1825, 
central Indiana lacked the available specie that would allow cash-oriented trade.  
Zachariah Glover paid his twenty-two dollar debt to McCarty with three barrels of 
whiskey.  And in November of 1825, he credited Samuel Stevens with thirty dollars in 
exchange for eight barrels of flour.159  As noted by various historians, cash was absent 
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from the capital in a way that prevented the rise of a developed economic 
infrastructure.160   
The absence of specie forced Hoosier merchants like McCarty to function on a 
limited basis when dealing with long-distance trade.  Timothy Mahoney notes that the 
limited access to outside markets and the inability to establish credit markets was a 
feature of frontier society.  Indianapolis, and Marion County as a whole, were subjected 
to this type of economic seclusion due to a lack of specie.  In the Old Northwest, the 
relatively new communities did not have surplus specie to establish these types of credit 
networks.  This basic reality is the most significant evidence of central Indiana’s location 
on the economic frontier.  Much like Timothy Mahoney suggests, Indianapolis was not 
able to produce its own goods.  Merchandise needed to be imported from abroad and then 
distributed to the community.  It was in the initial stage of development as an isolated 
outpost that existed on the far reaches of eastern economies.161   
The only mitigating factor to this development was the presence of the state 
government, which allowed local residents to acquire much needed specie by undertaking 
road construction projects.  This is a significant factor separating Marion County 
development from economic maturation in parts of the Northeast, where established 
communities could evolve with changing economic times and merchants could use their 
profits to start lending institutions.  Winifred Rothenberg’s excellent analysis of the 
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emergence of credit markets notes that there was enough available money in circulation 
that residents could invest in securities by the 1780s.162  In Marion County, private 
members of the community often lacked the ability to acquire specie.  The government 
provided the steadiest opportunity to receive cash payments for labor during a period 
where most merchants still functioned on some level of goods-based trade.     
Locals urged the Marion County Commissioners to open new roads because they 
could get their crops to market more easily and earn extra cash on the side, but they were 
not alone in their calls for increased transportation networks.  Newspapers explained to 
readers how internal improvements would assist in the development of the region.  The 
Indiana Journal argued for the symbiotic relationship between the East and West by 
stating that it should become “our policy not only to sustain the East, who have capital, in 
the establishment of and encouragement of domestic manufactures for the sake of 
obtaining a market to go to, but to encourage a general system of internal improvements 
for the purpose of conveyance for our property to that market when it shall be procured.  
The eastern people are disposed to render us every aid in their power to accomplish this 
most desirable object.”163  The author recognized that sending domestic goods to the East 
Coast was the best way to improve the local economy and that a system of internal 
improvements would increase the opportunity to do so.  He continued his promotion of 
improved transportation networks by warning that “it is only by this means that the 
Western can ever expect to be put upon a level with Atlantic and Southern states” and 
noting that “hence our interests are identified, and…it is our duty to unite in sustaining 
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this desirable system of policy.”164  Another article promoted the value of an expeditious 
passage of the Michigan Road, designed to go from Lake Michigan through Indianapolis 
to the Ohio River.  It stated that “it is of primary importance to the State of Indiana, that 
the late Treaty made with the Miami and Potawatomie nation of Indiana, should be 
ratified…and particularly that article in the said Treaty, by a grant of land is made to the 
United States [to build the Michigan Road] because it will tend greatly to promote the 
national interest, and the commercial prospects of Indiana.”165  The Indiana State Gazette 
also noted how internal improvements were a boon to the local region.  It noted that “the 
work now progressing on the National Road, and the prospect of something actual being 
done with regard to the road from Lake Michigan, at the ensuing session of the 
Legislature, has inspired a new confidence in the people, and they go forward, in 
improving the country, with a more lively zeal than heretofore.”166  A final article entitled 
“Internal Improvements” from April, 1827, used imagery from ancient Roman society to 
argue that by building roads, “the most distant parts of the world are brought 
comparatively near to each other.”167   
The author was trying to clearly explain the advantages of building roads to his 
readers by laying out examples of how roads could improve a region but argued that 
roads should be constructed with care.  “Internal Improvements” states that when 
building roads, residents must be careful to avoid simplistic, straight-line construction.  
“The erroneous idea of a straight aerial line, is not only received as truth by country 
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surveyors and road makers, but has crept into legislative enactments.”168  The author 
urged readers and legislators to consider that level roads be constructed rather than 
destinationally-oriented ones.  “More practical blunders [of straight-line roads instead of 
level-roads] have been committed in this country in this branch of civil engineering than 
in any other…the principle that should be received in preference is, that the road which 
will be travelled in the shortest time, between two places of different elevation; is that 
which approaches nearest to a plane of uniform inclination.”169  He contends that the 
mistakes of straight-line construction of roads without considering environmental barriers 
was on display in an Ohio turnpike from Trenton to Brunswick which “has for twelve 
years enjoyed the unenvied reputation of being the worst turnpike road in the United 
States” because it was constructed on a “straight line upon the ground between two 
points.”170  While the author argued that elevation changes and interposing ridges were 
potential issues when building roads, “the most important is, the nature of the soil, which 
will sometimes call for deviations of a still greater amount from straight line.”171  
Ultimately, while promoting the construction of roads, the Indiana Journal reminded that 
“the convenience of the inhabitants, the position of old established settlements and 
villages, are also points that should never be neglected.”172 
Residents of Marion County were also willing to push for related economic 
investments to their region.  The author of the Indiana Journal article promoting steam 
power got their wish in 1828.  On January 28, Nicholas McCarty, Benjamin Blythe and 
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James B. Ray announced that stock subscriptions would be offered to the public.  
Echoing the sentiments of newspaper editors, the announcement proclaimed that 
investing in the mill would allow residents to succeed economically and that “the large 
sums continually sent from our vicinity may be retained at home and we may become an 
independent and prosperous community.”173  By 1831, the “extensive dimensions” of the 
mill were completed.  The forty-five by fifty foot, four-story mill had “power for 
propelling 2 pairs of stones, two setts of carding machines, and a saw.”174  Mill investors 
hoped that if they built a central station, the members of the community would come to 
use the facilities.  Transportation difficulties created a different outcome.   
The failure of the Indianapolis Steam Mill in 1835 happened, as James Madison 
notes, because “it proved, in fact, to be too big, capable of producing more goods than the 
local market could consume.”175  The residents of the farthest reaches of the county found 
it difficult to travel several miles to Indianapolis to grind grain or saw wood and then haul 
it home, especially before effective roads were established.  While it was useful for 
nearby farmers, the population within the immediate vicinity of the mill was limited, and 
poor transportation systems turned it into a boondoggle for investors.  The population of 
Marion County in 1830 was only 7,192 and was relatively well balanced throughout the 
county.176  As a result, the value of transporting grain from the outer reaches of Lawrence 
or Warren Township to the mill and back home soaked up any potential time or profit 
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gains that the mill attempted to provide.  The outer edges of Marion County were roughly 
ten miles from the mill itself, located on the White River just above the National Road 
Bridge extending from Washington Street.177 This trip would have cost as little as a dollar 
and a half and as high as seven dollars each way.178  Other estimates argue goods were 
$.50 per one hundred pounds for each twenty miles.179  Including the return trip to pick 
up the milled goods could have cost the average farmer up to twenty-eight dollars per 
load each year just to transport goods.   
The value of corn in Marion County also did little to help the prospects of 
Indianapolis Steam Mill.  Calvin Fletcher noted in an 1823 letter to his brother that his 
farm produced about 75 bushels of corn per acre.180  In Marion County, most farm 
purchases were forty or eighty acres during the 1820s and 1830s, suggesting that they 
were single-family affairs.  The first few years of settlement were limited to about ten 
acres as families began the necessary improvements for increasing output.181  Supposing 
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that eight acres were used for corn production, the average farmer produced 600 bushels 
equaling roughly seventeen tons of corn.182  The price of that corn was only ten to twenty 
cents per bushel at the time totaling sixty to one hundred twenty dollars per year.183  If 
residents on the outer edge of the county spent an average of seventy dollars on 
transportation, they faced the very real possibility of losing money by using the 
Indianapolis Steam Mill.184  Thus, local families did not transport their goods to the new 
mill built on the White River.  Instead, they relied on nearby, smaller mills that dotted the 
countryside.  The negative margins and the absence of a navigable river kept families 
from centralizing their economic activity and prevented Hoosier businessmen from 
acquiring the kind of capital necessary to further expand economic activity.   
This sentiment is echoed by Percy Bidwell and James Falconer’s estimates that in 
the nearby Wabash River Valley, “corn could not stand the expense of moving 20 miles, 
even though produced at no cost, and wheat could not be profitably transported by land 
more than 50 or 75 miles.”185  The transportation cost of getting crops to the mill severely 
curtailed any efforts to obtain profits; any effort to ship them to the Ohio River and 
thence to New Orleans would require extremely favorable economic circumstances.  
Thus, it is no surprise that Hoosiers did not immediately specialize in growing corn and 
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wheat and patronize the Indianapolis Steam Mill.  Ultimately, the mill was an ambitious 
attempt by boosters to establish the city as a center of commerce, but the reality of 
transportation economics forced it out of business.   
The construction of the Indianapolis Steam Mill was emblematic of the early 
hopes of city residents who dreamed of establishing an economic dynamo within the first 
decade of settlement.  Rather than hope for seclusion from the market, the vast majority 
of all citizens worked diligently to make the new state capital an inviting economic 
outpost.  From practically uncontested support for road clearing and construction at the 
local level, to wide-spread support for internal improvements candidates in national 
elections, Hoosiers in Central Indiana were adamant that they could build a transportation 
network that would foster economic activity and growth that would make them a center 
of regional economic activity.  Local transportation networks were not able to handle the 
scale of shipping necessary for the mill to become a success, but Hoosiers were adamant 
that their city was destined to become an economic behemoth.  Residents of Marion 
County, overcoming the warning signs that they should proceed with economic 
investment carefully, surged forward into the biggest economic bubble the nation had 
ever seen.   
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CHAPTER 4: “ONE BIG BILL AND A DREAM: THE MAMMOTH INTERNAL 
IMPROVEMENTS ACT IN MARION COUNTY, 1833-1837” 
On January 16, 1836, the Whig-dominated Indiana state legislature passed the 
Mammoth Internal Improvements Act, which Whig governor Noah Noble happily signed 
into law.  The “Big Bill,” as it was fondly called, enacted a system of internal 
improvements in the state that was designed to improve transportation and make Indiana 
a more attractive haven for settlers. Hoosiers were thrilled with the passage of the bill.  
One commenter noted that “On Saturday night Indianapolis was most brilliantly 
illuminated as a manifestation of joy for the passage of the bill.”186  Even the Indiana 
Democrat, which had vociferously opposed taking out loans to complete all projects at 
once, had kind words for the project, stating that “the citizens of Indianapolis consider 
themselves one hundred percent richer than they were but one week since.”  The 
opposition newspaper also noted that they wished that “all party feeling may be 
swallowed up” in favor of supporting the system of internal improvements and promoting 
the interests of the state as a whole.187  Expectations for the bill were high as passage of 
the bill gave rise to sentiments that “we doubt not that population and capital will flow 
into our state…and we believe many of the present generation will live to see Indiana the 
third state in the confederacy.”188  Calvin Fletcher bluntly stated that “10 years will 
multiply our population.  This town will progress from 8 to 12 thousand our state more 
than a million should the improvements progress.”189  Hoosiers in Marion County, as 
they did across the state, had high hopes for the future of their region.  Marion County 
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Commissioners redistributed money toward road projects that would allow access to 
major internal improvements projects and residents in Marion County constructed the 
origins of a time-based system that would allow for more efficiency and overall 
economic success. 
The signing of the Mammoth Internal Improvements Act culminated the most 
intense fight of the first half of the nineteenth century in Indiana.  Hoosiers, recognizing 
the economic power provided by shipping, discussed the need for a transportation 
infrastructure system early in the territorial days of the late eighteenth century.  Even 
before statehood in 1816, Hoosiers schemed to construct a canal system around the falls 
of the Ohio River across from Louisville.190  The 1820s, as shown in earlier chapters, 
further encouraged the expansive system of internal improvements as information about 
the success of the Erie Canal spread across the nation.  By the 1830s, residents were 
encouraged by the development of their state so much so that they ignored obvious 
warning signs like the failure of the Indianapolis Steam Mill that the local economy 
simply could not support explosive growth.  In his 1832 “Governor’s Message,” Noble 
stated that “among the various topics deserving your attention, there are none fraught 
with more important consequences to the future prosperity of the state…than the 
[Wabash and Erie Canal].”191 
The background of the Big Bill is an important part of the story of Marion County 
development.  Before its passage, Hoosiers in Marion County were secluded and without 
real hope of improving the economic outlook of their region.  During the 1830s, however, 
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as the success of the Erie Canal became evident, a great excitement overtook the nation 
and central Indiana was no exception.  After 1832, when the Hoosier legislature accepted 
a federal land grant to fund the Wabash and Erie Canal by March 2, 1832, a surge of 
internal improvements projects encompassed the Indiana state government.  Paul Fatout 
argues that calls to implement internal improvements emerged after it was certain that the 
state would take on debt to facilitate economic growth.192  In response, the state 
legislature approved a $400,000 loan in 1833 to extend the Wabash and Erie further south 
and to provide for further surveys on other potential canals.  As Fatout notes, Hoosier 
lawmakers were “performing limbering-up exercises” to accommodate their constituents’ 
dreams of becoming a commercial center of the West.193   
There were several reasons Hoosiers were excited to construct a system of 
improvements.  First, the prevailing mood of the era suggested that the good times would 
continue to roll.  The Atlantic World banking system was heavily invested in the land 
boom occurring in the American Early West for multiple reasons including: Andrew 
Jackson’s ability to reestablish ties with British islands in the Caribbean and the resulting 
increase in agricultural prices; the ever-present need for cotton in English textile mills; 
and high silver reserves that drove inflation which made farm and land investments 
worthwhile.  The land speculation and western migration of the United States made 
economic stability seem like a sure bet.194  Second, Hoosiers did not want to fall behind 
developments in other western states.  The internal improvements of Indiana were based 
on the idea that the Wabash and Erie Canal would connect the Ohio River at Evansville, 
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Indiana, to the Great Lakes near Toledo, Ohio.  The canal would be the western-most 
point of access to the east coast, which made it an attractive program to many in the state 
and to those further west. Ohio’s access to this system would be limited to the relatively 
scant thirty-two miles of canal between Lake Erie and the border with Indiana.  The 
dominant portion of the canal would run through Indiana to the Ohio River and make 
Indiana a major thoroughfare for western river traffic.  Hoosiers were thrilled with the 
opportunity to become a major transportation hub which would increase land values and 
tax revenue.  Hoosiers were scared that Ohio would cut off their access to Lake Erie and 
accused Ohioans of trying to sandbag Indiana development from achieving its full 
potential.195  Finally, the presumed increase in crop prices influenced local feelings in 
Marion County.  Prices for agricultural goods in Indianapolis were extraordinarily low 
for the Early West.  Jacob Piatt Dunn noted that “Grain was selling for from thirty to fifty 
cents a bushel more on the Ohio River than it was in central Indiana.”196  The prospect of 
connecting the city with the Ohio River, coupled with stories of the success of the Erie 
Canal put dollars signs in the eyes of Hoosier farmers and merchants alike by slashing 
transportation times and costs and increasing the profitability of the fertile cropland.   
As a result of these positive feelings, the discussion over the internal 
improvements debate was multi-sided but, significantly, almost no Hoosiers were against 
improvements.197  The opponents of starting individual internal improvements projects in 
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central Indiana voiced their opinions vociferously because they wanted a different kind of 
improvement.  This argument is historiographically significant because it suggests that 
the capitalist mindset existed on a region-wide basis.  Hoosiers were already recalibrating 
their vision for the nation along lines of economic modernization rather than simply 
yeoman landowning.  The National Road had support of some members of the state 
legislatures as evidenced by the vote over the Wabash and Erie Canal.  The opposition to 
expanded funding of the northern canal came almost exclusively from the southern third 
of the state.  There were also opposition votes from Marion and Wayne County, both set 
on the National Road.  The support and opposition to the Wabash and Erie extension was 
extremely bipartisan, with pro- and anti-Jackson forces on both sides of the issue.198  A 
letter to the editor in the Indiana Journal blatantly defended roads with a populist bent.  
“Jack” derided railroads by stating that “Now all know what a state road is, but not one in 
ten thousand of us ever saw a rail road—we scarcely know what it is.”  He continued his 
tirade against railroads, saying they were “a great incubus…for “a few capitalists” to ride 
over poor people on, that will eventually involve the state in an immense debt.”199   
As noted above, as late as 1836, Hoosiers were still convinced that canals were 
the best option for accomplishing their economic goals.  An article in the Indiana Journal 
matter-of-factly showed the secondary nature of railroads in Hoosier plans for economic 
development by stating that the White River Canal should be connected to the Central 
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Canal “by canal if practicable, and if not by a Railroad.”200  Residents of Shelbyville, 
Indiana, reacted “with no excitement or even casual mention” of the first railroad trip in 
the state in 1834.201  And even the normally introspective Calvin Fletcher was noticeably 
silent about his rail travels during his tour of the Northeast in 1836.  He provided an 
offhand mention of traveling by rail but nothing induced him to comment on the new 
form of transportation.  In contrast, he fondly noted a trip down on the Wabash and Erie 
Canal only a year before in his diary, stating that “it was an inexpressible delight to all 
the company…to glide along upon the Waters that by nature were & had been by the 
Great Architect from the beginning designed & used to run into the St. Lawrence now by 
art & science made subservient to the purposes of commerce in the great valley of the 
Wabash making their way to the Mississippi.”202  It seems that Hoosiers were more 
interested in canal projects during the 1830s as part of a national trend to emulate the 
success of the Erie Canal.  Instead of examining the transportation tools that would best 
suit their city, residents of Indianapolis focused on copying the methods of success in 
eastern cities without realizing environmental realities.   
Hoosiers rarely questioned the type of improvement they wished. The major 
disagreement of the period revolved around how to pay for it.  Two distinct sides 
emerged on the question of improvement economics.  One side argued for a “general 
system” of improvements that would take out loans, construct all works at once, and reap 
the rewards as Indiana quickly emerged as the economic center of the West.  The second 
side urged for a “gradual system” where they would focus on major projects like the 
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Wabash and Erie Canal first, then use the revenue from the completed projects and 
increased land sale prices to construct further works.  Whigs supported the general 
system and Jacksonians supported the gradual system.  Donald Carmony has stated that 
“the General Assembly probably would have adopted a system at its session in 1834-
1835, but for the inability of legislators to agree regarding which works should have 
priority.”  After the meeting, State Treasurer Nathan B. Palmer even stated that “a 
decided majority appeared to be in favor of entering into a general system [sic], but the 
rock upon which they split, was the details of the bill.”203  A scathing article about the 
flaws of the general system from the Indiana Democrat noted that the state would be 
ruined by “debt, bankruptcy and ruin, by a set of aspiring office hunters, from which she 
will never be extricated, except by a ruinous system of taxes” and argued that classifying 
the acts would save the state from the dishonor of economic ruin.204  Supporters of a 
general system noted that internal improvements would not pass without following a 
“whole system” of improvements at once because no region was willing to classify their 
project as less important than any other.205 
The debate over how to pay for internal improvements is important because it 
suggests that by the 1830s, Americans in Marion County had a relatively clear view of 
the function of government.  The experience of Marion County reflects what John Lauritz 
Larson, in his study of the relationship between government ideology and internal 
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improvements, posits.  During the 1830s, federal projects were simply unobtainable 
because of political gridlock.  State governments tried to accomplish the goals of creating 
internal improvements system, but the Panic of 1837 wiped out any hopes for continued 
government planning in the eyes of the electorate.  “Fearing abuse from designing 
politicians, midcentury Americans thought they saw in the ‘invisible hand’ of 
competition an incorruptible arbitrator for desperately clashing interests.”206  Clearly, the 
aforementioned “Jack” represented a faction of Hoosiers that were apprehensive of taking 
out loans to build a railroad.  However, Hoosiers—even fiscally conservative 
Democrats—were not opposed to internal improvements.  They provided wide support 
for projects like the National Road or local road construction.  Opposition emerged 
because they did not want to pay for projects that would not directly help them.  They did 
not want to create projects that would take away traffic—and thus future funding—from 
projects that were already close to home.  Instead of trying to prevent the spread of a 
commercial market, these Hoosiers were more concerned about having funding and 
traffic move away from where they lived.  They were not debating internal 
improvements; they fought over economic regionalism.   
After serious political haggling through 1836, the signatories of the Big Bill 
announced a plan that would construct a general system of improvements across the state.  
Projects included the Wabash and Erie Canal, the Whitewater Canal, improving the 
National Road, the Central Canal and various other projects.207  To finance these projects, 
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Hoosier legislators called for a financing of loans of $10,500,000 through the State Bank 
of Indiana for the construction projects.  An internal improvements board of 
commissioners was put in charge of the projects and a group of canal commissioners 
were charged with acquiring the loans from external sources through the sale of state 
bonds. 
In summer of 1836, three fund commissioners went to New York to secure loans.  
Governor Noah Noble appointed Dr. Isaac Coe, an Indianapolis physician, as one of the 
fund commissioners—the others being Jeremiah Sullivan of Madison and Samuel Hanna 
of Fort Wayne.  Coe was the only successful negotiator, getting $500,000 in loans with 
J.J. Cohens and Brothers, “one third to be paid at once, the remainder in four months; and 
of $1,029,000 with Thomas Biddle and Company of Philadelphia, and the Morris Canal 
and Banking Company of Jersey City, $440,000 of the latter to be paid November 1, the 
remainder as called for in one year.”  Hoosiers were thrilled with the success of Dr. Coe’s 
efforts to secure funding to begin their projects in earnest.  By the end of 1836, the board 
of commissioners had spent $423,995.06 to begin surveying and grading projects across 
the state, but much of that was deficit spending until Coe’s success at discharging state 
bonds.208 
Donald Carmony has noted that canal commissioners felt comfortable beginning 
projects because of three basic beliefs.  First, Hoosiers believed that they could construct 
a transportation network through long term borrowing at low interest rates.  Second, he 
suggests that those residents believed they could pay back those large loans through the 
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gained revenue from internal improvement projects, and especially the Wabash and Erie 
Canal.  Finally, they believed that the construction of internal improvements projects 
would increase the population of the state and the value of property, which would raise 
enough tax revenue to cover the loans.  However, Carmony also notes that “Faith in these 
suppositions was the cornerstone on which the Internal Improvements System of 1836 
was fabricated.”209  Politicians were forced to choose a general system because of 
political gridlock.  They were also tied to the legacy of the Erie Canal in New York.  
Hoosiers pined for the success of the Erie Canal, which was an added encouragement for 
a general system.210  Support for internal improvements in one area were contested by 
those in other areas with claims that their project was the best to go first.211  Few 
Hoosiers were willing to ask the difficult questions regarding the practicality of the loans.  
Nicholas McCarty, while a supporter of the whole system movement and taking out 
loans, resigned as canal commissioner because the Big Bill did not factor the repayment 
of loan interest into the costs of the project.212  Thus, when the internal improvement law 
passed, little speculation focused on the potential for economic vulnerabilities of the 
state. 
The significance of the Big Bill to Marion County residents was unmistakable.  
Of the ten million dollars acquired by the state to complete the projects, three and a half 
million were designated to completing the Central Canal—by far the most of any of the 
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other seven projects.213  Hoosier politicians argued in unison that they needed to connect 
the center of the state to the rest of the national economy.  Calvin Fletcher noted that 
“Town property raised in value” in his diary on June 15, 1835, as discussion of internal 
improvements swirled in the state.  Speculators also emerged to drive up property values.  
Fletcher stated that “Several men from [Connecticut] were here on the 8th & bo’t 
property.  Merchant Tailor from Cincinnati gave very high [for] property.”214   
The squabbling over internal improvements across the state was not echoed at the 
local level.  Every region was looking for market access and each locality wanted to plan 
what was best for their community.  Marion County was no different.  As noted in the 
previous chapter, the push for local road projects dominated the early concerns for 
infrastructure in County Commissioner meetings.  Hoosiers were very comfortable letting 
their state government finance projects that would bolster market opportunities.  By the 
early 1830s, the Marion County Commissioners were using the Three Percent Fund to 
improve roads to foster development of roads to different parts of the state.215  At the 
September 1833 meeting, the County Commissioners voted to distribute the $450 they 
received from the state to improve roads to Brookville, Madison, Fort Wayne, Lafayette, 
Crawfordsville and other important points.  Hoosiers continued to build on these 
transportation networks during the following years, and their expenditures reflect their 
desire to connect with larger national markets.  Of the $450 approved for improving 
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Marion County roads, the commissioners spent significant portions on roads that would 
connect with the Wabash and Ohio Rivers.  The roads to Brookville, on the Whitewater 
River and near Cincinnati, received $70 as did the Madison Road, the shortest overland 
route directly to the Ohio River.  The Lafayette State Road received $65 and the Fort 
Wayne State Road toward the Maumee River that ran into Lake Erie received $60.  
Lesser roads each received $30 or less.  The work on these four roads represented over 
half of the expenditures of federal money in Marion County and show which roads 
county residents thought would become the future major transportation arteries of the 
state capital.216  Two years later, the Commissioners reiterated their support for these 
major roads with additional spending.  The Madison and Brookville roads received $60 
each while the Lafayette road received $70.   
Most important, the 1835 County Commissioners put significantly more money 
toward traditional overland routes.  Roads to areas like Winchester, Crawfordsville and 
Leavensworth obtained quantities of between $15 and $50.217  These quantities reflected 
the political realities of the era.  During the early 1830s, Hoosiers were caught up in the 
swift current of internal improvements and politicians were promising to build a canal to 
every city and a road to every village.  The Wabash and Erie Canal, proposed as early as 
1817 by famed New York Governor DeWitt Clinton, to connect Lake Erie with the Ohio 
and Mississippi Rivers represented one reason why cities like Fort Wayne or Lafayette 
were sound destinations from any Indianapolis centered road as late as 1834.  However, 
the continuing conflicts centering on the Wabash and Erie Canal during the period 
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warned that the waterway may not be completed in a timely manner, thus making the 
northward investment to Fort Wayne less profitable than strengthening the more secure, 
local southern and eastern connections on the Ohio or Whitewater rivers.218 
The road heading toward Fort Wayne—near the headwaters of the Maumee 
River—represents the best example of politics affecting local infrastructure economics.219  
Although County Commissioners did continue to build a road toward Fort Wayne, by 
1835 they renamed it the Andersontown State Road. It was a point nearer the capital that 
was still a stop on the way to Fort Wayne, but was conspicuously headed toward Muncie 
and the head of the Whitewater River on the eastern side of the state that flowed toward 
Cincinnati.  The 1835 expenditures on roads reflected a distinct focus on constructing 
local transportation networks as nearly two-thirds of the Three Percent Fund was used to 
construct local roads.220  Ultimately, the political atmosphere kept Marion County 
residents focused on connecting local roads to already established southern markets.  
They were unsure of the future positions of Indiana canals, so they took a reserved 
approach when spending money on local transportation networks.221   
The focus on improving local roads ended in 1836.  As the Mammoth Internal 
Improvements Bill emerged, borrowed money flowed to different internal improvement 
projects throughout the state.  County Commissioners again reimagined the structure of 
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state transportation systems by using Three Percent Fund money to build roads to major 
rivers.  In May 1836, the Commissioners allotted $230 for the road to Brookville, $250 to 
the road toward Lafayette, $220 to the Crawfordsville road toward the Wabash River 
south of Lafayette, $150 toward the Madison road and an additional $220 to the 
Andersontown Road.  The other eight state roads in Marion County were allotted $360 
combined suggesting that the County Commissioners were refocusing on their attempts 
to connect Indianapolis to the surrounding river systems in the state.222  The October 
meeting further supports this as the Commissioners were giving out the remainder of the 
years’ Three Percent Fund appropriations, a significantly smaller amount totaling 
$435.89.  This smaller amount was still appropriated toward the major roads to cities on 
rivers including Madison and Cincinnati.  The Madison road received $120 and the 
Brookville road obtained $80.  Roads toward the north, which would connect to the 
Wabash, also received larger portions of the remaining funds. The Lafayette and 
Andersontown roads each received $40 while the Crawfordsville road received $30.  The 
seven remaining roads received a total of $125.89.223  Clearly, the Marion County 
Commissioners’ allocation of funds represented the future plans of the city.  They wanted 
to make sure that their products could reach external markets by focusing on building 
roads to the nearest river crossings.  They were unable to break their vision of a water-
based transportation system that they brought with them from their eastern homes.   
In order to more easily connect to markets, residents of Marion County 
immediately promoted internal improvements in the state designed to connect them to 
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cities on the Ohio River and, thus, the wider economic world.  The unanimity of these 
actions during early settlement suggests a different story than older narratives posed by 
historians of the West during the transition to capitalism.  Road building in Marion 
County shows something about the temporal and spatial development of the Old 
Northwest and challenges the dominant historiography of development in the region.  
John Mack Faragher’s Sugar Creek has been the standard interpretation of the transition 
to capitalism in the Old Northwest region because of its incredibly detailed reconstruction 
of a frontier community that struggled with transportation issues and the tensions of an 
ever-encroaching market-based economy.  Faragher’s work, however, shows that the 
story of Sugar Creek road building was quite different than Indianapolis.224   
For Faragher, transportation improvements postdated the transition to capitalism.  
While residents only sought twelve road permits before 1846, he notes that “from 1846 to 
1860 Sugar Creek men filed sixty-one petitions for the relocation and improvement of old 
roads and for the laying out of new ones.”  He notes that the filers of these petitions were 
increasingly landowners and landlords.  Roads were built to sell the excess crops they 
received as rent from their tenants.225  The timing of this increase of petitions is 
significant.  Springfield became the state capital in 1839, so there was much less of a 
need for traffic to and from the city before that moment which explains the early dearth 
of road petitions.  The aftermath of the Panic of 1837 also probably prevented Illinoisans 
from wanting to quickly spend time and money building roads as the national economy 
was in shambles until the mid-1840s.  In contrast, the Marion County Commissioners’ 
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Record shows an immediate and sustained push to build roads and establish local 
transportation networks that would allow residents to move goods more efficiently.  The 
first six years of the County Commissioners’ Record show fifty-one petitions for roads in 
Marion County which dwarfed any other business undertaken by the committee.226  
Settlers planned to immediately market surplus crops and were convinced—as previously 
noted—that their agricultural skill would allow them to dominate western trade.  For 
Faragher, residents began petitioning for roads after the transition to capitalism was 
nearing completion, as landlords fully controlled the land and needed transportation 
routes to export their sharecrops.227  In Central Indiana, the combination of the new 
political center and the upswing in the regional and national economy is more 
explanatory of the mode of development than the emergence of landlord tenant 
relationships in explaining causation of road building.  Marion County residents jumped 
into the regional and national economy with both feet.  They did not—as in Sugar 
Creek—wait for economic conditions to draw them into national commerce.  It was a 
“democratic” transportation revolution rather than an “oppressive” one.   
Hoosiers also evolved their conception of time-consciousness to adapt to the 
expectation of external market connection.  Time-consciousness is important for 
understanding the development of an industrial society.  As E.P. Thompson has noted, “a 
general diffusion of clocks and watches [was] occurring…at the exact moment when the 
industrial revolution demanded a greater synchronization of labor.”228  The development 
of time-consciousness in Marion County in the 1830s is an important factor in 
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determining the location of the economic frontier in the United States.  Settlers moved to 
the new capital from several regions, including the Northeast.  For those migrants, 
Indianapolis’ lack of a coherent time system was a step backward in the development of a 
“modern” society.229  Calvin Fletcher’s diary entry from April 18, 1836, shows that 
Hoosiers were beginning to experience an entry into the time-based system that water-
based cities and well connected agricultural regions in the Northeast already experienced.  
He noted that “Mr. Cole sent my watch home which he bought at Philadelphia…The first 
article I have had for 10 years for the express purpose of ascertaining how time 
passes.”230  This brief entry highlights the pattern of development along the inland 
frontier.  Calvin Fletcher moved to Indianapolis in October of 1821.  He was born in 
Ludlow, Vermont, and was educated in Westford, Massachusetts, until about 1817.  
Sometime between his birth in Ludlow and his arrival in Urbana, Ohio, Fletcher took an 
appreciation of keeping the time.  In a letter to his parents, he recounted how he spent his 
days.  “You may want to know what proficiency I make in the study of Law.  Sir, I bend 
my mind to it as much as possible…I make a division of my time.  I keep school 7 hours 
in a day. I study 1 hour at noon 4 at night & 3 in the morning.   I have made it my rule for 
2 months to go to bead at 11 and get up at 5 but often get up at 4.  I feel very avaritious of 
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my time.”231  The specific descriptions of time usage and efficiency hints at the presence 
of time consciousness that began permeating eastern regions during the 1810s.232  When 
Fletcher stated that his watch was the first one that he had in ten years for the express use 
of telling time, he shows us that the Old Northwest region away from rivers was less 
reliant on time than those cities closer to major waterways.  His acquisition of and 
appreciation for a time-keeping device reflected the expectation of the spread of an 
interconnected market economy that would reach into the American hinterland in the near 
future. 
The increasing population of the town and size of the government caused a need 
for more efficient systems to emerge that could handle the increasingly complex needs of 
the city and state.  Martin Brueghel has pointed out that the evolution of time-
consciousness emerged in the Hudson River Valley because merchants at the river 
landings were increasingly turning toward time-orientation to maximize the efficiency of 
each trip down river.  He argues that these merchants altered conceptions of time in rural 
society because profits would only be high if transportation costs were driven down and 
shared amongst a large number of farmers.  As a result, farmers wanted to make sure that 
they were at the local landing at the same time—which required time orientation—in 
order to minimize the transportation costs and maximize profits for their agricultural 
goods.  This change is noticed in Calvin Fletcher’s diary.  In the early 1820s, there are 
few mentions of specific times.  He describes his tasks by the day or section of day.  He 
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notes on Christmas, 1821, that “I have done but very little this day.  I got up about 
sunrise…About 10 o’clock I went to the river.”233  The next week, on New Year’s Eve, 
he stated “A very agreeable day…Reading Robinsons History of America A.M. P.M. 
repaired my chimeny visited Mr. Foot.”234  Fletcher, during the early period of 1821, did 
not focus on writing down the specific times that he accomplished his chores or met his 
friends even though he had something to tell the time.  His diary from 1836—noted 
above—suggests that he had some timekeeping device until around 1826.  Clearly, focus 
on time was less important to Calvin Fletcher in 1821 than it was in 1818 when he lived 
in Ludlow, Vermont.   
There was a major change by 1835, however, as Fletcher routinely used his watch 
to discuss the passage of time.  On June 17, 1835, he notes that “At 12 o’clock came 
home found Mr. Reed from Va at my house from Lynchburg on his way to Laport. His 
family were at Buck Creek.  Pleasant day.  At 2 went with a man to my farm to see the 
same he desiring to buy a farm…The stage arrived this eve 6 o’clock brot the unpleasant 
news of cholera at Madison.”235  During the 1830s, as the expectation that Hoosiers 
would build a canal to connect Marion County with the rest of the regional economy, 
Fletcher became very specific in mentioning the times that events occurred.  This change 
in habit suggests that the timing of events was more important in 1835 than it was a 
decade earlier and is evidence that the city was gearing up to improve its ability to 
participate in regional trade networks.  Ultimately, the pattern of time-consciousness that 
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occurred in Marion County suggests a similar pattern of events from the Hudson River 
Valley as proposed by Brueghel.  The relationship between rural people and the notation 
of time suggests that the integration of either region was slightly different.  The Hudson 
Valley entered a time-oriented society beginning in the 1810s while Marion County came 
into one during the mid-1830s.  This is strong evidence for the establishment of the 
economic frontier along an atmosphere that can be studied by other historians to fully 
understand the places where time had a stronger grasp over society.   
Calvin Fletcher was not the only Hoosier to recognize the significance of time as 
the transportation revolution touched Marion County.  Like the studies conducted by 
Mark Smith in the antebellum South, Hoosiers in the Early West found an increasing 
purpose for clocks when reorganizing their economic lives and shows the advancing 
nature of economic development in Marion County.236  As noted by various authors, time 
is an important tool for organizing complex economies, and measuring the emergence of 
time-consciousness is an effective marker of market orientation.237  Before 1830, clocks 
and watches were virtually absent from the town.  They were so rare that they were even 
used as probable identification for maimed bodies.  One article in the Indiana Democrat 
from 1831 reported that the Charleston, riding down the Wabash River near Vevay, 
crashed into the Sylph, which immediately sunk.  James A. Frazier, a resident of 
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Indianapolis, was crushed to death.  The newspaper noted that the mangled remains of 
Frazier’s corpse were identified only by “his watch and part of his clothing being found 
on the deck.”238  That the authorities used his timepiece as a key piece of identifying 
evidence shows that watches were a relatively rare accompaniment to an outfit or special 
enough to have engraved, and suggests that Indiana was in a transitional period where 
watches and clocks were a notable feature of life rather than the norm.   
The emergence of a time-conscious society began in the 1830s.  Calvin Fletcher 
transitioned his thought process toward time-consciousness by 1835, and it seems that 
other Marion County leaders also considered the changing landscape of time-
consciousness.  On November 7, 1831, the County Commissioners—predicting the surge 
in clock sales—passed a law stating that “each applicant for License to vend wooden 
clocks in this County of Marion, shall pay into the County Treasury ten dollars.” 239  
Clearly, leading Hoosiers found an increasing interest in clocks during the 1830s as the 
city began to grow and stabilize its relationships with the surrounding region.   
Probate records also show an increase in the number of clocks and watches owned 
by deceased residents.  Between 1825 and 1834, only wealthy farmer Jacob Pugh’s 
probate—the first in Marion County—had a clock listed.240  While perhaps residents did 
not think that watches and clocks were important enough for probate record—which is 
unlikely, due to the extremely detailed nature of the documents—it is more likely that 
there was less of a need for time pieces.  The nature of the economy was so localized that 
time-saving, efficiency-oriented institutions were not in place.  Residents of the 
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overwhelmingly rural Marion County were secluded from high-volume trade that 
required long-distance organization and coordination to maximize efficiency.  Using 
clocks to coordinate travel schedules to increase profit was ineffective because lack of 
effective roads and other transportation networks made travel from Central Indiana to 
external markets too irregular to be efficient.    
By the mid-1830s, as an expression of their confidence in the impending internal 
improvement projects, clocks were becoming a regular feature of Hoosier life.  The 
market for watches and clocks increased as evidenced by the emergence of the first watch 
and clock and shop in the city.  The advertisement noted that resident A.F. Morrison will 
repair various types of clocks and watches and that new watches will be available “at the 
usual Cincinnati prices.”241  By July of 1837, W.H. Talbott’s competing shop opened and 
began advertising that he and his partners would “sell their stock at unusually low 
prices.”242  Hoosiers in Marion County, because of the passage of the Big Bill and the 
related expectation that they would dominate regional trade, created a market for watch 
shops which confirmed their intent on joining larger economic networks.  Local Hoosiers 
became convinced that Marion County needed to operate on a more formal time-oriented 
system to reap the benefits of improved transportation.   
The timing of Fletcher’s watch acquisition and the emergence of watch and clock 
shops is significant specifically because it determines the demarcation of the economic 
frontier during the early decades of the nineteenth century.  In New York’s Hudson 
Valley, Martin Brueghel has noted that clocks were relatively rare before 1810.  
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However, “the dissemination of clocks and watches progressed rapidly between 1810 and 
1830.”243  For Brueghel, the emergence of timepieces was necessary because “the 
development of long-distance trade increased the complexity of scheduling…Timetables 
represented a step toward increasing predictability and order.”244  For Brueghel, the 
emergence of clocks mirrored the development of a complex economy.  Clocks were the 
tool by which Americans, for the first time participating in an anonymous economy, 
could maximize their efficiency.  The absence of the transition to capitalism—noted by 
the low number of clocks and watches—in Indianapolis during the 1820s, when 
Brueghel’s Hudson Valley was experiencing a massive transition, shows that 
Indianapolis was still an economic outpost in the first stage of frontier evolution, as 
defined by Timothy Mahoney.  Hoosiers were not an economic hub and were not 
entrenched in high-volume, long-distance trade, thus they did not require an 
extraordinary number of clocks.   
Marion County Probate Records show a noticeably low number of clocks through 
the 1820s which suggests that the local economy had not yet developed enough to require 
the kind of efficiency necessary in the market-oriented Hudson River Valley.  In the 
1820s, there was no reason for Marion County residents to own anything other than a 
decorative clock.  Marion County Probate Records do not record another clock until 
1835.  However, a serious change occurred during the 1830s as the probate is 
increasingly littered with clocks.245  By the mid-1830s, with the expectation of internal 
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improvement projects connecting the city to the Ohio River trade, residents of Marion 
County felt that time-keeping devices were solid investments.246   
More evidence of the time-conscious frontier is seen in newspapers.  Newspaper 
pages advertised mail schedules and they show an interesting view of the presence of 
time-consciousness along a boundary determined by environmental and transportation 
frontiers.  Arrival and departure schedules published in the Indiana Democrat show that 
Indianapolis did not function on a time-oriented system while cities nearer to the Ohio 
River did use time as a stable measurement.  In 1830, the schedule noted that the mail 
“leaves Indianapolis on Monday morning and arrives at Lawrenceburgh [on the Ohio 
River near Cincinnati] on Tuesday evening; departs next morning 6 o’clock and arrives at 
Indianapolis on Thursday evening.”247  The article shows that Indianapolis did not have 
an organized time-infrastructure the way that Lawrencburgh did, thus, they could not 
predict exactly what time the mail would arrive.  However, Lawrenceburgh, because of 
its close connection with Cincinnati, needed a stable time infrastructure to manage its 
economy so it was able to determine that mail carriages would leave at 6 A.M.  
Ultimately, this shows that in 1830, the border between task and time-oriented societies 
lay somewhere in southern Indiana, and that Indianapolis lagged behind Ohio River cities 
when establishing the tools necessary to construct a modern economic network.  By 
1834, however, the Indiana Democrat began using specific times when describing mail 
routes.  A notice from May stated that mail carriers left for “Lawrenceburgh—Monday, 
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Wednesday, 7 o’clock A.M…Madison—Monday, Wednesday and Friday, 3 o’clock 
A.M.”248  The increasingly specific time shows that Hoosiers were preparing for 
connections to the market.  Although the Mammoth Internal Improvements Bill was two 
years away, discussions over internal improvements were raging across the state.  Central 
Indiana Hoosiers were still catching up to the long-established cities of the Ohio River 
Valley in terms of developing a time-oriented society.  Cities who had easier 
transportation access to national markets were more likely to adopt temporal structures to 
maximize profit.249   
There is evidence that Hoosiers in Central Indiana were trying to create a time-
oriented system as early as 1827.  An article in the Indiana State Journal described some 
of the notes on bidding for mail routes to the Hoosier capital and focused on fines for late 
delivery, amounts of time allowed per stop, and rules for the bidding process.  That the 
Indiana Democrat promoted a less time-oriented notation of the mails than the Indiana 
State Journal suggests a social divide in Marion County.  The Indiana State Journal 
supported Whiggish tendencies in Marion County.  They wished to borrow money for a 
general system of internal improvements believed that capturing western agricultural 
commerce would make Marion County an economic behemoth. For them, time 
organization was a key development that would allow Hoosiers to maximize profits of 
individual farmers and, thus, pay back the loans they needed to build their internal 
improvements.  Those that followed the Democratic Party and the Indiana Democrat 
were more likely to maintain a social system oriented toward strong local ties and to 
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support a gradual system of improvements and bypassing any debts.  They were less 
inclined to jettison the safety of personal social ties than those who were willing to 
quickly create time-managed transportation deadlines that were far more susceptible to 
impersonal economic relationships.  Hoosiers, rather than arguing over whether or not to 
enter the market, stressed over the best way to get crops into the national economy and 
how to pay for those transportation issues. 
The patterns of labor relations in Marion County also showed a lag when 
compared to other regions.  Sean Wilentz has noted that the artisanal system was under 
attack in New York City early in the 1820s.  However, Marion County residents were 
still advertising openly in newspapers for apprentices.  In May 1837, Thomas Donnellan 
posted an ad stating “Wanted.—A boy 12 or 14 years old of moral and industrious habits, 
to learn the Cabinet madding business.  A good opportunity will be given.”250  While 
these types of advertisements were rare, the population of the region suggests that the 
artisanal system was still a viable option for young employees before connections to 
outside markets gave rise to competitive disadvantages.  
At the same time, labor shortages were common.  Many people left the city when 
work was unavailable or when conditions were considered unfair.  Conditions were so in 
favor of laborers that Calvin Fletcher had to pay extra to his farm hands if he wanted 
them to work without imbibing on the job.251  Especially during the Panic of 1837, when 
employers usually had the upper hand and wage laborers usually took pay cuts to ensure 
a continuing paycheck, Fletcher bemoaned the work ethic of available laborers.  He noted 
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that “At 1 PM went to the farm found that the 4 hands I had [hired] had nearly given 
out…Laziness is the common complaint of the people of the country—they will not work 
unless you stand by them…These men were all poor—2 had families & a good name as 
faithful hands should have been sought as the finest capital to make life agreeable.”252  
Fletcher’s complaint about his workers suggests that wage labor was not fully entrenched 
in Marion County.  Residents that chose not to work for wages had other opportunities to 
make a living for their families and felt comfortable enough to break their agreement with 
Fletcher to clear his field.253   
The labor market in Marion County was also still driven by exchange of goods 
and services rather than cash.  Few usable account books survive, but that of William 
Speer is demonstrative of the type of working economy used at the time.  He kept a 
running tab of services provided to Edwin Jones and allowed repayment in bushels of 
corn.  The same account book shows that David Fasett paid for blacksmithing work by 
providing “one lode plank,” two days of “hauling,” and “two hundred weight of hay.”254  
Instead of functioning on a cash-based system, which increasingly occurred in the more 
complex economies of the Northeast, Marion County farmers were still forced to use a 
system of exchange that predated consistent needs for specie.255   
Other sources show the slow emergence of Indianapolis as an economic outpost.  
By the time Indianapolis residents began constructing a navigable canal in 1836, 
newspaper advertisements reflected a maturing economy in the city.  Advertisements for 
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sales of personal property still graced the pages of the Indiana Journal.  One 
advertisement from 1835 promoted the sale of a “farm lying on the old Crawfordsville 
road…containing 320 acres of first rate land, eighty acres under fence…a good brick 
house, log barn and other convenient out buildings.”256  The significant drop in the 
number of announcements of personal sales over the previous decade represents a change 
in the economy of the city.  Newspaper advertising became a function of primarily 
business and governmental agencies.  Personal advertisements like those noted above 
became few and far between because the larger population of the city allowed for public 
announcements of land sales to flow through the local land office where interested buyers 
could congregate and purchase any available land instead of being announced in the 
newspaper.   
Advertising for merchant-based commercial goods was the basis of newspaper 
classified sections.  An announcement by two Indianapolis-based hat manufacturers 
declared that a new hat manufactory opened and that “[t]hey have new on hand and 
intend to constantly keeping a general assortment of [drabs, hats and caps] all of which 
they will sell [w]holesale or [r]etail to suit purchasers.”257  Another ad placed by 
Indianapolis shoemaker and merchant, a Mr. E. Depew, stated that the proprietor 
“respectfully informs the citizens of Indianapolis and the surrounding country that he has 
new and intends keeping constantly on hand a full assortment of [ladies and gentelmen’s] 
[e]astern and [s]hop made [b]oots, &c. consisting of all varieties of the most approved 
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fashions.”258  An additional notice states that Charles Martens opened a store for “Fresh 
Groceries and Liquor” from which “country dealers may find it to their advantage to 
purchase goods of him.”259  A final announcement placed by merchant E.T. Porter in the 
Journal stated that “[i]n addition to the present extensive stock, [Porter] is about 
receiving a select assortment of [f]all and [w]inter goods,” and that “[e]very effort shall 
be made to accommodate customers, as regards price and quality of goods.”260  The high 
numbers of advertisements focusing on consumer goods reflects the maturation of the 
city economy.  Advertisements in the 1830s reflect a trend toward the solid establishment 
of overland economic ties with cities on the Ohio River in the emerging city even though 
the city was not connected to eastern markets by river or rail.   
The large number of specifically commercial advertisements overshadowed those 
who operated in both the public and private spheres.  In 1835, an advertisement in the 
Journal pronounced that “Mrs. Irwin & [d]aughters [respectfully inform] their friends 
and the public that they continue to carr[y] on as usual [millinery and plain sewing] in all 
their varieties…They are prepared to accommodate several [boarders].”261  Another 
advertisement announced the effect of a personal matter on commercial interests.  Gideon 
Johnson placed an advertisement warning “against trading with my wife Delilah, as I 
shall not be accountable for any of her contracts, as we have made a final separation and 
division of our property.”262  Likewise, an announcement in the Journal put out an 
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advertisement in order to settle accounts around the city because “[o]ne of the firm of 
T.M. Smith & Co. will [move] east.”263  The Indiana Journal was clearly still a place to 
air personal information in the 1830s but residents felt comfortable explaining 
commercial interests and their relationship to personal events in a public venue.  As the 
city matured from a frontier to an outpost, community announcement were less important 
in newspapers than the economic advertisements that graced the pages.   
Government announcements for local contracts also transformed during the canal 
era as the city stabilized during the 1830s.  Government advertising announced municipal 
ordinances and business or took the form of lawsuits.  One publication announced new 
ordinances “to [r]egulate the[l]icensing of [g]roceries and [t]ippling [h]ouses in the Town 
of Indianapolis, and for other purposes.”264  Others offered potential contracts to 
carpenters, painters and bridge builders to the lowest bidder.  One advertisement 
requested “[s]ealed [p]roposals...for shelving and finishing the rooms in the library of the 
State capitol.”265  Another called for “[s]ealed proposals for the construction for the… 
[b]ridge over the Eel river at the north end of Bridge Street at Logansport.”266  Legal 
announcements regarding summonses riddle the classified section of the Indiana Journal 
and suggest the stabilizing development of a legal culture in the city.  The transformation 
of governmental advertisements in the Journal implies that the city government structure 
stabilized in the decade after 1835.  No longer did government officials have to worry 
about heating the Statehouse during congressional sessions.  Instead, they could focus on 
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refining cultural institutions like libraries or regulating social and commercial 
institutions.   
The development of a stable society in Marion County allowed an increasing 
number of commercial merchants to pay cash when seeking goods.  One announcement 
declared that two merchants “will pay [fifty-six] and one fourth cents [in cash] for good 
merchantable [w]heat.”267  Another ad, published months later, by William Wernwag 
proclaimed that the local brewery needed “400 BUSHELS of good sound oats, for which 
cash will be paid at the rate of 25 cents per bushel.”  The ad continued by stating the need 
for “200 bushels of good merchantable [barley], for which cash will be paid at the rate of 
43 cents per bushel.”268  Another advertisement, placed by a wholesaler looking to attract 
merchants’ business noted that they “are now receiving their spring supplies…which will 
be sold as low as at any rate west of the mountains, for cash or approved paper.”269  
These advertisements in classified sections of the Indiana Journal reflected a growing 
change in the nature of the economy of Indianapolis.  Calls by merchants for rural 
residents to bring their goods in exchange for cash increased reflected the emergence of 
the city as an economic outpost.  Merchants were in an economic borderland between the 
cash-based economies of Cincinnati, Louisville or New Orleans, while, at the same time, 
goods were still frequently exchanged in-kind among residents buying consumer goods 
including dry goods and fall or winter goods.   
As the city emerged as an economic outpost for the surrounding communities, 
however, it was still secluded from most of the economic activity of the Early West.  As a 
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result, Marion County residents were forced to adapt to a situation without strong 
banking or cash-oriented commercial instruments.  The strongest evidence for this is the 
high number of merchants who still accepted in-kind payments.  An advertisement from 
Anderson, Bell and Co. notes that the wholesalers “will receive [g]inseng, [b]eeswax, 
[t]ow and [f]lax [l]inen, and [r]ags in exchange for goods.”270  John Jamison, a prominent 
businessman and merchant, published that “[c]ountry produce will be taken in exchange 
for goods at the market price” in his new dry goods store.271  At the same time, an ad 
noted that accounts at T.S. Smith and Co. could be settled with “cash or approved country 
produce.”272  Likewise, E.T. Porter stated that “[c]ountry produce, such as [j]anes, 
[]l]insey, [l]inen, [s]ugar, [b]eeswax, [s]ocks…will be received in exchange for 
goods.”273  An advertisement for flax seed showed the availability of in-kind payment by 
stating “[t]he subscribers will pay the highest price for 3000 [bushels flax-seed] delivered 
at their [d]rug [s]tore…Flax seed [o]il will also be given in exchange at a fair rate.”274   
Central Indiana lagged far behind the social changes occurring in other parts of 
the United States at the outset of 1837.  After nearly two decades of settlement, they still 
lacked a stable system of cash-based trade and labor markets, and only occasionally used 
time as a consistent measurement.  Manufactories were absent from the community, and 
labor organizations were also non-existent.  The vast majority of people were farmers 
who traded for goods or dealt in specie rather than dealing with paper money, and most 
products were either expensively imported or done without.  However, Hoosier hopes of 
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a commercial empire that would intensify trade in the city got a boost in the winter of 
1836 with the announcement of the Big Bill.  After construction, Hoosiers would be able 
to boast of their state as the center of the northwest trade network by linking the Great 
Lakes and the Gulf of Mexico in one water-based transportation system.  Unfortunately, 
Hoosiers experienced the troubles of wide-reaching economic networks rather than 
getting the long sought-after benefits as the Panic of 1837 descended upon the nation.   
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CHAPTER 5: “THE PRESENT APPROACHING CRISIS: THE PANIC OF 1837 
AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN MARION COUNTY, 1837-1843” 
 The first rumblings of economic distress reached Hoosiers in May of 1837.  On 
account of the “great pressure in N.Y. & Philadelphia,” Calvin Fletcher, on Saturday, 
May 13, 1837, called a meeting of Indianapolis’ main merchants including E.T. Porter, 
Alexander Russell, Henry Bradley, James M. Ray, James Blake, Nicholas McCarty, and 
William Hannaman.  Gathering at McCarty’s counting room, these men surveyed the 
financial situation of the West and agreed to “not to do any injustice to any of their 
Eastern crediters but to pay them all an equal portion as it becomes due & especially to 
pay the [State Bank of Indiana] as fast as any other crediter—have determined to make 
no noise in their home collections—to resist bills drawn on them by Eastern merchants 
without a previous agreement so to do & to pay no one more than an equal portion of 
their debts to the injury of any other creditor.”  The urgency of the meeting stemmed 
from “an idea [in the East] that there are abundant means in the West” and that “the 
moment a debt is due the note is presented here to drawn for.”  Fletcher, although noting 
that merchants in Indianapolis all had adequate means to pay their bills, stated that local 
vendors were behind “on consequence of their indulgence to their customers.”275  On 
Monday, May 15, Fletcher and his compatriots met again “to take into consideration the 
presant approaching crisis” and “agreed for the present not to pay only an equal 
proportion to their Eastern crediters, to sustain the Bank in case of pressure &c & to meet 
Every Wed. at 4 at the same time & place.”276 
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Two days later, Fletcher arrived at the “Bank board of State Directors…We all 
met with feelings of no ordinary concern for the institution over which we were placed.”  
The concern felt by the board emanated from the failure of a “deposite Bank at Buffalo—
other deposit Banks at the South Mississipp & Louisiana…our Bank has 12 hundred 
thousand dollars in these deposit Banks out of the state & others.”  Fletcher continued to 
fret that “the daily news from the Eastern cities & from Europe would indicate that the 
fountains of the great deep in the commercial world are about to break up.  What are we 
to do is the enquiry from every one?”277  The next day, Samuel Merrill broke into a 
meeting between Fletcher and James M. Ray with “his hands full of letters he had just 
received by 2 messengers one from Lawrenceburgh & one from the Madison branches 
stating that all the Banks in the Eastern cities together with the Cincinnati banks had 
suspended payment.”278  Fletcher somberly reported that the board of the State Bank was 
reconvened and also invited the Governor and the State Treasurer to determine the course 
of action.  “The question presented in a solemn manner by our President was what shall 
the Board do—Let our specie be drawn out by Banks that owe us when they have closed 
their doors?...After a most solemn deliberation in which the Governor & Treasurer both 
took part we agreed to permit each branch to suspend if it thought best…This occurance 
was sudden as it as unexpected by most.  I had feared this calamity for some time yet the 
shape it appeared was different from what I expected.”279 
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The actions of May 18, 1837, kept the board together until nearly midnight and 
the aftermath was in doubt.  Fletcher noted that the board met the next morning, Friday, 
May 19, and grimly stated that “our board met again this morning with some little doubts 
as to what had transpired the night before but on a review all were satisfied that the best 
had been done & flattered themselves that it was but a temporary suspension which 
would not last but a few months at most.”280  Fletcher’s negative mood regarding the 
suspension of specie payments of the State Bank of Indiana was more accurate than that 
of his compatriots.  The Panic of 1837 was very rough on Indiana, as the state strained to 
complete its internal improvements projects and manage the state’s debts to eastern 
creditors. Central Indiana was especially hard hit as financing of the Central Canal 
disrupted the regions efforts to become the central economic hub of the Early West.  
Historians like Logan Esarey, Donald Carmony, and James Madison have described this 
period in Hoosier history, but a detailed description of the Panic of 1837 in Marion 
County evades the historiography.281  This chapter examines the ground level effects of 
the Panic of 1837 on Marion County residents to examine how westerners experienced 
financial collapse during the early stages of growth.   
As noted above, the meeting amongst the leading men of Indianapolis was the 
first major moment of economic turmoil in the long depression that followed the collapse 
of land prices.  However, Fletcher confided in his diary on April 28 that “Our collections 
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from the East seem to be good—too large I fear—augurs bad for the future.”282  His 
ominous comment regarding the economic future of local Hoosiers foreshadowed the 
difficulty of the state and region in the following years.  From 1837 through the mid-
1840s, Hoosiers in central Indiana experienced the Panic of 1837 in microcosm, as the 
economic dreams of the state hinged on connecting the fertile lands of the capital city to 
the rest of the national economy.  The fortunes of the city followed those of the state, as 
the debt acquired for the Mammoth Internal Improvements Bill bound all regions of the 
state together under the obligation of repayment for a general system of improvements.  
Unfortunately, the burdens of the Big Bill were too much to bear because of poor 
governmental oversight, fiscal irresponsibility, and a lack of economic realism by all 
involved. 
The fiscal crisis of the Panic of 1837 is well documented.  Land speculation in the 
trans-Appalachian western United States caused a spike in prices and interest rates for 
loans.  Banking houses in Europe profligately loaned money to investors to buy land and 
slaves which furthered the crisis.  The redistribution of surpluses from federal land sales 
to the states supported the speculative trend as states would have extra funds to complete 
internal improvement projects, further increasing the value of land.  Jackson’s Specie 
Circular, issued in 1836 in order to prevent speculation and the possibility of a bust by 
demanding that land purchases be made in hard currency, had the opposite effect by 
creating a vulnerability in the banking system that was unknowingly triggered by the 
increase in British interest rates.  As noted by Jeremy Atack and Peter Passell, “the U.S. 
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financial system was the helpless victim of rapid shifts in the demand for specie at home 
and abroad.”283 
The panic hurt Indiana because of its internal improvement loans.  As briefly 
mentioned in the preceding chapter, the Hoosier legislature authorized a $10 million loan 
at five percent for twenty years in order to finance its projects.  Poor choices are often 
defended because the future is unpredictable, but the state legislature did not even 
cursorily examine the tea leaves before they passed the Big Bill.  As Paul Fatout bluntly 
states, “Indiana’s contribution to irrationality [of the internal improvements craze] was a 
system plan that could not survive the test of hard sense.  The ultimate cost of the 
projected works was certain to be much higher than the appropriation of $10 million.  
Available to the assembly at the time were reports of engineers who figured the total at 
$16 million.  Adding the expense of overhead, wastage, superintendence, and a possible 
rise in wages meant an increase to probably more than $20 million.”  In addition, he 
reminds readers that “unpredictable nature could play havoc with tide estimates when 
floods crumbled new canal banks, swept away bridges, and destroyed aqueducts.  The 
appropriations were too tight to allow leeway for contingencies.”284  In fact, tensions with 
nature were a constant factor in the construction of Indiana canal projects.  Muskrats 
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were ever-present in the Central Canal and were extremely destructive to the budget and 
function of the project.  “An energetic muskrat would dig a hole through the bank, and, 
unless the opening was very quickly discovered, that was an end of the canal for weeks.  
The company paid a bounty on muskrat scalps for years, on this account, and it never 
made a more profitable investment.”285   
The serious problem facing Hoosiers was the weight of the loans.  The five 
percent interest rate due biennially on January 1 and July 1 each year was $500,000.  
Meanwhile, the state received only one tenth of that sum in tax revenue on an annual 
basis.  As Fatout notes, “the annual interest on a loan of $10 million at 5 percent was 
$500,000, which was ten times the state revenue from taxation, yet the system bill 
provided no means of paying the interest.  Expectations of great profits from public 
works ignored costly years of construction when the works would be only liabilities 
earning nothing.”  For Hoosiers, the overly rosy suppositions that undergirded the loan 
drove them into a mindless frenzy regarding planning for repayment of the loans.   
The early events of the Panic of 1837 exacerbated the weakness of the Indiana 
internal improvements finance system.  By the end of that year, the public debt was 
nearly $5 million and the tax receipts only $190,000.  The general system of 
improvements left a series of unfinished projects that were incomplete and costing the 
state money through interest payments.  The money needed to run the government left a 
debt on interest of nearly $50,000.  At the legislative session of 1837-38, outgoing 
Governor Noble, who initiated the works, argued that they should continue on with the 
most important and immediately profitable projects.  The legislature, quickly realizing 
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their miscalculations, were in the unenviable position of having to restructure the system 
so that they could pay their debts without raising taxes.  The politicians passed a budget 
in 1838 that allowed fund commissioners in New York City to acquire even more debt in 
order to complete all the works at once.  Dr. Coe sold state securities to the Staten Island 
Whaling Company, the Bank of Western New York, the Bank of Erie County, and, again, 
the Morris Canal Company.286  These loans, conceived to get the state through its deficit, 
were atrocious contracts.  According to one telling of the story, “the railroad was a fly-
by-night, the banks were wildcat outfits, and the whaling company was a rickety concern 
about to fall apart.  The Morris Company bought bonds without paying for them, sold 
them, then used the proceeds to prop up its various tottering enterprises.”287   
By the end of 1838, the state was on the road to outright financial ruin.  Governor 
Wallace, noted in an address to the legislature that “it would be folly to conceal it—we 
have our hands full…to preserve the credit and character of the state unimpaired.”288  
However, his optimism came through when “by a feat of mental or mathematical 
gymnastics, that Indiana finances were in flourishing health.  Citing the probable income 
from taxes, from 90,000 acres between Fort Wayne and Logansport at ten dollars an acre, 
from 294,624 acres between the Tippecanoe River and Terre Haute at six dollars an acre 
[and other sources] he got a total of $4,383,623… ‘Here is a clear unencumbered capital 
of at least four millions of dollars.’”289   
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The 1838-39 session of the legislature finally realized its folly in loaning out 
relatively substantial amounts of money.  There was a dramatic change in fiscal strategy 
to deal with the shortages of money coming into state coffers while outflows remained 
high.  In order to save money, the legislature cut the six members of the board of 
commissioners and the three canal commissioners down to a three person board elected 
by both houses.  In addition, the legislature limited expenditures to $1,500,000 annually, 
which forced classification of projects.  Board members apportioned their allotment 
among five projects.  The Wabash and Erie, long the focus of improvers, got $279,000.  
The Central Canal got $389,000, the Whitewater acquired $274,000, the Erie-Michigan 
received $100,000, and $70,000 went to the Cross-Cut Canal.  Objections raged from 
parts of the state that would lose out on immediate funding; however, the projects that 
received money moved along and by the end of 1839, the Whitewater Canal produced its 
first profits.290 
The first profits from the Whitewater Canal were not enough to support the 
increasingly bloated interest on the debt.  In 1839, only forty-five miles of the Central 
Canal were completed, an unimpressive number for two years of profligate spending on 
work.  Indeed, the only section that held water was the eight-mile tract between 
Indianapolis and Broad Ripple just north of the capital.  The Whitewater Canal was in 
operation from Brookville to Lawrenceburg, and the Wabash and Erie Canal was 
functioning across ninety miles of sparsely populated north central Indiana but managed 
to make a small profit.  Overall, the lack of concentration on important projects during 
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the early stages of the internal improvements era prevented the major projects from 
moving further along.291 
The year 1839, as noted above, was a turning point in legislative purpose 
regarding canal expenditures and construction.  It was also a turning point in the way that 
projects were financed.  In order to raise money to increase state revenue, the legislature 
allowed private companies to lease the valuable water power on completed parts of 
canals.  In Marion County, “on the 11th of June [1839] the State leased power to one 
Woollen Mill two Cotton Mills two Paper Mills an Oil mill and two Grist and two Saw 
mills an addition of ten mills and a business that could not but be a very material help to 
the town.”  The lease of water power to these companies was derived to help with the 
massive debt the state had accumulated, but they were little help.  “The canal was not as 
efficient as expected.  It had too little fall for a race and it was grievously obstructed by 
an annual growth of grass which was only imperfectly cleared out at the expense of some 
money and turning off the water for a week or two.”  When the water was turned off in 
order to clear the brush, the companies “refused to pay their rent.  Suits were defeated by 
evidence showing constant loss from the failure of the State to supply water according to 
the contract.  It is doubtful if the rent paid in the ten years that the State retained the canal 
would cover the costs of her suits against the lessees.”292 
1839 also saw a change in loan acquisition strategy as new fund commissioners 
were appointed.  Milton Stapp and Lucius Scott were placed in charge of acquiring loans 
for the state in order to complete its public works projects.  Scott acquired a loan of 
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$600,000 for the state, and Stapp negotiated for $1.2 million, some from the Morris Canal 
Company.  As a result of these loans, the debt of Indiana on the eve of 1840 was a total 
debt of $10,064,000 and an interest payment of $479,000.293 
The real stress for state finances also began in 1839.  While the Panic of 1837 
affected the entire nation, the real aftershocks began hitting the Early West as the Morris 
Canal Company declared bankruptcy.  John Joseph Wallis notes that “The cessation of 
canal and railroad construction in these states was not caused by a restriction in the flow 
of international capital, but initially by the collapse of one American bank, the Morris 
Canal and Banking Company of New Jersey.”294  After fulfilling the interest payment on 
the state debt on July 1, 1839, Hoosiers began worrying how to pay the upcoming 
installment at the outset of the New Year.  News worsened in August when the Morris 
Canal Company announced that it was unable to fulfill its contracts, owing Indiana 
$2,536,611.  Shortly after, the Detroit and Pontiac Railroad and the Bank of Western 
New York both closed their doors, owing the state a combined $330,000.  In all, the 
suspended or lost debt eclipsed four million dollars.   
The results of the projects were, at best, meager.  As news of the collapse of the 
Morris Company spread, work on Indiana projects stopped.  Fatout notes that 
“momentum kept operations going a few weeks longer, like a spinning top slowing 
down.”  The board of internal improvements, in the face of the failing economy, ordered 
that all works other than the Wabash and Erie Canal and a few minor structures on the 
Whitewater Canal be stopped immediately.  In all, years of work on the projects and eight 
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million dollars of expenditures returned completed projects totaling one hundred twenty-
nine miles of canal, twenty-eight miles of railroad, and forty-one miles of macadamized 
turnpikes. Left unfinished were two hundred-ninety miles of partially completed works 
that “were a dreary spectacle of torn earth being overgrown by weeds and eroded by 
rain.”295  The inability of the state to acquire extra funds also led the legislature to 
question what to do with the unfinished works.  In order to “ameliorate the burdens of 
taxation” to their citizens, the legislature suggested that private enterprises should be able 
to work on the projects in return for state bonds.296 
By 1841, the question of paying interest on the debt emerged paramount.  In July 
of 1841, the state debt was $13,667,433.  In order to pay the debt, the state government 
approved the sale of bonds at seven percent interest and raising property taxes.  These 
measures, however, were ineffective as no one bought the bonds and the tax increase was 
overwhelmingly paid in state scrip that was useless for payments to external creditors.  
Governor Noah Noble, in his quest to acquire money to pay the interest on the debt, 
found that he could not sell state bonds under any circumstances in the spring of 1841.  
When the payment came due on July 1, Noble stated that he could not pay and offered 
payments to creditors in seven percent state bonds, which no one accepted.297   
By the fall of 1841, investors demanded repayment and were openly hostile to the 
Hoosier plight.  The London Morning Herald decried “the plundering vagabonds of 
India-Scampia,” and argued that “Indiana mocks all the obligations of good faith and 
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common honesty.”298  The abuse was to no avail as Indiana finally wrung its last dollars 
from its creditors.  The state was unable to access any more money and quietly absorbed 
the tirades pointed at it.  By 1842, including the missed interest payment, the total debt 
was $15,088,146.  The annual interest ballooned to $615,000 while the treasury could 
only assemble $56,000 in assets.299  The state would not make another payment on its 
debt for five years as Charles Butler negotiated on behalf of eastern bondholders to repay 
the debt.  The result of the negotiation gave Hoosiers respite from the massive debt they 
incurred over the course of the previous decade.  After two years of intense negotiation 
between bondholders and the state legislature, it was decided that the state would pay half 
of its debt and interest thereupon, while the other half of the debt would come from the 
receipts of the Wabash and Erie Canal which would go directly to bondholders.300  Only 
after the Butler Bill of 1847, which created terms of repayment favorable to the frontier 
economy, could the Hoosier government build the infrastructure necessary to begin 
repaying the loans acquired over the previous decade.301   
The failure of the Mammoth Internal Improvements Bill left Indiana paralyzed.  
The state owed massive interest payments on debts.  After the financial ruin of the state 
was plain, the legislature appointed committees to investigate the various loans and 
project expenditures in order to understand their plight.  Of the twenty-four people 
investigated by the legislature, thirteen were proclaimed innocent of any wrongdoing.  
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Various other officials were reprimanded by the state for exceeding their authority or 
negligence.  The state sued Milton Stapp for $107,187 after noting that Stapp’s work was 
foolish and ill-conceived.  The investigation committee noted that “his complicated 
negotiations with Sherwood, Danforth, Dodge, Robinson and others…are facts too 
glaring to be denied, to grossly wrong to admit of palliation, and to palpably indefensible 
to invite attack.”  Stapp, the committee implied, was too stupid to notice getting 
swindled.  In the end, after credits were applied to his account with the state, Stapp repaid 
$27,175 to settle his debt with the state. 302 
The most shocking case centered on Dr. Isaac Coe.  He, as an original fund 
commissioner, was there for the most important loans to the Morris Canal Company.  An 
examination by the state found that not only was he selling bonds to the Morris 
Company, but that he was also a large stake-holder in the business.  Coe profited 
immensely from selling the state bonds to companies in which he was a shareholder.  
Accused of improperly disposing of state funds, Coe called on Calvin Fletcher to defend 
him in court.  Fletcher, in his diary, noted that “This day learned that Dr. Coe would be 
very much exposed in relation to his actings as fund commissioner.”303  Samuel Merrill, 
in a letter to his brother, noted that Dr. Coe “no one pretends that he has not done very 
wrong, and generally he is considered as dishonest and corrupt….I may escape in that 
case by technicalities.”304   
On the surface, it seems strange that Dr. Coe’s case would draw the sympathy of 
two of the city’s most prominent leaders.  Coe had personally benefitted from his 
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handling of state bonds and brought the city and state to the threshold of ruin but was still 
able to acquire the services of the city’s most prominent attorneys and citizens.  This is 
only explained by the fact that Fletcher, Merrill, Hervey Bates, James M. Ray, Nicholas 
McCarty, James Blake, and Caleb Scudder all signed bonds backing Coe when he was 
appointed as a fund commissioner.305  The result was that they would all be held fiscally 
liable for the financial duplicitousness of Coe.  Fletcher’s help emerged from the reality 
that he would be financially ruined if Coe’s securities were held liable for the doctor’s 
impropriety.  On July 3, 1840, he noted that “I have this day been looking into my 
liabilities in consequence of my being on Dr. Coes bond as Fund Commissioner…If 
[States Bonds unpaid for] are liable on a security it must produce the insolvency of 
myself as well as other securities.”306  According to Fletcher, on January 25, 1842, “Coe 
called & wished to retain us for himself & his securities in the event of a suit on his 
bond.”  Fletcher, wishing to protect his own financial assets, accepted the case on behalf 
of him and his partners Ovid Butler and Simon Yandes.307  Fletcher’s help allowed Coe 
to escape any punishment regarding his improper handling of state funds.  By 1847, all 
charges were dropped or dismissed and he escaped with hundreds of thousands of ill-
gotten dollars.308 
The Panic of 1837 was devastating to the state, but it was equally devastating to 
individuals in Marion County.  The bursting bubble and the resulting demand for 
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payment in gold and silver specie crushed the local economy and kept prices low for 
nearly half a decade.  Land and goods sales show just how strapped the region was for 
hard currency.  An advertisement in the Indiana Democrat from December 27, 1839, 
stated that “The undersigned will sell cheap a valuable tract of land situated on the 
Leavenworth road, eight miles south of Indianapolis.  The tract contains eighty acres, 
twenty improved and eighteen cleared…The above tract of land will be sold for twelve 
hundred dollars down.  No credit will be given.”  The land, sold by Joseph Speer, was 
barely two miles from the Central Canal and the Madison and Indianapolis Railroad.309  
Speer’s inability to give credit shows exactly the kind of hard times that were pressing 
upon Marion County during the winter of 1839-40.  Another land sale in the Democrat 
noted that the “real estate belonging to Joseph Bonman and the heirs of John Ellos, 
deceased…will be sold to the highest bidder by the undersigned, as commissioner 
appointed for the purpose, in pursuance and by virtue of a decree of the Marion Circuit 
Court.  Term of sale one third of the purchase money in hand, one third in six and the 
remaining third in twelve months from day of sale.  Good title made in final payment.”310  
The advertisement in the Democrat suggests that the sellers were trying to get any money 
possible out of their land by providing credit on a small scale.  Another strategy used to 
acquire money was to provide discounts to buyers.  An ad in the Indiana Democrat noted 
that “To meet the exigency of the times and to facilitate the system upon which we will 
hereafter transact business, we have this day made a general reduction of every article in 
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our line—a reduction of twenty percent below our former prices, for cash, and for cash 
only will we sell.”311   
Sheriff’s sales were also common occurrences in Marion County during the 
depression following the Panic.  In 1835-36, the Marion County sheriff dealt with land 
sale settlements for roughly half of his official acts.  After 1837, the order books are 
overwhelmed with notes for property sales for debt.  Connor Vickers sold land on behalf 
of plaintiffs on a regular basis during the deepest years of the crisis.  Martin Bush sued 
his brother Simon Bush and David Kime, from which “returned January 13, 1840, came 
to hand October 30th 1839 by virtue of the same I have made $218.50 and now file the 
plaintiffs a receipt for $130.00.”  Stoughton Fletcher, Calvin Fletcher’s son, sued William 
Schofield in 1842 and “Returned this execution to plaintiffs…for one hundred forty nine 
dollars and 14 cents.”  While most suits were settled, not all suits were able to cover 
debts.  In 1839, Lucius Barbar sued agricultural reformer Solon Robinson but the sheriff 
“returned October 14, 1839…and I have found no property wherever to levy this wit.”312 
The financial struggles shown in the Execution Books are reflected in newspaper 
advertisements.  The Indiana Democrat issue from December 27, 1839, placed an article 
stating “By virtue of an execution to me directed from the Clerk’s office of the Marion 
Circuit Court, I will expose to public sale to the highest bidder on Saturday the 4th day of 
January next, in front of the Washington Hall, in Indianapolis, at 2 o’clock. M. on said 
day, the rent and profits for seven years, of lot No. 3, in square No. 61 in the town of 
Indianapolis, and on failing to realize the full amount demanded by said execution, 
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damages and costs, I will at the same time and place, expose the fee simple of said lot 
executed as the property of Jonathan Eakle, a the suit of Joshua C. Oliver against said 
Eakle and Chas. C. Campbell.”313  In January of 1841, a sheriff’s sale put up Nathaniel 
Cox’s town lot in Indianapolis to pay debts to A.W. & J.D. Morris and Morris , Haselett 
& Co.314  The August 18, 1841, issue of the Indiana Journal listed eight land sales from 
all over the county.  John Carnahan’s land was sold “on failure to realize the full amount 
demanded by said execution with damages and costs...at the suit of the State of Indiana.”  
Some suits were brought by individuals against each other.  Lewis Lewis’ town lot 
number ten in square forty was sold on suit by Priscilla Allen.315   
Land sales at public auction were a common site in early 1840 when the 
depression was at its worst.  An April 18, 1840, notice in the Indiana Journal announced 
sales of land for failure to pay interest on their loans.  The notice, which ran one and a 
half columns, listed properties across the state and included local failures.  Local resident 
Harry Perry’s town lots ten and eleven in section 50 were put up for sale to pay off his 
$200 mortgage.  Land just outside of Indianapolis city limits mortgaged by Benjamin 
Crothers was put up to cover his $500 owed to the state.  Thomas Thomas’ thirty-five 
acres of land was put up to cover his $200 debt.316 
Insolvent probates were also prominent features of local newspapers requesting 
that creditors come forward to put in their claims in order to settle the account.  The 
January session of the Marion County Probate Court in 1841 listed several insolvent 
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probates including those of Jacob Roop and Samuel Parker.317  Roop’s probate eventually 
went through the probate court in order to settle debts.  In his instance, his estate—which 
listed a clock, an unknown number of horses, twenty-six shoats and one sow—was not 
enough to cover his debts.  As a result, his debtors got barely a third of what they were 
owed.  David Boyd received only $.59 of the $1.50 his was owed, Jacob Miller was due 
$21.33 and got $8.49, and Goerge Heiser was owed $108.96 and got $43.45.  Nicholas 
McCarty was owed $86.70 and got $35.16 back.318  Probates also show that the economy 
was still struggling to recover from depressed prices.  The estate of Thomas McClintock, 
settled in August of 1841, shows that buyers purchased his goods at prices roughly 
twenty-five to thirty percent below their appraised value.  His stallion mare was appraised 
at $200 but only sold for $150, his bay mare sold for $40 but was appraised at $60.  The 
estate sale for James Harton shows a similar difficulty.  His mare was appraised at $30 in 
1839 but sold for only $17 in 1841 when the probate sale occurred.319  Henry Mundy’s 
estate shows that a milking cow appraised at $14 only sold for $12.  William Hobson’s 
kiln, appraised at $200, only sold for $120.  In a comment in his diary, Calvin Fletcher 
noted that in March of 1840 “I have looked with concern to the great pressure which 
pervades our land at present.  The change has been sudden & tremendous.  One year ago 
a cow was ready sale at $15 or $20—wheat $1. a $1.25.  Now money cannot be got for 
either.”320  Ultimately, what these prices show is a remarkable similarity with the rest of 
the United States regarding the overall effect on prices.  Jeremy Atack and Peter Passell 
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have argued that the “financial crisis that began in 1837 was extremely severe.  The 
money supply fell by 34% from 1838 to 1842.  Prices fell by 33 percent from 1839 to 
1843.”  These numbers fit in directly with the experience of Marion County and suggest 
that while the local economy was not completely connected to the rest of the national and 
international economy in terms of circulation of cash, it experienced the same kinds of 
depressed prices felt in other regions.321 
Obviously, not all probates were insolvent in Marion County.  William Holmes 
had a large probate that listed a remainder of $1479.76 to be distributed to his six heirs, 
but even he took severe losses due to the Panic of 1837.  Holmes’ bay mare was 
appraised at $100 but only sold for $86.  His cows and pigs sold at a considerable 
profit—one of the few noted in the record.  The cow, valued at $15, sold for $26.75, and 
the hogs were appraised at $10 but sell for $20.18 ¾. Homer Brooks’ probate listed that 
he owned sixty-six shares of State Bank of Indiana stock worth $2679.50.  While Holmes 
and Brooks’ probates left them with a lot of money, the probate of David Murdock, a 
local canal contractor who owned a significant number of wagons and yokes of oxen, is 
more representative of how the Panic affected residents of central Indiana.  It showed that 
he died with $7.41 to distribute to his heirs.  Ultimately, these probates show that all 
classes of people were affected by the Panic.322   
There is also a bit of money lending between individuals at the local level.  The 
aforementioned William Holmes took out a loan from Philip K. Landis on August 30, 
1836, for $1,000 at ten percent interest over ten years.  Holmes, hoping for the 
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completion of internal improvements projects, presumably took out the loan to increase 
his ability to benefit from the lowered cost of transportation to external markets via the 
Central Canal.  He would almost certainly have taken the money to hire hands and buy 
improved implements in order to increase his ability to export his crops.323  Holmes was 
not the only Hoosier to take out loans from local lenders to buy land.  Hugh O’Neal 
borrowed one hundred dollars cash from Calvin Fletcher and another note of one hundred 
dollars on credit “which he will return when able.”324  As the panic tightened its grip on 
the region, Hoosier debtors found it more difficult to meet the financial responsibilities 
they accumulated over the previous years.  Especially after the failure of the internal 
improvements projects, things got even more difficult as prices dropped and 
transportation prices remained high.   
The Panic was also difficult for stores in the region.  Stresses and closures were 
reported in newspapers as the credit crunch landed on merchants unable to pay their 
dealers, thus forcing them to eliminate sales on credit, which was the only way that the 
frontier economy could function.  In one example, W.A. Sangers & Brothers, a grocery 
store and liquor dealer, advertised that “to meet the exigency of the times and to facilitate 
the system upon which we will hereafter transact business, we have this day made a 
general reduction of every article in our line—a reduction of twenty percent below our 
former prices, for cash, and for cash only will we sell.”325  In another, P.K. Landis, on 
January 5, 1839, posted an article in the Indiana Journal noting that he “respectfully 
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informs his customers that he has sold out his stock of Dry Goods, and requests all those 
indebted to him by note or book account, to call and settle without delay, as longer 
indulgence cannot be given.”326  Yet another from the Journal noted that “just received 
and opened at the Clothing Store and Tailoring establishment opposite the Washington 
Hall, a beautiful assortment of FALL AND WINTER GOODS, which will be sold very 
low for cash or on a short credit to punctual customers.”327  The last article is important 
because it most clearly demonstrates that merchants were struggling with cash on hand.  
The emphasis on punctuality is an emphatic reminder that customers would not be able to 
obtain goods on long-term credit due to the Panic.   
Business partnerships also experienced a major shakeup during the Panic.  A 
notice in the Indiana Democrat in 1838 stated that “The partnership heretofore existing 
between Bolton and Livingston, was dissolved by mutual consent, on the 4th May, 1838.  
The amount of debts on subscription, advertisements, jobs, &c., &c., owing the late firm, 
amount to about $6000.”  It continued by noting that “To make every effort in our power 
to meet joint liabilities, we have placed all accounts due the establishment in the hands of 
Mr. George Pattison, who is well acquainted with our business, and will be ready in a few 
days to enter upon the duties assigned him, with the understanding that the first proceeds 
of his efforts will be devoted to those having claims against the firm.  The urgency of our 
creditors has compelled us to instruct Mr. Pattison to spare no pains to bring the business 
to as speedy a close as possible.”328  Another posting entitled “Dissolution of 
Partnership” appeared in the Democrat.  It stated that “the firm of Phillips & Griffith is 
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this day dissolved by mutual consent.—The business of the establishment will be carried 
on by Philips alone—grateful for past patronage, he solicits its continuance.  All persons 
indebted to the firm, will call at the store and settle, by cash or mote, with Philips—Delay 
is Dangerous and the accounts will be left for collection without delay.”329  A notice 
posted by F. Foltz and Joseph R. Pratt in the Democrat from February 18, 1841, notes 
that “The Partnership heretofore existing between the subscribers has this day been 
dissolved by mutual consent.  Those indebted to the firm will please make immediate 
payment to John W. Holland, who is authorized to settle up the business of the 
concern.”330   
As late as 1841, money was still very tight in the local economy.  Calvin Fletcher 
confided to his diary that “If I would indulge in gloom I could not feel more gloomy for 
the future prospects of my country so far as it relates to her pecuniary matters.”331  A 
notice in the Indiana Journal from February 7, 1841, noted that “All persons knowing 
themselves indebted to me by note or book account will please call and settle up before 
the first of March…as I must have money.”  The ad, posted by William Wiley, threatened 
to turn accounts over to the authorities for collection if they were not promptly paid.332  
Another, from B. K. Smith, similarly stated that “The subscriber is under the painful 
necessity of saying to his customers and those in arrears that he MUST SAVE MONEY!  
He finds, by examining his books and papers, numerous clams…which, if they had been 
docketed a year or two ago would have been made…He is now compelled to call upon 
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his more honest and honorable patrons to stop in and help him out of his difficulty.  Cash, 
cash-notes or judgments must be had, within one month.”333   
The administrator’s sale for William Vert, of Lawrence Township, placed an ad in 
the Indiana Journal noting that they would sell the farmland, cattle, and crops but would 
not require immediate payment.  The notice stated that “credit of twelve months will be 
given on all sums over three dollars, purchasers giving bonds or notes with approved 
security.”334  This notice is a sharp change from those in 1839-41, when sales routinely 
demanded at least a portion of money down for any public or private sales.  Another 
advertisement from the same issue noted that the Covington Rolling Mill in Cincinnati 
“is prepared to furnish at all times a complete assortment of Iron and Nails…The usual 
credits given to regular customers.”335  A notice in the Indiana State Sentinel suggested 
that some merchant houses could afford to rely on barter and credit instead of cash.  It 
noted that “produce such as Wheat, Oats, Beef Hides, Linen, and a few other articles 
taken in exchange for goods in their line, at the market prices.”336   
While there were still large numbers of sheriff’s sales and demands for cash 
payments in newspapers, late 1842 seems to be a period when merchants began loosening 
credit restrictions in Marion County.  The resumption of specie payment on June 15, 
1842, helped bolster the availability of credit in the region.  As the effects of the Panic of 
1837 wore off, the banks felt they had the ability to again pay their depositors in specie 
without fear of a run on the institution.  The resumption of specie was so smooth that 
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leaders of the Indianapolis branch of the State Bank noted, “We have expected heavy 
runs for specie but it passed off without much excitement & not more than $50 drawn.”  
That there were no runs on the Indianapolis branch suggests that they were insulated from 
the heavy trade of the Ohio River.  While out-of-state lenders attempted to recover hard 
currency at the Ohio River branches, Marion County’s seclusion allowed it to weather 
any potential runs from out-of-state parties.337   
After 1843, the recovery in Marion County accelerated.  New businesses emerged 
as the Panic and ensuing depression cleared out older businesses.  John H. Wright’s pork 
packing mill was the first successful endeavor in its industry beginning in 1843, 
according to Calvin Fletcher.338  Wright partnered with his relatives Jeremiah and 
William Mansur to begin slaughtering in an abandoned blacksmith shop on the corner of 
Meridian and Maryland streets just south of the center of the city on the National Road.  
He took his goods for “half cash and half goods” at his store to induce farmers to bring 
their stock to him and were successful enough to operate a second location eight miles 
north of town at Broad Ripple.339  The success of the slaughterhouse was not lost on 
Calvin Fletcher.  He noted that he “Went to Wright’s pork house in which they put up 
this year 1500 hogs, the most put up in our market in any one year in our place.”  The 
possibilities of the railroad reaching the city led him to continue that “I look forward to 
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the day when immense quantities will be put up.  Should the railroad reach here from 
Madison not less than 15 Ms. will be slaughtered here the first year.”340   
The state agricultural society was another casualty of the Panic of 1837.  
Established in 1836 as an “Act for the encouragement of Agriculture,” the agricultural 
society of Indiana was designed to spur growth in farming so that Hoosiers could use 
internal improvement systems to send increased crop yields to external markets.  The 
agricultural society did not hold another meeting for five years.  Solon Robinson 
lamented during a trip to Indianapolis that “It is painful to learn that the agricultural 
society at the seat of government of such a state as Indiana…now sleeps too sound to be 
awakened by the ordinary cries of a community suffering for the want of a better system 
of agricultural education.”341  Robinson further decried the lack of improved agriculture 
in the region, stating that “there is a great defect in agricultural knowledge in this part of 
the world, or we should find more attention paid the cultivation of grass and stock.  
Around Indianapolis, there are some slight indications of improvement in this respect.  
But the fact that an agricultural paper was not adequately supported at that place proves 
that the country was far more rich in soil than any thing else.”342 
Jane Shaffer Elsmere notes that the agricultural societies of Marion County and 
the state of Indiana “failed within a few years probably due to the state’s small 
population, inadequate communications, and poor transportation.”343  When examining 
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the burden of transportation in Marion County as noted in chapter two, the failure of the 
agricultural society is less surprising.  The association was formed in 1836, the same year 
that the Mammoth Internal Improvements Bill was signed into law.  The legislature’s 
support for a statewide agricultural society reflected their belief that the state would be 
able to transport their goods to external markets for a profit.  When the internal 
improvements projects failed during the Panic of 1837, the proposed transportation 
network vanished and made farming for markets inefficient.  Prominent Indiana 
agricultural historian and economist William Latta notes that “the cost of transportation 
of small shipments would often be more than the prices at commercial centers, and 
increased production, that would make large shipments and economical transportation 
possible, must wait for the gradual clearing away of the dense forest.”344  The result of 
these lack of transportation networks was a key factor in the failure of the agricultural 
society by 1841.  Hoosiers in central Indiana had no incentive to improve their farming 
methods to increase output because they could not sell excess crops at a profit.  Hence, 
the agricultural societies would do little to help Hoosier farmers make their lives better.   
The Panic of 1837 was devastating for Indiana.  The carelessness of internal 
improvements loans, ineffectiveness of government oversight, and outright illegal 
activities by loan commissioners left a strong mark on the history of Indiana.  In 
September of 1843, Calvin Fletcher reflected on the severity of the crisis over the past 
few years.  He stated that “I have recently been thro several of our one flourishing towns 
& out of 20 or 30 merchants at Lafayett only 4 of the old ones survive…There is scarcly 
a store in many of the county seats & other towns in the state…Out of more than 2000 
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merchants in the state not one 20th has escaped the general reck of the credits 
system…The whole agricultural population are also broken down depressed and made 
dishonest—3/4 of our legislature for the last 3 years has been known or secret 
bankrupts.”345  Prominent Indiana historian James Madison provides an excellent 
understanding of the meaning of the Big Bill when he argues that “The Mammoth 
Internal Improvements act symbolized both the optimism and the democracy of the age 
[but] they lost and looked foolish in the end…In a curious irony of history, the 
venturesome pioneer generation contributed to the reluctance of succeeding generations 
to take similar risks, to use active state government, as they had, in service of the general 
welfare.  Revulsion with the system of 1836 was a direct cause of the provision in the 
Indiana Constitution of 1851 that to this day restricts the state from going into debt.”346   
The crisis was an even more critical turning point in the history of Marion 
County.  Through the 1830s, residents of central Indiana were certain that the Central 
Canal would make Indianapolis a major stopping point in water-based transportation 
systems that would simultaneously bring trade, increase the value of farm land, and allow 
local citizens to partake in the river-based economy of the United States.  With the failure 
of the Mammoth Internal Improvements Bill, Hoosiers were forced to adjust their 
expectations of an agricultural empire.  The Agricultural Board was disbanded due to 
lack of interest, the Central Canal only functioned for a short isolated stretch in Marion 
County, and land prices dropped precipitously because of the financial collapse.  Property 
values dipped so low that local government had to step in and state that no property could 
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be sold for less than its appraised value to prop up the local economy.347  The original 
plan for the city of Indianapolis to become a center of western river-based commerce was 
dead.   
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CHAPTER 6: “THE RAILROAD ARRIVES: BEGINNINGS OF TELESCOPED 
GROWTH, 1844-1852” 
 
The Panic of 1837 brutalized Marion County.  Hoosiers gave up their dreams of 
becoming the center of a water-based commercial system that would command trade 
between the Great Lakes and the Gulf of Mexico as the state rebuilt its finances during 
the decade following the land bust.  Prices for goods dropped, residents fled to the West 
looking for better opportunities, and those who stayed battled through economic 
difficulty.  Calvin Fletcher, in March of 1840, described the situation by stating that the 
“change has been sudden & tremendous.  One year ago a cow was ready sale at $15-
$20—wheat $1 a $1.25.  Now mony cannot be got for either…Wheat nominal value 50 
cents—cow $8 and $10.  Merchants cannot longer [obtain] credit…We have greatly 
abused the privileges of a Kind Providence.”348  The tide turned in favor of Hoosiers 
during the mid-1840s as railroads captured the collective imagination.349  In 1843, the 
Madison and Indianapolis Railroad Company took over construction of the first railroad 
that would connect the state capital to the Ohio River.  It took four years for the railroad 
to get to Indianapolis, but it had a dramatic effect on the development of the city.  It 
began a process of telescoped development that made it one of the first cities in the 
United States to experience the kind of development regularly seen in the Far West.350  
From 1847 to 1865, Indianapolis foreshadowed the kind of explosive growth western 
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boomtowns would see as transportation and communication networks obliterated time 
and space. 
The style of urbanization in Marion County is significant.  Indianapolis was a 
pioneer in Early Western development.  As Richard Wade notes, other major cities in the 
region—Cincinnati, Louisville, Chicago, St. Louis, Pittsburgh—all had their roots in the 
18th century.  Like Indianapolis, they were planned cities whose development preceded 
the arrival of settlers.  In Wade’s telling, towns were the “spearheads of the frontier.”351  
Unlike the Hoosier capital, these cities had access to effective river transportation that 
shaped their economic development.  The success of water-oriented shipping in these 
cities allowed for the emergence of long-standing social, economic, and cultural 
relationships.  These relationships provided stability as society and markets changed over 
time, but those relationships also hampered the kind of economic and transportation 
development seen in Indianapolis.  River cities experienced a developmental inertia 
because of the social, economic, and political relationships created by successful water 
transportation.  They ultimately prevented river-based urban areas from immediately 
adopting new infrastructure technologies like the railroad.  As a result, Indianapolis and 
the surrounding community grew faster, especially in agricultural pursuits, than any other 
city in the Early West.   
Hoosiers also had to deal with the arrival of large numbers of outsiders that 
threatened the established social structures that existed when the city was a secluded 
hamlet.  Marion County was settled overwhelmingly by Anglo-American Protestants, but 
the rise of the railroad created a national infrastructure that lowered travel costs.  The 
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waves of immigrants that poured ashore during the 1840s could cheaply travel west, and 
the boomtown of Indianapolis was an attractive location.  The arrival of these outsiders 
challenged the balance of electoral power and social stability in the city and gave rise to a 
feeling of anxiety best exemplified by the creation of local vigilante groups.  Residents 
like Calvin Fletcher were also unable to show the tolerance for roughhousing that existed 
early in the city’s history, as city leaders wrote disdainfully about the recreation of 
immigrant groups that settled in the city during the 1840s.  Locals argued about the ways 
that outsiders were a threat to their security as residents of Marion County organized 
paralegal military organizations to police the seemingly insecure social landscape.  Labor 
strife was one unique factor of urbanization that was absent in Marion County.  Labor 
tensions were not palpable in the early railroad era as the building boom soaked up 
excess workers who were replaced by agricultural machinery.  Overall, the late-1840s 
noticed a significant shift in Marion County, as the economic life of the region improved 
drastically but social tensions emerged that threatened the vision of what early settlers 
dreamed would be the perfect haven of wealth and tranquility.   
In Indianapolis, the arrival of the railroad drastically restructured the local and 
regional transportation system and made the city a hub of western commerce.  There 
were practically no economic institutions that lobbied against the rise of the railroad 
because all residents suffered from a lack of access to outside markets.  As noted in 
previous chapters, internal improvements received support from all parts of Hoosier 
society, so when the canal project failed, the railroad received all the remaining support 
for internal improvements.  As Donald Carmony has noted, this led to the “unusually 
rapid advance” of railroads in Indiana during the 1850s.  In 1850, Governor Joseph A. 
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Wright announced that there were 212 miles of railroad in the state.  By 1853, Wright 
noted that there were over 800 miles and in 1855, Hoosiers reported that the state had 
1,406 operable miles of track.352   
In Marion County, the advance of the railroad was as fortuitous as it was 
anywhere in the world.  Prior to the arrival of the Madison and Indianapolis Railroad in 
1847, Hoosiers were practically unconnected with regional economic networks and 
remained on the economic frontier.  After the arrival of the rail, however, residents 
quickly saw the economic benefits of their new connections as prices for agricultural 
goods, such as wheat, jumped from forty to ninety cents over the course of a few 
weeks.353  Calvin Fletcher described a sharp price increase for agricultural goods over the 
course of a year.354  Local residents also began to establish their own economic sphere of 
influence by manufacturing their own goods and selling them to others in Marion County.  
By January of 1848, residents could buy wholesale readymade clothes from the Palmer 
House or stationery from the Hood and Noble businesses on Washington Street.355  In 
April of 1848, David Craighead opened his wholesale drugstore.356  By September 1848, 
residents could buy wholesale dry goods from L.B. Williamson’s store on Washington 
Street.357  In May of 1848, the telegraph reached the city, connecting central Indiana to 
Dayton, Cincinnati and “the East” on the “lightning line.”358   
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There was also an alteration in the urban layout.  Albert Dickens states that the 
depot “led to a rapid change in the structural pattern of the city.”359  By 1850, there were 
over 100 manufacturing establishments in the city producing at least $500 of goods.360  
Real property also increased in value from roughly one million dollars in 1847 to 2.3 
million dollars in 1850.361  The railroad allowed these manufacturers to ship their 
products to Ohio River markets for the first time and shop owners began locating their 
outfits near the rail depot.  The Madison and Indianapolis Railroad Depot lay on South 
Street just east of Meridian.  The land was cheap, swampy, and virtually untouched by 
farmers in the preceding decades, but the arrival of the railroad drew manufacturing to 
the southeast side of the city.  James Falconer, owner of the Monumental Marble Works, 
built his shop “at the Madison and Indianapolis Railroad Depot” on the southeast corner 
of the city.362  Charles Woodward and his partners S.V.B. and T.R. Noel advertised their 
wholesale warehouse on the west side and the Blythe and Holland merchant warehouse 
was on the east side of the same depot.363   
The increase in economic activity after the arrival of the railroad also brought 
increased urbanization.  The new newspaper, tellingly entitled The Locomotive, reflected 
the excitement surrounding the arrival of the railroad.  It noted that “During the coming 
summer there will be more building erected here than there ever was in any two 
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seasons…There will be a great demand for the different kinds of mechanics here this 
summer.”364  More than three hundred homes were built during 1849.365  By 1854, the 
Indiana Sentinel noted that there was a housing shortage in the city.366  Indianapolis 
boosters finally achieved the economic goals they sought since the earliest days of 
settlement in the 1820s.  For the first time, Indianapolis had the opportunity to get 
involved in the economy of the nation on a scale only seen in regions connected to the 
broader world of trade by water or rail.   
In contrast, residents in river cities were slow to recognize that the railroad 
threatened the viability of river trade in the long-term.  Jeremy Atack and others argue 
that the entire state of Ohio was slow to grasp the merits of railroads because, “having 
invested heavily in the earlier canal technology, Ohio initially tried hard to discourage the 
[railroad] from devaluing the state’s existing infrastructure investment.”367  Sentiments 
that the Ohio River would provide an endless commercial bounty were so strong in the 
early nineteenth century that local Cincinnati leaders were forced to warn against 
“excessive faith in the river as a commercial mother lode.”368  As railroads became more 
important, it became imperative for urban areas to overcome the economic bias toward 
rivers.  But residents did not always see the long-term implications of infrastructure 
change.  Steven Ross notes that “having failed to embrace the railroad as rapidly as they 
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had the steamboat, [Cincinnati’s] merchants and capitalists could only moan as the bulk 
of the East-West trade of the 1850s and 1860s shifted from rivers to rails and 
consequently away from Cincinnati.”369   
As mentioned above, Cincinnati dominated the Indianapolis market in the 1830s.  
In 1846, advertisements still routinely mention the prices and products of Porkopolis.  
One advertisement from the Indiana State Sentinel declared the availability of stoves 
which he received “direct from the manufacturer in Cincinnati…which he will sell at the 
smallest possible advance on the Cincinnati price.”370  An ad placed a week later in the 
competing Indiana Journal by company agent James Calhoun publicized that the 
“[Queen City Varnish Company]…will shortly be in the receipt of the largest and best 
supply of [gums] for the manufacture of [v]arnish, ever brought into the Western 
country.”371  Other advertisements offer goods including window shades, wine, liquor 
and cigars from Cincinnati producers.372  The preponderance of advertisements from 
Cincinnati reflected their dominance over the Ohio River trade in the early nineteenth 
century.  Merchants and producers in the “Queen City of the West” had easy overland 
access to Indianapolis up to 1847 and had solidified trade ties to wholesalers and 
merchants to the north.  For two decades, Cincinnati could supply the nascent Hoosier 
capital with basic goods necessary for professional development and personal comfort.  
However, increasing industrial output and the expansion of rail lines throughout the 
northern part of the United States gave rise to an economic challenge to Cincinnati.   
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The increasing capabilities of railroad infrastructure drove a shift away from 
Cincinnati.  By the end of 1847, advertisements from New York firms were a regular 
feature of Hoosier papers.  One advertisement in the Indiana State Journal by New York-
based merchants, artisans and mechanics aimed “solicit the calls of country merchants 
who wish to purchase any articles in their line.”373  Another declared the sale of foreign 
periodicals such as the London Quarterly Review and noted that “[the] above 
[p]eriodicals are reprinted in New York…they afford all that advantage to the American 
over the English reader.”374  Further announcements proclaimed the availability of “the 
largest and best assortment of [s]ilk parasols and [p]arasolettes [e]ver offered to the 
[m]erchants of America.”375  These advertisements from eastern producers reflect the 
integration and modernization of the national economy and the rise in production from 
manufactories.  However, it also reflects that the city of Indianapolis became a larger cog 
in the national economy.  Population growth in the western city made shipping products 
more efficient by allowing eastern merchants to combine loads.  Increased traffic to 
Indianapolis forced a restructuring of transportation networks.  The appearance of a 
railroad provided the city with a contemporary symbol of promise.  The growing city 
became a natural economic market for coastal merchants because of these changes, as 
businessmen could quickly and easily address local consumer needs and manufacture 
goods cheaper than their western competitors. 
The insurgence of eastern merchants into western markets caused a regional 
tussle.  Competition for the Indianapolis market emerged as a central theme of advertisers 
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seeking Hoosier business.  One eastern advertisement touted the sale of cough drops 
“prepared from the receipt of an eminent German physician…having been extensively 
used in the eastern States with unparalleled success.”376  Another proclaimed the success 
of cheap goods purchased from New York “since the great reduction in prices, which will 
enable us to astonish the natives in the way of great bargains.”377  The Philadelphia 
merchants selling parasols told consumers of their advantages over other producers, 
stating that they, “have adopted every improvement in machinery, manufacture mainly by 
steam, and have carried the division of labor to a great extent” which will allow them “to 
offer lower prices than ever before.”  Significantly, the author of this advertisement laid 
out his business model to prospective customers.  He noted that “[s]mall profits, large 
returns, and the mutual interests of buyer and seller, on a broad scale, is the object and 
basis of this…house.”378  These advertisements imply that eastern merchants were 
actively seeking out markets in Indianapolis.  Instead of having Hoosier partners in New 
York, eastern merchants and businessmen—using newly located telegraph lines and 
railroad transportation—were asking local merchants to cut out the middle men in 
Cincinnati.  The guide shown here reflects traditional patterns in the modernization and 
expansion of capitalism in the United States.  The most efficient producers—those in 
New York, Boston and Philadelphia—used improving transportation and communication 
technology to expand their market influence in ever-increasing areas throughout the 
nation.379  On the way, they competed with producers and merchants who traditionally 
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served their clients’ needs.  After 1847, the technological and transportation infrastructure 
quickly evolved enough that the New York economic market efficiently reached the 
Early West.   
The city experienced serious growth due to the arrival of the railroad, but the 
telescoped development of Indianapolis also created serious problems for the city.  The 
economic success of railroads depended on efficient delivery of goods from the 
hinterland to the marketplace so that time was not wasted.  Marion County residents were 
forced to adapt their conception of time to fit the railroad.  An advertisement in the 
Locomotive suggested these tensions, noting “The citizens of Indianapolis have been 
bothered, to know when, where or how to get the correct time…Now the truth of the 
matter is, none have been able to keep the correct time, for want of a good time piece.”  
The subscriber, clock and watch shop owner W.H. Talbott, stated that he bought a 
“Mercurial Regulator…in which all can have confidence.”  Talbott’s advertisement 
certainly aimed to draw customers to his shop, but it is equally important that he believed 
that residents felt that the lack of a common time was detrimental to city business.380  In 
the 1830s, Hoosiers began buying timepieces in expectation that they would use them on 
the canal, but the failure of the canal ended their usefulness.  By 1848, however, Hoosiers 
were searching for ways to increase their efficiency as they connected to regional and 
national markets that necessitated a complex timekeeping structure.   
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One measure of Hoosier excitement during the 1850s was the re-emergence of a 
formal Agricultural Society and the rebirth of the Board of Agriculture of the State of 
Indiana, the reports of which offer insight into the concerns of central Indiana farmers.  
The first Ag Society in Marion County emerged in 1825.  It failed quickly due to lack of 
interest, presumably because improved agriculture would provide no benefit due to lack 
of transportation access.  The next attempt to create a supporting institution to 
agricultural improvement emerged in 1835.  The timing is significant because of the 
emergence of the Mammoth Internal Improvements Bill.  Hoosiers in central Indiana 
were willing to participate in the society because they believed that they would be able to 
transport crops to Ohio River markets.  However, the Panic of 1837 quickly dashed the 
hopes that Marion County residents would achieve that access and, as a result, local 
interest in the society faded and would not meet again until 1851.   
The lack of an agricultural society in Marion County between 1837 and 1850 does 
not mean that all residents gave up on improvements.  Many prominent Hoosiers 
promoted agricultural improvements.  Henry Ward Beecher, the outspoken anti-slavery 
speaker, promoted agricultural improvements and the moral purpose of farming during 
the course of his time in the Hoosier capital.  In 1840, he was instrumental in forming the 
Indiana Horticultural Society and in his “Seven Lectures to Young Men,” published in 
1844, he argued that agricultural propriety shielded one from accusations of idleness.  “I 
went by the field of the slothful, and by the vineyard of the man void of understanding; 
and lo! It was all grown over with thorns, and nettles had covered the face thereof, and 
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the stone wall thereof was broken down.”381  For Beecher, “in America, industry is 
prosperity…every product of the earth has a susceptibility of improvement.”382  He 
wanted his readers to work hard in the mechanical arts so that they would earn an honest 
living as opposed to the “scheming speculations of the last ten years that have produced 
an aversion among the young to the slow accumulations of ordinary industry and fired 
them with a conviction that shrewdness, cunning, and bold ventures are a more manly 
way to wealth.”383  The preacher believed that the actions of the new sort of young men 
created social problems in rural communities because, “the young farmer becomes almost 
ashamed to meet his schoolmate, whose stores line whole streets, whose stocks are in 
every bank and company, and whose increasing money is already wellnigh 
inestimable.”384  These comments hit home in Indianapolis during the aftermath of the 
Panic of 1837.  Perhaps in an attempt to justify the rural character of the local populace, 
he stated that “if a young man has no higher ambition in life than riches, industry—plain, 
rugged brown-faced, homely-clad, old-fashioned industry—must be courted.”385   
The reemergence of the county agricultural societies was partially influenced by 
the emergence of Henry Ward Beecher on the national political scene.  Beecher, one of 
the most influential preachers of the mid-nineteenth century, moved to Indianapolis in 
1837 to run the Second Presbyterian Church—a newly formed parish on the northwest 
corner of Market Street on the Circle in the center of town.  Beecher’s success in 
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preaching to the local community and his insistence on improving local agriculture gave 
rise to his editorship of the Indiana Farmer and Gardener.  On New Year’s Day in 1846, 
his newspaper joined with the Western Farmer and Gardener, and by the end of the year 
had more than 1200 subscribers.  Beecher’s growing prominence as an anti-slavery 
advocate provided the necessary interest to grow his agricultural newspaper.  However, 
the publication ended when he moved to New York in 1847.386  The resulting lack of an 
agricultural periodical gave rise to the formation of county agricultural societies.   
By 1852, Marion County was regaining its footing as an agricultural and 
economic power.  No fewer than four railroads connected the city to places on the Ohio 
River, and more were under construction.  Across the state, more than thirty counties 
organized an Agricultural Society under an 1851 law that allowed for a State Board of 
Agriculture.  Residents of central Indiana followed in these footsteps reforming the 
County Agricultural Society that was abandoned after 1836.  The initial report of the 
Marion County chapter of the Indiana State Board of Agriculture was incredibly positive 
in its assessment of Indiana agriculture.  It noted that Hoosiers were becoming 
increasingly aware of the opportunities of agricultural improvement by stating that “The 
public mind seems now to have waked up to the realization of something practical; and 
each man asks for himself the best system, the best mode, the best manner of reaping the 
reward for the labor bestowed upon the earth.”387  The State Board pushed for “what is 
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always desirable, the saving of time and toil, but means of the most judicious, skillful and 
approved application of labor to any given pursuit.”388   
The Marion County branch of the State Board of Agriculture, headed by none 
other than Calvin Fletcher, noted that improvements in Marion County were well 
underway in some areas.  The prominent farmer specifically stated that “we are pleased 
to state that our farmers are introducing new labor saving machines—new thrashers [sic], 
shellers, straw-cutters and other implements.”389  He also noted that local farmers were 
using the Gatling grain drill, of which the “results highly approved,” and the McCormick 
reaper which, he noted, “has well sustained its high reputation.”390  And that “deeper and 
better plowing as well as rolling of the land is beginning to meet with practical favor.”391  
Fletcher noted regarding his own farm that “I have built me a barn and repaired my house 
prepared my farm for a better and Higher state of agriculture.  Expenditures have been 
greater than usual but hope I shall realize my outgoes in future.”392  Newspaper 
advertisements also show that Hoosiers were interested in agricultural improvements.  A 
June 8, 1848 notice in the Indiana State Sentinel stated that Gatling’s Wheat Drill was the 
“most valuable improvement in planting wheat…the time is not far distant when the 
farmers of this State, as in all of the older states, will consider the wheat drill an 
indispensable labor saving machine.”393 
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The 1850 Census of Agriculture shows the effects of water-based infrastructure 
on Marion County when compared to the rest of the Early West.  The Hoosier capital 
lagged far behind river counties when examining markers like percentage of improved 
land, cash value/farm, and land value/acre.  Marion County, as shown in the Appendix, 
was more on par with counties away from the Ohio, Wabash or Whitewater River 
valleys.  The only category that Marion County was comparable with river-based 
counties was in the land value per improved acre in 1850, presumably because the 
railroad finally reached the city and the price of improved land increased dramatically.   
However, not everything in Marion County was improving.  The report noted that 
“the number and quality of neat cattle have not been improving, and no pains have 
recently been taken to improve the breed of hogs.”394  That Calvin Fletcher noted the lack 
of improvement in cattle and hogs and the lack of focus on improved crops presents an 
interesting problem.  Why did Hoosiers hold back investments in improved breeds and 
seeds after they had access to national markets?  This is explained by a short excerpt from 
the Indiana Gazeteer from 1849.  Describing the hesitance of Hoosiers to specialize for 
external markets, they hint that farmers would rather stay diversified because of “frequent 
gluts in the market of some kinds of produce,” and continued by stating that “the farmer 
often doubts as to the proper objects on which to expend his labor, and it has become 
very desirable that he should have a greater diversity of crops than he has had 
hitherto.”395  Hoosiers, rather than quickly specializing to use their agricultural advantage 
to full effect after 1847, diversified to offset the radical changes to markets during the 
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massive infrastructure change.  The economic changes of the early nineteenth century 
were so drastic that Hoosiers reverted to stronger versions of self-subsistence to make 
sure their families were secure before they adapted the specialization that historians 
frequently note occurred as market connections emerged in new regions.396 
Moreover, there was a labor shortage during the initial years after the railroad 
entered Marion County.  As noted above, the population of the region increased 
dramatically during the period from 1847-1860, but the need for construction labor also 
increased rapidly.  Building an infrastructure for railroads, housing, government, and 
other major trades kept immigrants in town doing construction rather than working for 
fields.  When farmers finally had the ability to acquire increased prices, they lacked the 
labor to immediately increase output unless they took the heavy expenditure of buying 
machinery.  Only those who could comfortably afford grain drills and reapers could 
harness the power of the market.  Those that lived closer to the economic margins 
reverted to diversification to see where the market would go.   
By 1848, economic activity in Indianapolis seemed to operate on a predominantly 
cash basis.  This alteration marked an important evolution in the history of the city.  Cash 
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ubiquity marked another turning point in which the city entered a full-fledged market 
economy as described by Christopher Clark.397  As the city urbanized, carpenters, 
blacksmiths, and laborers all earned wages for their work instead of barter.  For example, 
in 1849, Samuel Merrill paid James Keely and J.M. Barnwell in cash for work 
bricklaying and shingling.398  These workers used this money to buy goods and pay for 
lodging.  But country producers were not able to rely solely on cash.  Rural residents of 
Marion County still relied mostly on barter to accomplish their economic goals.  
Advertisements showing that merchants would accept country produce still existed.  Jesse 
Jones and J. H. McKernan opened a shop on Washington Street advertising their 
assortment of dry goods.  They would take cash or “all kinds of country produce and 
marketing in exchange for their goods.”399  These transactions were remnants of a frontier 
economic model in Indianapolis where local merchants offered credit to country 
producers for the year and traded goods for their crops.400  Indianapolis grew after the 
arrival of the railroad, but rural residents were limited in their ability to enter the cash 
economy during the first years of economic expansion.   
The brief push to diversify crops to stave off economic risk was only one surprise 
that awaited Hoosiers during their attempts to connect to markets.  At the same moment 
transportation improvements made mobility cheaper, an influx of European immigrants 
to the region led to arguments over proper social etiquette and the contestation of what it 
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meant to be an American.  Hoosiers, long accustomed to the relatively uniform social 
character of their region—dominated by white Protestants—for the first time had to deal 
with the issue of massive mobility.  As late as 1830, there were no unnaturalized citizens 
residing in Marion County.401  However, unbeknownst to them, Hoosiers opened their 
community to the outside world at precisely the same time Europeans were beginning to 
migrate to the United States in huge numbers due to famine and revolution.  The result 
was a virtual double-whammy, as central Indiana opened itself up to the nation and the 
nation opened itself up to the world.   
Hoosiers quickly realized that by bringing in economic activity to their region, 
they also attracted workers who did not share their cultural values.  Most Indiana 
historians studying the Irish during the early pioneer era focus on violence and how those 
workers fought due to cultural values or to religious factionalism.402  However, Jay Perry 
argues that Indiana historians have frequently overstated the religious significance of 
Irish conflict because of the oft-cited conflict on the anniversary of the Battle of the 
Boyne.  By examining similar conflicts in other states on internal improvement projects 
across the nation, Perry convincingly argues that the date was pure coincidence and that 
controlling the ability to acquire jobs was the major factor of the dispute.403  For Perry, 
immigrants were much more likely to fight when issues of payment or job availability 
                                                 
401 James J. Divita, “Ethnics in Indiana between Statehood and the Civil War, 1816 to 1860” (no publisher 
info), 1988. 
402 Logan J. Esarey, Internal Improvements in Early Indiana (Indianapolis: Edward J. Hecker, 1912), 94-95; 
Charles R. Poinsatte, Fort Wayne During the Canal Era, 1828-1855 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 
1969), 62; Paul Fatout, Indiana Canals (Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1972), 69; William Holloway, 
Indianapolis: A Historical and Statistical Sketch of the Railroad City (Indianapolis: Indianapolis Journal 
Print, 1870), 63.    
403 Jay Perry, "The Irish Wars: Laborer Feuds on Indiana's Canals and Railroads in the 1830s" Indiana 
Magazine of History 109 (2013): 250.   
165 
 
 
emerged.  In Marion County, these two issues emerged simultaneously in the late 1830s 
after boosters, hoping to capitalize on the bounties of the Canal Era, advertised in the 
Evansville Journal for Irish workers to come build the canals which brought a surge of 
Fardowns to compete with a Corkonian faction of workers.  These workers viciously 
fought each other as a way to control opportunities to work on public projects and 
mistrusted each other deeply.  As the full brunt of the panic hit in 1839 with the stoppage 
of all public works, the vast majority of Irish workers were laid off with little money and 
few job prospects, which further increased the tensions between the two groups.  The 
revised argument holds up in Marion County.  In 1839, local resident and contractor 
Nathanial Vice was forced to give up his contract on the canal due to lack of funds.  He 
paid his Irish workers as much as he could according to what they were owed, but 
suspicion at a perceived slight led to a street fight between Vice and several workers.404  
As Irish laborers responded to the harsh world in which they lived, Hoosiers became 
increasingly irritated at the new cultural complexities their society experienced.  One 
commenter, upon visiting the city for the first time in 1839, noted that “the influx of 
adventurers and foreigners attracted hither by the public works in the vicinity, has exerted 
a deleterious influence upon the morals of the people, gambling and dissipation being too 
common, and petty theft scarcely rebuked.”405  
A similar experience emerged when Germans immigrated to the city as rail 
builders.  By 1850, twelve percent of Indianapolis residents had “immediate German 
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ancestry.”406  Hoosiers received a cultural shock that they did not expect when they laid 
the plans for their market connectivity.  The influx of immigrants was an issue of dispute 
even before the railroad reached the city.  Calvin Fletcher noted that German immigrants, 
by 1844, were affecting local politics, stating “The polls were opened at 8 A.M. the 
newly naturalized Germans rushed to the polls to vote the democrat ticket.”  Fletcher, as a 
strong temperance Whig, noted that “The ignorance, the want of schools, the deficiency 
of men of integrity & intelligence renders it almost unfit for self-government.”407  These 
Germans were the first of a wave that settled in Central Indiana as they worked on the 
railroad during the early years of the 1840s.  In the years following the Revolutions of 
1848, these immigrants would increase in number throughout the Early West, filling 
other cities like Cincinnati, St. Louis and Milwaukee with expatriates.  By 1849, the 
German community existed on the east edge of downtown bordered by Market, East, 
Noble and New York streets.  The problem was equally bad in 1852 according to 
Fletcher.  He noted that “Some 500 Germans Some 250 or 300 naturalized within 3 days 
so as to vote under our new constitution.  All thronged the ground ready to vote for 
license to sell liquor—one unanimous voice almost from foreigner to encourage 
intoxication…Soon it was discoverable that the German vote would be unanimous for 
Todd the whisky candidate & that they would elect a German justice of the peace.”408 
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After the Madison and Indianapolis railroad reached the city in 1847, the workers 
who built the project remained in the city and tried to find jobs.  The stereotype of Irish 
troublemakers continued in the eye of private citizens.  Fletcher, in 1850, noted that “the 
Irish made an appointment to fight a pitch battle on Judge Stevens lot opposite of the 
house.  I went out & scolded them.  One had injured the other badly.”409  In 1852, Calvin 
Fletcher again took umbrage with the Irish regarding property rights.  He noted that “I 
had some difficulty with the Irish who have turned their cattle on to me or let some oxen 
encroach on me which were imployed on the rail Road Cincinnati on the section right 
south of us.  They paid me $2 & agreed to trespass no more.”410  
While Fletcher was awarded damages quickly, the presence of Irish people in the 
public sphere was an increasing problem as the region increased in population.  One of 
the major battlegrounds in the 1852 election was whether the Irish should vote 
Democratic or Whig.  One telling example of the mudslinging aimed at gaining Irish 
support for the Democratic Party appeared in the July 29, 1852 issue of the Indiana State 
Sentinel claiming “the remarks of the [Indiana] Journal accompanying the list are 
evidently designed to convey the impression that while the Whigs were remarkably 
liberal in the contributions [to the Irish relief fund], Democrats were the reverse.”  The 
article continues by suggesting that the Democrats were, in fact, more charitable to the 
fund and that “the editor of the Journal…considers the Irish voters…as little better than a 
parcel of fools.” 411  That Irish people represented such a significant portion of the 
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population as to warrant an open feud between the Indiana State Sentinel and the Indiana 
Journal shows that they were a powerful voting bloc and were obtaining electoral power 
on par with long-settled residents.   
That Fletcher scolded the Irish for fighting suggests an important evolution of 
behavioral expectations in the city between 1830 and 1850.  Fighting was a regular 
pastime in the early history of the city.  Although city ordinance prohibited fighting 
punishable by a fine, it was a common occurrence and caused no social tension.412  
William Holloway recounted the early history of fighting in the city, noting that “the 
fighting in the early days of the capital was quite a feature in its social, or unsocial, life.  
No Saturday passed without one, or commonly, a half dozen…It was not done to attract 
attention and create notoriety either.”413  One recollection from his 1870 history of the 
city noted that: 
The Methodists were holding a camp meeting in the 
military ground and under the ministrations of Rev James 
Havens then in the prime of his enormous physical strength 
and impressive but uncultured eloquence were making 
many converts. On the third day of the meeting Burkhart 
barefooted and considerably drunk wandered into the 
woods and around the camp ground keeping himself quiet 
and unobtrusive. An additional drink or two, however, 
started him and began marching around the outer line of the 
seats shouting a dirty couplet of original rhyme at the top of 
his voice. The preacher several times stopped kindly asked 
him to go off and not disturb the congregation, but without 
effect last he came down from the pulpit walked right up to 
old Buck a bit of that astonished him and asked him again 
to go off and leave them alone. He swore he wouldn’t and 
Mr. Havens at once knocked him down whipped him till he 
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roared. His defeat by a preacher the object of supreme 
contempt to the gang ruined the leader's power. Shortly 
afterwards he was arrested for some misconduct and taken 
before Squire Scudder where he “cavorted” and boasted 
furiously till Samuel Merrill as he used to tell the story to 
the writer good humoredly took up his challenge for a 
scuffle and threw him violently the floor of the Squire's 
office. These successive humiliations, and the growth the 
moral element of the town, were too much for “Old Buck” 
and he moved to the Bluffs, where he reformed and died at 
an advanced age.414 
 
Oliver Johnson echoed Holloway in his remembrance of the city.  He noted that 
“Fights was right common when I was young.  Fists would start flying over triflin 
matters.”415  The type of fighting noted in the early years of the city reflect those 
recounted by Elliot Gorn in his studies of backcountry life in the antebellum era. Fighting 
was a test of manhood and honor rather than a social upheaval, and Hoosiers seemed 
accustomed to the frequent fighting that existed in the city during the early years.416  
Dave Burkhardt was well known as a fighter and troublemaker in the city but was still 
allowed to open a grocery in his house.417  It seems that the tolerance for fighting faded as 
the city grew from an isolated outpost to one where middle-class notions of respectability 
emerged.  As such, Hoosiers lost their tolerance for fighting as Germans and Irish 
descended on the city and recast expectations about public behavior.     
Many historians have noted that anger toward European immigrants created a 
period of extreme social stress in the United States.  Nativism was rampant in the 1840s 
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as the rise of Know-Nothing parties emerged across the United States.  While these 
movements were strongest in the Northeast, Indiana had a strong American Party 
beginning in 1852 that continued until 1860.  The gradual breakdown of the Whig Party 
after the Panic of 1837 and the increasing number of immigrants created a tempestuous 
atmosphere where anti-Catholicism and nativism flourished.  This tension was fueled by 
the arrival of immigrants to the Hoosier capital beginning in the 1830s during the canal 
era.418  Adam Criblez, examining the rise of nativist movements in the Midwest, states 
that the rise of the American Republican Association in Marion County was specifically 
formed to protest the arrival of Germans in the 1840s.419  In 1844, an article “Native 
Americanism” in the Indiana State Sentinel exclaimed “It is earnestly desired that every 
man who has the honor and welfare of his country at heart, and would resist the 
encroachments of foreigners upon the rights and privileges of the native born citizens, 
will come forward at this important crisis.”420 
Arguably, the most overt symbol of the stress of transportation connectivity for 
the state was the new state constitution of 1851, which barred African-Americans from 
entering the state.  During the 1840s economic downturn, Hoosiers became afraid of 
anyone entering the state who could drive down wages, especially people of color.  Thus, 
the overwhelmingly white male voting population banded together to add an amendment 
banning one particular group of people who could be forced to work for less.421  This 
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anxiety emerged from the perceived threat of an influx of African-Americans during the 
1840s, as blacks decided to move to the Early West to buy cheap land and escape the 
difficulties of life in settled regions.  Escaped slaves and freedmen also immigrated to the 
region as early as the 1820s.  The 1830 census shows that there were twenty-eight 
African American families living in Marion County.  James Divita, through a study of 
ethnic settlement patterns in Indiana, notes that “from its very inception Indianapolis has 
had black residents.”422 
That black residents were in Marion County from the beginning is a significant 
factor when examining the new tensions that emerged after the arrival of the railroad.  
Early residents of Marion County recalled stories of fights between whites and blacks.  
One recollection by William Holloway, an early resident and future city historian, stated 
that a battle between Dave Burkhardt’s “chain gang” and the black residents of town was 
inevitable, as Burkhardt’s gang did the same ditch and well-digging often associated with 
African-American or Irish laborers.  As told by Holloway, “The feud culminated in a 
collision with Old man Overall a negro of rather a plucky disposition who had some sons 
as willing to fight as any white man could be and who lived on the open common near the 
present line of Ohio street east of the military park. The chain gang gave out that they 
meant to go for the Overalls on a certain night and the negro gathered his forces, 
barricaded doors and windows, loaded guns, and prepared for a siege. The assailants 
made a demonstration before the colored fortress but a few shots and the formidable 
preparations warned them off and the warfare resulted in a victory for the negroes.”423  
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Ultimately, these stories show that although there was racial tension in the region from 
the very beginning, only after the railroad was completed in 1847 did residents begin to 
seek more powerful solutions to the issue of outsiders in central Indiana.   
During the period of extreme social and economic change that filled the 
antebellum era, Hoosiers debated whether they wished to allow free immigration into the 
county.  Erik C. Wade has argued that the issue of slavery and the threat of African-
Americans to white free labor was so troubling to Hoosiers that they wanted to settle the 
issue during their “moment of reimagining” as they revised the state constitution.  For 
Wade, “the new constitution in 1851 was a commitment to neutralizing the subject of 
slavery by ending the institution in Indiana and, at the same time, advancing white 
political rights and prioritizing white labor as a vehicle toward economic 
independence.”424  It was a reimagining of Indiana as a place where white men would not 
compete against slaves for jobs or land.   
The Constitution of 1851 shows the statewide anxiety aroused by increased 
mobility.  In Marion County, however, the best example of the anxiety aroused by the 
arrival of the outsiders is seen in the formation of the Eagle Creek Marion County Horse 
Thief Detective Agency.  On January 21st, 1850, the state Senate of Indiana ratified a 
charter for the Eagle Creek Marion County Horse Thief Detective Agency.  The agency, 
formed because “crime of all descriptions and particularly horse-stealing and house 
breaking have lately in many parts of the State been committed with unaccustomed 
daring,” sought to create a sense of control for residents of the Indiana capital.  The 
anxiety emerged from a feeling that, as the agency charter stated, “these offences are 
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committed by organized companies of daring and desperate men whose vigilance and 
secret communications with each other, enable them to evade the slow and more public 
process of the law.”425   
Obviously, horse theft was a major issue because of their economic necessity as 
an instrument of pioneer life.  Rather than just a crime against a beloved animal, horses 
were crucial for farmers as both a tool of transportation and agriculture.  Paul Salstrom 
notes that horses were the preferred stock of Indiana farmers emerging along with 
mechanization as early mechanical plows required faster speeds to operate the gears.  
Between 1840 and 1860, the number of oxen in Indiana dropped 88 percent.  In the 1850s 
alone, horses in Indiana increased by 65 percent.426  The significance of losing a horse on 
the frontier—especially an unpopulated one—could mean failure, as crops could not get 
planted or spoil before being harvested, not to mention loss of marketability due to lack 
of transportation.  Oliver Johnson noted that his family used their horse to take corn to 
the grist mill every ten days, since milling larger amounts would lead to spoilage.427  
Losing a horse in the antebellum era was at least as damaging to an individual as grand 
theft auto in today’s world because of the tight window between grinding, spoiling, and 
running out of meal.  The significance of horse theft raises the question of why the 
ECMCHTDA emerged in 1850.     
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Horse theft was an issue that could spark tensions among the population of the 
Hoosier capital from the very beginning of white settlement.  George Pogue, the first 
permanent white settler in the region, went to search for some stolen horses in 1819 and 
lost his life in the process.  Popular accounts note that Pogue, hoping to recover his lost 
livestock, followed a Native American named Wyandotte John into the woods and never 
returned.  Local suspicion suggested that Pogue was killed for his accusation that local 
Natives were stealing pioneer horses.  While never confirmed, the legend of Pogue’s 
murder is an important event in the city’s early historical memory.  It is the first murder 
in town, and was never officially solved.  That local lore recalls that he was murdered by 
Native Americans shows that Hoosiers were leery of people from different cultures and 
felt that they represented danger to Euro-American settlement.428   
Pogue’s murder was not the only example of outsiders being targeted as a 
criminal element without proof.  In 1830, an advertisement promised a reward of ten 
dollars for the return of a horse probably stolen by a black prisoner who escaped the 
Marion County Jail the same night.  The notice promised no money for the capture of the 
suspect.429  While the coincidence is certainly suspicious, there was no other evidence 
that suggested the escaped prisoner was the one who stole the horse.  Gangs of white 
thieves were active in the area at the time, including the aforementioned thief and general 
ruffian Dave Burkhart, whose gang supported itself by “stealing their neighbors, corn, 
pigs, poultry and potatoes…and not unfrequently robbing outright.”430  The focus on the 
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escaped black prisoner suggests that the community was especially attentive to people of 
non-European descent and their effect on local crime.   
The significant part of the story about the African American thief relates to the 
amount of the reward and knowledge of the accused’s identity.  The reward for the horse 
stolen by the black man was ten dollars.  No one wanted the thief caught or returned for 
punishment.  The advertiser simply wanted the horse returned.  Hoosiers in the early days 
were wary of outsiders, but seemed more concerned with maintaining their livelihoods 
than establishing a racially or culturally based social order.  However, a concurrent 
advertisement signed by John Tipton reveals a more telling layer to the tensions 
surrounding horse theft in the first decade of settlement.  It gives the description of a 
stolen horse from a Marion County farm and states that a fifty dollar reward will be paid 
“for the horse and the thief, or for the thief alone.”431  The high reward suggests that 
major anxieties emerged in the community when members did not know who they could 
trust.  The accused black thief was a known social quantity and would likely never return 
to the community.  As such, the community did not have to worry about being swindled 
or robbed by the same person ever again.  The mystery of who stole the second horse 
created such an issue of trust in the community that the owner was willing to pay fifty 
dollars just to know who the thief was rather than getting the horse back.  Community 
security was something far more important than just getting back the initial animal 
because if left undiscovered, the same thief could strike again and again at will creating 
an intense sense of dread among neighbors.   
                                                 
Indianapolis: A Historical and Statistical Sketch of the Railroad City (Indianapolis: Indianapolis Journal 
Print, 1870), 53.   
431 Indiana Democrat, 28 August 1830. 
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As noted above, Hoosiers were focused on knowing who could be trusted in their 
community.  Before the late 1840s, few outsiders existed in the state capital.  Unlike 
major cities like New York, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, Paris, or London, central Indiana 
Hoosier eyes were not “veiled mirrors” as noted by Walter Benjamin in Arcades 
Projects.432  The lack of a navigable river kept population of the city and all of Marion 
County quite low in pure numbers and overall density.433  While the lack of population 
density would have provided many havens for horse thieves, the communal nature of 
living on the frontier prevented them from blending anonymously into the local 
background.   
The sense of community, however, seemed under attack in the 1840s as local 
newspapers initiated crime columns during the decade and began reporting on grisly 
murders that happened around the country and world to drive up readership.434  They also 
printed increasing numbers of articles declaring the breakdown of society in the local 
community.  For instance, an 1845 article in the Indiana State Sentinel lamented that “the 
moral influence of a dozen churches is not sufficient to check the vicious propensities of 
our population.”435  The “vicious propensities” of residents were also a concern to Calvin 
Fletcher.  His search for moral order focused on various issues, but the biggest was the 
temperance movement.  During one election in 1847, he noted that “the moral part of the 
                                                 
432 Walter Benjamin, “Arcades Project” in The Blackwell City Reader, Ed. Gary Bridge et al. (New York: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 119-125.  For an example of this theory applied to New York City, see Karen 
Haltunnen, Confidence Men and Painted Women: A Study of Middle-class Culture in America, 1830-1870 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).   
433 The population of Indianapolis in 1840 was only 2,695 and Marion County as a whole was 16,080.  
“Historical Census Browser” University of Virginia Library, Retrieved February 2, 2016.   
434 David Bodenhamer and Robert Barrows, eds., The Encyclopedia of Indianapolis. (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1972), 7, 163-164. 
435 Indiana State Sentinel, July 9, 1845.   
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community had not organized but the wicked had.  I went to the poles soon learned that 
the vilest had taken possession of them.”436  For residents of Indianapolis, the breakdown 
of society was already underway well before the railroad reached the city.   
The arrival of so many outsiders and the perceived increase in crime forced 
residents to take matters into their own hands.  The ECMCHTDA emerged as a 
paramilitary organization designed to “deliver over to the civil authorities without a 
warrant any person against whom there are circumstances of strong suspicion and guilt” 
of horse theft or other crimes.437  Without any evidence other than suspicion of guilt, 
residents of the ECMCHTDA seized the opportunity to fill the role of the not yet fully 
functional police in protecting the property of the region.438  They grasped the occasion to 
feel powerful during a period of massive socio-economic change.439 
The rise of the ECMCHTDA is not surprising when examining the membership 
signees in the original constitution.  The vast majority of the members were farmers who 
lived near each other and interacted closely with other members and their families.  The 
Pughs, Hollingsworths, Barnhills, Wilsons, Martindales, Faucetts and Hardings all 
interacted in a very tight social network that spanned across kin networks, mutual farm 
                                                 
436 Gayle Thornbrough, The Diary of Calvin Fletcher, Vol. 3 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1974), 
364.   
437 Constitution of the Eagle Creek Marion Co. Horse Thief Detecting Company (Indianapolis: Ellis & 
Spamm, Printers, 1850). 
438 The Marion County Police Department was relatively ineffective until the Civil War due to the 
Democratic Party’s insistence on keeping taxes low for anything other than the most necessary functions.  
See David Bodenhamer and Robert Barrows, eds., The Encyclopedia of Indianapolis (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1972), 89.  The Marion County Sheriff’s Office was equally understaffed and was based 
on a volunteer system before the Civil War.  See David Bodenhamer and Robert Barrows, eds., The 
Encyclopedia of Indianapolis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 971-972. 
439 David Bodenhamer provides a similar explanation of why Hoosiers created their own vigilante 
societies in David Bodenhamer, “Crime and Criminal Justice in Antebellum Indianapolis” (PhD Diss., 
Indiana University, 1977), p 97. 
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aid and estate executorships.  These families had all moved to the region by 1830 and 
many were active in local government.  For instance, James Miller, Martin Martindale, 
Isaac Pugh, and other members of the ECMCHTDA were appointed as road viewers by 
the Marion County Commissioners in November, 1823, and Asa B. Strong was a Wayne 
Township sheriff for nearly two decades.440  For them, the success of the railroad should 
have brought agricultural prosperity.  While it did bring economic success, it also brought 
outsiders who threatened the moral order of the community.   
The residents of the ECMCHTDA were long-standing residents of Marion 
County.  The inadequacy of sources in rural communities is well known, but a reasonable 
examination of records shows that nearly half of the members bought land in the county 
before 1836 and the majority of those purchases were before 1830.  For instance, Robert 
Barnhill, Sr. bought land in Marion County on July 19, 1821.  Samuel Harding purchased 
land in Township 15 North, Range 3 East, Section 6 on July 20, 1821.  John Miller 
bought land the same day in an adjoining section, and the Pugh family began their 
significant land purchases in 1828 next door to Miller.441  Berry Sulgrove noted that 
several important members of the ECMCHTDA were early settlers of the Eagle Creek 
region of Marion County, including the Barnhills, Corbaleys, and Robert Harding.442   
Family kin networks settled in the area suggesting that these Hoosiers were 
looking for economic safety when they arrived.  Robert Barnhill’s son Robert Barnhill, 
Jr. purchased land in a neighboring township in 1828.  Six years later, in 1834, John C. 
                                                 
440 Commissioners’ Record, Vol. 1, 1822-1827 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Records Survey, 1941). 
441 Jane E. Darlington, Marion County, Indiana Records Miscellanea (Indianapolis: Indianapolis Historical 
Society, 1986).   
442 Berry Sulgrove, History of Indianapolis and Marion County, Indiana (Philadelphia: L.H. Everts, 1884), 
23.  
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Barnhill bought 160 acres adjoining his father’s land in Wayne Township.  These 
members were also tied together through family bonds, as marriages between member 
families was common.  For example, Robert Barnhill, Jr., son of one of the wealthiest 
members of the ECMCHTDA, married Mary Anne Connaroe, daughter of fellow 
member Joel Connaroe, in 1847.  Henry S. Johnson married fellow member David 
Varner’s daughter Margaret in 1848.443  Samuel and Israel Harding each married one of 
Jeremiah Johnson’s daughters.444  These family bonds tied the community together as 
tightly as possible and, although account books do not survive, the social habits of 
nineteenth century rural Americans suggests that these people were supportive of each 
other on their mutual farmsteads as well.445   
The Marion County Probate Record also shows the close bonds between members 
of the ECMCHTDA.  Family estates of deceased group members were often 
                                                 
443 The Locomotive.  April 1, 1848.   
444 John H.B. Nowland, Early Reminiscences of Indianapolis (Indianapolis: Sentinel Book and Job Printing 
House, 1870), 24, 26.   
445 The literature on mutual assistance in nineteenth century farming is quite large.  One of the best 
overviews of the debate over mutual assistance and the transition to capitalism is Allan Kulikoff, “The 
Transition to Capitalism in Rural America” The William and Mary Quarterly 46 (1989): 122; the classic 
article on mutual aid being more important than economic gain is James Henretta, ““Families and Farms: 
Mentalité in Pre-Industrial America” The William and Mary Quarterly 35 (1978): p 3-32; the opposition to 
Henretta is Winifried Rothenberg, “The Emergence of Farm Labor Markets and the Transformation of the 
Rural Economy” Journal of Economic History 48 (1988): 537-566.  The best book that examines the issues 
social and economic change is Christopher Clark, The Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 
1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).  One of the best overviews of the relationship between 
families, mutual assistance and economic goals in early America is Daniel Vickers, “Competency and 
Competition: Economic Culture in Early America” The William and Mary Quarterly 47 (1990): pp. 3-29.  
For women’s experiences with mutual aid, see Nancy Grey Osterud, Bonds of Community: The Lives of 
Farm Women in Nineteenth-Century New York (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Joan Jensen, 
Loosening the Bonds: Mid-Atlantic Farm Women, 1750-1850 (New Haven: University of Connecticut Press, 
1986); Glenda Riley, The Female Frontier: A Comparative View of Women on the Prairie and the Plains 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1988).  Martin Brueghel, Farm, Shop, Landing:  The Rise of a Market 
Society in the Hudson Valley, 1780-1860 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002) is also a strong 
examination of how economic changes in the Atlantic World economy brought social transformations 
during the antebellum era.   
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administered by someone outside the family when the departed was the head of the 
household.  For instance, when Stephen Gullifer passed in 1835, his wife Elizabeth was 
the legal adminstratrix but decided to have Stephen’s son Aaron, who was then assisted 
by future ECMCHTDA member Adam Wright and father of four other members, 
Lephraim Hollingsworth.  These members also lived within a mile of each other in 
Wayne and Pike Townships on the west side of the county.  John Dollarhide’s wife 
relinquished her legal rights to administer the estate to neighbor David Kime, another 
member of the ECMCHTDA.446   
The ECMCHTDA was supposed to protect society from the dangers of horse 
thieves and outsiders.  Their rules of admission betrayed their feelings toward those who 
were not well-known to the entire community.  The “Application and Qualification for 
Membership” noted that only free white men were allowed in and that they “be of a man 
of good moral character.”447  Member proposals were relatively open, but members were 
left to be judicious judges of character before offering any sponsorship.  The constitution 
stated that “Any member may propose a candidate for initiation; but it is particularly 
enjoined on all that they shall not, from any motives of favor, affection, or interest 
whatever, propose any one whose general character will not bear the strictest 
scrutiny…In every instance when any member shall willfully disregard this injunction he 
shall forfeit the sum of five dollars for the use of the company.”448  Obviously, members 
                                                 
446 Marion County, Probate Complete Record, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, Indiana. 
447 Constitution of the Eagle Creek Marion Co. Horse Thief Detecting Company (Indianapolis: Ellis & 
Spamm, Printers, 1850). 
448 Constitution of the Eagle Creek Marion Co. Horse Thief Detecting Company (Indianapolis: Ellis & 
Spamm, Printers, 1850). 
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of the ECMCHTDA were concerned about the character of their company and did not 
want it to become a social club open to the public.   
The moral character was judged by the members of the group through a difficult 
voting process where two no votes (out of 90) would require a defense of the potential 
member and three or more banned them from ever applying again.  However, once 
admitted, the society provided a strong vision of egalitarianism.  “All members of this 
company are equal in social rights; and no one shall be entitled to exclusive emolument 
or privileges.”449  In addition, members had an obligation to fight for the rights of other 
members in case of theft.  When any crime was committed against any member of the 
group, “he, or the officers as the case may be, shall call any number of men that may be 
thought necessary for the pursuit.”450  Amongst many other requirements, members were 
required to “hold himself in readiness to go in search or pursuit of any person or property 
when called on…and to obey said call by going and using every means in his power to 
accomplish the object of the call.”451  The significance of the ECMCHTDA is clear.  
Hoosiers were experiencing a widening anxiety regarding social ties during a period of 
drastic infrastructural changes.  As a result, they created a community-based institution 
that had semi-legal power to defend their property in case the need arose. 
The effect of this HTDA is not clear from the historical record.  The only 
pamphlet ever published for the ECMCHTDA discussed the purpose and rules of the 
organization.  However, HTDAs formed quickly throughout central Indiana at the same 
                                                 
449 Constitution of the Eagle Creek Marion Co. Horse Thief Detecting Company (Indianapolis: Ellis & 
Spamm, Printers, 1850). 
450 Constitution of the Eagle Creek Marion Co. Horse Thief Detecting Company (Indianapolis: Ellis & 
Spamm, Printers, 1850). 
451 Constitution of the Eagle Creek Marion Co. Horse Thief Detecting Company (Indianapolis: Ellis & 
Spamm, Printers, 1850). 
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time the ECMCHTDA was formed.  The Regulators, a group of detectives from Noble 
County in northern Indiana that formed in 1852, were so prominent that they wrote their 
own history in 1859.  Their words follow the concerns of the ECMCHTDA, noting that 
since its very inception, “the county of Noble had become so notorious…that honest 
traveling from here to other sections of the country were ashamed to own from whence 
they came.”452 
HTDAs have a long history of appearing in sparsely populated regions that focus 
on agriculture.453  The low population—usually caused by poor transportation 
infrastructure and connection to markets—prevented the formation of full-time police 
forces that could investigate property crimes.  The lack of a police force made the 
resident population an easier target for bandits because of the lack of specialization 
needed to study criminal habits.  As a result, the local residents, usually with state 
authority, formed systems of protection that allow them to band together as a community 
to protect their property.   
What is significant about the formation of these HTDAs is that they are 
overwhelmingly a feature of frontier society.  As scholars like Warren Elofson have 
suggested, comparing frontiers and borderlands have a significant ability to tell about 
commonalities between time and space.  He argues that “similarly high levels of 
lawlessness and disorder characterized the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
cattle ranching frontiers” in western Canada and the Northern Territory in Australia.  He 
                                                 
452 M.H. Mott, History of the Regulators of Northern Indiana, (Indianapolis: Indianapolis Journal Company 
Printers, 1859), 5.   
453 Warren Elofson, “The Universality of Frontier Disorder: Northern Australia Viewed Against the 
Northern Great Plains of North America” Agricultural History 88 (2014): 147-174. 
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suggests that, even though those regions had very different characteristics, “frontier 
conditions…were strikingly similar.”454  As Elofson posits, the frontier emerges and 
residents become targets of thieves because they lack the formal structures of power that 
attempt to prevent theft due to a sparse population.  As the frontier fades, formal police 
forces take the place of HTDAs in criminal apprehension because the local population 
can afford the cost of specialization.  This dissertation supports his argument.  The 
HTDAs may remain, but they take on a significantly different meaning.  For instance, 
Dedham, Mass., had an HTDA form in 1816 and another formed in Brookline, Mass., in 
1819.455 Indiana HTDAs were common occurrences during the middle of the nineteenth 
century as railroads emerged across the land to create a new frontier.  THE 
ECMCHTDA, formed in 1850, was one example and the Regulators of Noble County, 
formed in 1852, was another.  Those were just a few of the myriad HTDAs founded 
during the period of expanding frontier regions.  Various others emerged at the same 
time, with the same mission espoused by the ECMCHTDA.  They were precursors to the 
HTDAs and vigilante societies of the Far West, but the mission was founded on similar 
social structures and is one more example of the comparative frontier experience across 
time and space.   
                                                 
454 Warren Elofson, “The Universality of Frontier Disorder: Northern Australia Viewed Against the 
Northern Great Plains of North America” Agricultural History 88 (2014): 147-174. 
455 The Massachusetts Historical Society’s online search tool shows at least three horse thief detective 
agencies from 1800-1819.  See http://balthazaar.masshist.org/cgi-
bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?Search_Arg=horse+thieves&Search_Code=FT*&PID=b8TN3gpSF-
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“Constitution of the Society in Dedham for Apprehending Horse Thieves,” Massachusetts Historical 
Society; “Constitution of the Society in Roxbury, Brookline and Brighton for Apprehending Horse Thieves,” 
Massachusetts Historical Society.  
184 
 
 
From 1847 to 1852, Marion County was a crucible of change.  Residents certainly 
could expect finer and cheaper finished goods.  Rural residents got significantly higher 
prices for their agricultural crops.  Hoosiers also began slowly improving their farms to 
produce more output.  They were also finally able to reach the foreign markets they 
sought for over a quarter century.  Hoosiers were active participants in feeding Irish and 
German poor during the potato famine and the revolutions of 1848, which spurred even 
higher prices for their goods.  However, residents of Marion County also acquired an 
infrastructure that allowed large numbers of socio-cultural outsiders to cheaply come to 
their booming city.  The telescoped growth of the city created massive opportunities, but 
the opportunities presented themselves to everyone.  Almost at once, it seemed to 
Hoosiers, Irish and German residents descended on the city like a scourge.  They fought, 
drank and caroused in a way that was unacceptable to the social proclivities of previous 
settlers.  African Americans were such an affront to laborers that they were banned in 
1851 during a period of drastic infrastructural change.  As a result, rural Hoosiers turned 
to vigilante societies like the ECMCHTDA as a way to maintain the social order of their 
region during a period of drastic social change.  The structural changes of the 
transportation revolution were not complete, but Marion County Hoosiers, for the first 
time, experienced what it was like to be part of a larger world.   
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CHAPTER 7: “THE PLACE WHERE THE WAYS MEET:” INDIANAPOLIS 
DEVELOPS A HINTERLAND, 1853-1860456 
The arrival of the railroad in 1847 caused a surge in economic activity in Marion 
County.  In 1846, Indianapolis remained an urban outpost without any sphere of 
economic influence outside of its immediate surroundings.  When the Madison and 
Indianapolis Railroad finally reached the city, its success drew other investors to the 
cause of transportation connectivity and, by 1853, no less than eight railroads converged 
on the city.  Washington Street, the long-sleepy central avenue of the city bustled with 
activity not seen since the passage of the Mammoth Internal Improvements Bill.  
Residents of the city were able to buy goods produced around the world right in the city 
without ordering from Cincinnati or Louisville.457  By 1855, farmers could send their 
agricultural products directly to New York markets via rail and steamboat passage 
through the Great Lakes and along the Erie Canal.458  Hoosiers in Marion County also 
reopened their agricultural society with the goal of improving their stock.459  The 
increasing economic activity and swell in population led to a boom period for local 
residents.  The old families of the early years like the Fletchers, Hollingsworths, 
Barnhills, and Wilsons finally attained the ability to reach the outside markets that 
promised to bring economic security to their families.   
                                                 
456 A.C. Howard’s Directory for the City of Indianapolis (Indianapolis: A.C. Howard, 1857), 52. 
457 Newspaper advertisements like those seen in the Indiana show that Hoosiers were increasingly able to 
access foreign or eastern-made goods relatively easily.  See Daily State Sentinel, August 1, 1853; Daily 
Indiana State Sentinel, March 11, 1854; Daily State Sentinel, June 3, 1859.  James Madison argues that 
railroads allowed eastern manufactured goods to move to the city in large numbers after 1847 but asserts 
that New York goods overtook the central Indiana market during the 1850s.  See James Madison, 
“Businessmen and the Business Community in Indianapolis, 1820-1860” (PhD Dissertation, Indiana 
University, 1972), 171-177. 
458 Gayle Thornbrough, The Diary of Calvin Fletcher, Vol. 5 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1977), 
430.   
459 Gayle Thornbrough, The Diary of Calvin Fletcher, Vol. 5 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1977), 
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The city also experienced a physical evolution.  In October of 1853, Thomas A. 
Morris completed the first Union Station in the United States a half mile south of the city 
center.  The Union Depot drew businesses like J.R. Osgood’s woodworking factory, 
located one block south of the station, or L.W. Hasselman’s foundry, located across the 
street from the station away from Washington Street for the first time.  By 1860, the 
industrial section of the city grew rapidly toward the south and east of the city center, 
reflecting the significance of the railroad to local manufacturing.  The same period also 
witnessed the growth of neighborhoods north of the downtown districts.  Wealthy 
residents retreated to neighborhoods on the north side of town to escape the bustle and 
danger of the newly lively city.460  These changes during the 1850s demonstrate the speed 
with which central Indiana Hoosiers caught up to the urban evolution occurring in water-
based areas like Cincinnati or Rochester, New York.  Paul Johnson argues that the social 
pattern of Rochester evolved during the period from 1827 to 1834 as employers 
sequestered their home lives from their manufactories but that they “continued to 
consider themselves the rightful protectors as governors of their city.”461  Walter Glazer 
suggests that changes in urban social landscape of Cincinnati were of similar speed.  He 
states that during the 1830s “the cultural and economic organization of the city began to 
change” as immigrants altered the demographic makeup of the city and the improved 
economy “created a more specialized and stratified occupational and economic 
                                                 
460 The Old Northside Historic Neighborhood is one example of this trend.  See Albert E. Dickens, “The 
Growth and Structure of Real Property Uses in Indianapolis” (Bloomington: Indiana School of Business, 
1939), 27-28; David Bodenhamer, The Encyclopedia of Indianapolis (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1994), 1064. 
461 Paul Johnson, A Shopkeeper’s Millennium: Society and Revivals in Rochester, New York, 1815-1837 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), 61. 
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hierarchy.”462  The developments occurred during such an abbreviated period were 
mirrored by the experience of Indianapolis.  This suggests that the process of 
urbanization was influenced more by market connectivity than by the length of time cities 
were established.   
These changes were not all positive.  The 1856 address to the State Board of 
Agriculture by Judge Samuel Perkins’ e stated blithely that “The days of early simplicity, 
of backwoods enjoyment and suffering…destitution of a market for surplus produce, and 
isolated living…have indeed mostly passed away in Marion county.”463  However, as 
noted in the previous chapter, the successes of the improved economy brought about 
unforeseen consequences for residents.  Hinting at the tension created by connecting to 
external markets, Perkins remarked that “Whether for better or for worse, whether 
bringing a greater degree of happiness or otherwise…I need not intimate…it is enough 
for my present purpose that the [economic] change mentioned is taking place, and cannot 
be arrested” acknowledging the significance of the new transportation system was the 
driving force of social tension.464   
Connected to these developments, the arrival of newcomers during the rush of the 
1840s and the continued surge during the 1850s—Marion County’s 65% rate of 
population increase from 1850-1860 was, by far, higher than any other county referenced 
in this study—sustained the whirlwind of social turmoil absent during the 1820s and 
1830s.465  Locals, instead of sorting out problems individually or through kin networks, 
                                                 
462 Walter Glazer, Cincinnati in 1840: The Social and Functional Organization of an Urban Community 
during the Pre-Civil War Period (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999), 84.   
463 Fourth Report of the Indiana State Board of Agriculture (Indianapolis: William J. Brown, 1856), 389. 
464 Fourth Report of the Indiana State Board of Agriculture (Indianapolis: William J. Brown, 1856), 390. 
465 Seventh US Census; Eighth US Census.   
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created secret societies and public civic groups to prevent the spread of non-English 
Protestant culture.466  The creation of a formal police force stemmed Irish violence.  
Hoosiers ardently challenged German beer-drinking culture to reestablish a strong 
temperance atmosphere which further mirrors the developments seen in Paul Johnson’s 
work during a period of intense market orientation.  Most tellingly, the anxiety of an era 
of movement was seen in the passage of the Constitution of 1851, which barred black 
people from moving into the state.  The problems of increased access to transportation 
networks also demanded solutions, but police and fire departments needed to be paid and 
equipped, temperance and exclusion laws needed to be enforced, and market regulations 
needed officers and tools to ensure equitable trade.   
Merchants also created their own economic sphere of influence that reached into 
the central Indiana hinterland in a meaningful way.  By 1860, the city of Indianapolis 
functioned as an economic depot that competed with Cincinnati and Chicago for regional 
trade.  Local manufacturers and merchants began advertising their goods as wholesalers 
to nearby merchants rather than dealing directly with customers.  Elliot West notes that 
frontier cities possess several characteristics in common including “unusually unsettled 
conditions and fluid possibilities, the ready availability of unexploited land and the lack 
of well-established legal and political systems.”467  The uptick in the various 
developments mentioned above over the period from 1853-1860 show that Hoosiers in 
central Indiana were in the middle of the kind of telescoped growth seen across the 
                                                 
466 See previous chapter discussion on the rise of the Eagle Creek Marion County Horse Thief Detective 
Agency.   
467 Elliot West, “Grain Kings, Rubber Dreams, and Stock Exchanges: How Transportation and 
Communication Changed Frontier Cities,” in Frontier Cities: Encounters at the Crossroads of Empire, ed. By 
Jay Gitlin et al. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 112. 
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frontier in western cities after the Civil War.  Marion County residents experienced 
explosive growth rarely experienced by eastern cities in the early 19th century because 
cities like Cincinnati, Louisville or Pittsburgh lacked characteristics mentioned by West.  
Those cities slowly emerged as river transportation improved but grew too large to adapt 
railroad transportation as effectively as a less-settled region like Marion County.   
The 1860 census provides evidence of the kind of growth seen in Marion County 
during the 1850s.  In the 1850s, Indianapolis reaped the advantages of the railroad at a 
faster pace than cities with established water networks.  Examples of development 
include percentage of improved land.  Marion County lagged behind counties in the more 
developed, southern portion of the state.  By 1860, the amount of improved land in 
Marion County skyrocketed into first place in the state and, while remaining behind those 
in other regions of the United States, was significantly closer than in 1850.468  Farm 
prices show a similar trajectory.  Marion County land was the second most expensive in 
the state in 1860—after Wayne County—and also had the second highest rate of increase 
in land value—behind Lake County, near Chicago.  Dearborn County—near Cincinnati—
land had the smallest rate of increase of the examined Indiana counties.  The average cash 
value per farm also moved into the range seen in the other examined regions of the 
United States but the rate of increase from 1850 to 1860 surged past longer settled 
regions to do so.469    
                                                 
468 See Appendix B for fuller analysis of data from the US Census.  
469 See Appendix B for census data and rates of increase.   
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Similar patterns appeared in value of farms per acre, value in farms per improved 
acre, percent increase in land value per acre, and percent increase in land value per 
improved acre.  Marion County also showed its increasing similarity to the agricultural 
development of other large cities of the United States.  Nearly every other regional 
county measured in this study increased in the overall number of farms while 
simultaneously decreasing average farm size.  This suggests that farmers in Marion 
County were beginning to experience the same kind of development patterns seen in the 
Northeast as families adapted to the reality of larger families and limited land availability.  
The patterns stated above reflect a general trend that existed in the rest of the agricultural 
statistics examined in this study for the period 1850-1860.  Longer settled counties in the 
southern Ohio River Valley or on the Wabash River in northern Indiana experienced a 
longer and slower development than those far removed from waterways in the northern 
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part of the state.  From the period 1850-1860, Indiana’s southern counties like Dearborn, 
Clark, and Lawrence were vastly outpaced by Marion, Tipton, and Kosciusko in the 
north.   
Crop production also increased rapidly during this period.  In Marion County, as 
in many other places, the agricultural census shows a steep rise in crop production in the 
decade after rail access was solidified.  Corn production in Marion County increased by 
85.7% through the 1840s as the railroad moved into the region and Hoosiers had access 
to exterior markets and by another 37.5% by 1860.  This expansion in production was not 
matched by an increase in improved farmland, which only increased 15.6% from 1850-
1860.470  Other crops also increased dramatically during this period.  Bushels of wheat 
increased by 200.1% and bushels of oats increased by 23.8% during the 1850s.  These 
figures, taken together, suggest an explosion of growth and crop intensification seen in 
few other counties in this study.  The northern counties of Tipton, Kosciusko and Lake 
were only ones comparative to the kind of growth seen in Marion County.471  The 
growth—relative to other cities during this period—shows that the Panic of 1837, while 
hampering immediate development in the city, helped Indianapolis avoid the trap of tying 
its economy to water-based transportation systems.  Like the phoenix rising from the 
ashes of Chicago after the Great Fire of 1871 mentioned by Cronon’s impressive work 
Nature’s Metropolis, the infrastructure of Marion County emerged from the economic 
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disaster of the Panic of 1837 with the ability to build a transportation infrastructure on a 
relatively blank landscape.472  Indianapolis was able to turn its lack of water access to an 
advantage during the rail era.   
Historians have agreed that agriculture changed rapidly during the early 19th 
century as transportation improvements emerged.473  Large-scale agricultural 
improvement in Marion County was directly tied to the advent of the railroad.  In Marion 
County, agricultural improvements had a relatively long history.  Calvin Fletcher 
promoted farm enhancements soon after moving to the area.  He was a member of the 
original agricultural society and wanted to make sure that Marion County residents used 
their soil to maximum benefit.  The failure of the early society and the repeated calls to 
improve output in newspapers implies that many Hoosiers were only partially focused on 
maximizing their production for market during the 1830s because, as noted in Chapter 
Two, efficient transportation networks prevented them from increasing the value of their 
labor.  Instead, they were primarily focused on providing a security oriented mode of 
production that allowed for local trade and flexibility in case of catastrophe.   
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In general, Marion County farmers did not alter their market orientation until the 
mid-1850s.  They were content to remain diversified to avoid potential risks associated 
with specialization.  The Marion County Agricultural Society noted in its annual meeting 
in 1854, “Many of our first farmers appear to be wholly engaged in getting good prices 
for their produce, but seem to have little desire to attend our agricultural meetings, or 
lend a helping hand to improvements in agriculture.  This will be corroborated by the fact 
that a premium list of some eight hundred and ninety dollars was made out by the 
executive committee, and that the amount of the premiums actually awarded to the 
different competitors is less than five hundred and fifty dollars.”474  As noted in the 
previous chapter, prices jumped drastically after the arrival of the railroad and stayed 
high for major crops.  Hinting at the high prices of the early 1850s, Calvin Fletcher 
reported that “Feeding corn scarce & can get now 40 cts. Per bushel” and he “hope[s] to 
get 50 cts. per bushel” in October of 1854.475  Corn and wheat prices were high during 
the early and mid-1850s before the Panic of 1857 and Hoosiers in central Indiana seemed 
content with the high prices they received following the arrival of the railroad rather than 
risk investment in technological improvements.476   
The report from the 1854 meeting indicates that Marion County residents were 
searching for the best prices for their agricultural goods but were just beginning to take 
out loans to improve the land.  As James Madison notes, the Panic of 1837 left an 
indelible mark on the psyche of Hoosiers.  The “venturesome pioneer generation 
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contributed to the reluctance of succeeding generations to take similar risks.”477  Thus, 
Hoosiers, rather than invest to take advantage of new market possibilities, were slow to 
respond to changing economic conditions immediately after the arrival of the railroad.  
The 1854 report was the first to state that “the general aspect of the improvements in our 
county is cheering, and every where visible in the increased cultivation of farms in many 
parts of the county, showing that the earnings of the people are being expended at home, 
instead of being invested in new tracts to lie unproductive for years to come.”478   
The report does not explicitly say that Hoosiers took out loans to improve their 
lands.  It is possible that farmers took their profits and drove them back into their own 
facilities.  However, Calvin Fletcher noted that in 1846, “there was but one man Bill 
Matlock in Hendricks City. that applied in the spring of the year to get money to buy 
cattle…Now [in 1854] there are some 30 to 50 persons.”479  The driving change in the 
economic approach was a lack of available land.  By 1853, only one percent of federal 
lands were still available for purchase.   The rest were owned by residents or speculators 
which, after the arrival of the railroad, drove prices for land above the federal 
minimum.480  The growth in population and the rise of the railroad made farmland more 
valuable so speculators bought most of the land by mid-century.  The resulting lack of 
land made improvements on current farms more practical than purchasing increasingly 
expensive land by the mid-1850s.   
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Hoosiers also increased their turn toward improved farming methods during the 
1850s because of decreasing economic security.  Judge Samuel Perkins, speaking in 
Marion County, argued that Hoosiers should improve their farms or risk socio-economic 
decline.  He argued that farmers, more than mechanics, must be stimulated to produce a 
surplus because “he can be a careless, negligent, non progressive farmer…and still live, 
coarsely, slovenly, it may be, but still alive.”481  The judge contended that “the time has 
come when an improved system of farming must be…practiced in Marion County…The 
days of early simplicity…are passing, have indeed mostly passed away in Marion 
county.”482  For Perkins, improvements were necessary, whether Hoosiers liked them or 
not, stating that “it is a disputed point with some, even, whether savage or civilized life 
confers most enjoyment…but it is enough for my present purpose that the change 
mentioned is taking place, and cannot be arrested; for, as a consequence, an improved, 
careful, neat, laborious system of husbandry, is absolutely necessary to enable the 
farmers, by increased harvests, to meet the enlarged expenses incident to the new order of 
things; and he who fails to adopt such, will find himself gradually descending upon a 
sliding scale.”483 Perkins clearly described that as the region connected to outside 
markets, comparative advantage became far more important for families seeking 
economic success.  Growing for local consumption no longer provided family subsistence 
as factory-made products like cloth became cheaper and farmers made decisions to 
specialize and produce for market, and cease to barter with their neighbors.484  As noted 
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above, the choice was an unpleasant one to some farmers.  Either increase risk by 
investing and mechanizing or sacrifice the family future and slide down the economic 
scale.  Just like urbanites in Indianapolis who struggled with labor conflict, rural residents 
experienced a tension of connecting to external markets.   
Fielding Beeler’s Marion County Agricultural Society address given in 1856 
echoed similar sentiments.  He stressed that fellow residents of Marion County had every 
stimulus to improvement and rhetorically quipped that “when the agricultural interests 
are marching forward toward that high destiny that awaits them, shall the farmer…of 
Marion, fold his arms and say, it is enough; let me alone; I can manage my own affairs in 
my own way.”485  Beeler responded that farmers, horticulturalists, or others that toil the 
earth should “fix your standard high” or risk “[passing] through the world unnoticed and 
unknown, and sink to your graves without a sympathizing tear, or even a stone to mark 
your earthly resting place.”486  He finished by remarking on improving soil, crops, 
implements, and animal husbandry and urging farmers to consider ways to use their 
resources more effectively.   
The railroad also influenced livestock markets in central Indiana during the mid-
1850s.  Improved breeds of horses were a constant in Indianapolis from the beginning but 
the railroad finally allowed local farmers to breed animals for export.  In the 1853 
meeting of the State Board of Agriculture, the board decided to take subscriptions of $25 
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a share to raise $20,000 for importing quality cattle stock directly from England.487  The 
1856 annual report of the MCAS noted that “horses commanded high prices during the 
year; higher perhaps than they ever have done before.”488  It continued by noting that 
“Indianapolis is becoming the leading horse market of the country…the general 
government has repeatedly been a large purchaser of our animals, for army 
purposes…Our favorable central position and great railway facilities render us accessable 
[sic] at all times from all quarters, and our horses therefore go to all points of the 
compass.”489  Cattle breeding also improved in the 1850s.  The report stated that cattle 
improvement “slowly aroused” the interest of local farmers but that “a rapid change is 
now going on.”490  The railroad allowed Hoosier farmers to connect directly to eastern 
markets for the first time. Calvin Fletcher noted in one 1855 entry that “Calvin [Jr., 
Fletcher’s son] started Ragin with 100 & odd cattle to N.Y. market—first we ever sent 
direct.”491  The same argument was made for sheep.  Beeler noted that “sheep are 
decreasing in number…but this deficiency is more than compensated by the improvement 
in their quality.”492 
One important note of the society described how local markets were adapting to 
external economic factors.  Hinting at the comparative disadvantage of Hoosier sheep 
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farmers, Beeler offered his opinion on why the number of sheep declined.  He stated that 
“the prime cause being found…that the native breeds produce but little wool, and that of 
an inferior quality.  This wool commands a low price, and the present low price of 
woolen goods compared with former years makes it tend still downward.”493  Moreover, 
he commented that “a great rise has taken place in the value of land, farm products and 
live stock, making the rearing of such scrub sheep, either for wool or mutton, a very 
unprofitable business.”494  These comments are some of the clearest markers that rural 
society was feeling the effects of the railroad by the mid-1850s.  The specialization of 
farmers to raise fewer, but higher quality, sheep suggests that they were responding to 
market changes occurring in the larger economy.   
By 1854, farmers also began producing beef cattle in Marion County.  Calvin 
Fletcher, in an above quote, noted that in 1846, “there was but one man Bill Matlock in 
Hendricks City. that applied in the spring of the year to get money to buy cattle…Now 
[in 1854] there are some 30 to 50 persons.”495  Although it is a small number of farmers 
in the county, the increase in cattle production shows that Marion County farmers were 
responding to changing market forces caused by the railroad.  The previous chapter notes 
that residents diversified their crops to avoid any market gluts but the remarks of Beeler 
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and Fletcher suggest that by 1850s, Hoosiers in central Indiana were responding to 
market forces by adapting their livestock raising to reflect realities of the market.496   
The railroad altered property relations for farmers in central Indiana.  Charles Post 
writes that “rising debts and taxes forced Midwestern family farmers to compete as 
commodity producers in order to maintain their landholding [thus] they were compelled 
to seek various ways to increase the productivity of labor through mechanization.”497  As 
noted above, the arrival of the railroad created a land boom in Marion County unlike 
those seen in other regions of the early West.  It also experienced a dramatic increase in 
the value of agricultural implements.  In 1850, Marion County ranked fifteenth in the 
state in terms of value of agricultural implements with just over $114,000.  Wayne, 
Tippecanoe, and Dearborn Counties all had more in terms of implement values.  By 
1860, it ranked fourth in the state with nearly $210,000.  Ultimately, the 80% increase in 
agricultural machinery during the 1850s explains the higher yields much more than 
increased land improvement or increases in farm labor.  Farmers, rather than invest in 
more laborers tended to invest in machinery to increase their output with less labor.   
Calvin Fletcher purchased his first mechanical reaper in June of 1853 to assist 
with his harvest.  By 1854, there seem to be multiple reapers in the region.  Fletcher 
noted that “Calvin [Jr.] came in to attend the mowing machins that are to perform at Mr. 
Blakes.  Tomorrow They reap with machins at McFarlin place.”  The reapers were to go 
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to Fletcher’s fields the day after McFarlin’s land was cleared.498  The Marion County 
Agricultural Society reports also reflect this.  The report from the 1854 meeting detailed 
that “Farm implements are more called for, and the buffing, rusty, rough mould-board is 
giving way to the best polished cast steel…and enabling [the farmer] to do his work not 
only better but more of it.”499  By the middle of the 1850s, mechanical implements were 
in demand in central Indiana—as they were across the Early West—to improve the work 
and increase the amount of work possible.500   
Fletcher’s diary does give one small hint at the kind of rural anxiety over higher 
input costs of farming.  In the 1854 entry where he describes the path of reapers through 
the community, he briefly states that “[Calvin, Jr.] is very cool does not fret as I should if 
I were to be responsible for a correct decision.”501  The increased responsibility of 
operating high value machinery in the setting of increased necessity of high volume 
agricultural output was not attractive to Fletcher—and probably other Hoosiers who 
preferred to maintain traditional farming methods.  The tension of increased investments 
in seed, labor, technology, and planning all emerged during the 1850s as Hoosiers began 
responding to market forces that opened some avenues for family security like increased 
ability to invest in local manufacturing and agriculture and closed others like the small-
scale subsistence farming that existed before land values increased in the post-railroad 
era.   
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The railroad played a role in shaping the labor market for farmers.  The arrival of 
the railroad set off a boom in urban development and builders needed laborers to 
construct the city.  The construction jobs in the city drew workers away from rural 
pursuits and drove wages up.  During the 1840s in Marion County, increased investments 
in manufacturing establishments from $141,874 to $320,410 in 1850, and to $785,865 
invested in manufacturing by 1860.  In 1850, manufacturing establishments produced 
$892,133 and by 1860, those numbers increased to, $1,111,370 value of produced 
goods.502  Calvin Fletcher noted “so scarce are hands in consequence of the demand on 
R.R. that they can scarly [sic] be had—have to give from 1$ [to] 1 50 per day for harvest 
hands.”503  In 1853, lazy laborers threatened Fletcher’s harvest by claiming they were too 
sick to work.  He noted that “this warm morn 3 of our hands Mr. Anderson Mr. Andy 
Bolen & Noah Ford sick & c.”504  The next day, Fletcher stated that “Hands several failed 
to come to Harvest.”505  Several days later, he joined his son Calvin, Jr. in the field and 
“did a fine days work—cut some 10 or 12 acres—tho’ many of our hands had left us.”506   
The high price for labor continued for the next few years.  Fletcher, on April 1, 
1856, stated that “I have concluded to hire Mr. Smith.  He asks a dollar a day the year 
round.  It is high but I think likely it is best.  It seems the last 2 years have been quite 
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expensive.”507  The rising value of land, which drove higher property tax rates, along 
with the high costs of labor forced Hoosier farmers to expand their mechanical 
investments to maximize their opportunities to capitalize on the high prices given for 
crops.   Hoosiers, who were increasingly looking to increase their family security by 
participating in the national economy, were forced to adapt new technology to make up 
for this output.508   
The valuable farm land and large number of farms in the region made the city a 
hub of agricultural commerce and businesses sprang up to capitalize on those 
characteristics.  One historian notes that after the railroads arrived “manufacturers 
appeared, and would not disappear.  “Stores” that had formerly mixed up dry goods, 
groceries, grain, hardware, earthenware, and even books, in their stock, began to select 
and confine themselves to one or two classes of their former assortment.”509  City 
directories give us an insight into the kind of machinery produced and used in Marion 
County.  The first city directory wasn’t published until 1855, suggesting that the city was 
small enough that residents were confident in their knowledge of city merchants and 
residents until the surge in population that followed the railroad.  However, the 
advertisements in the Indianapolis Directory show that by the mid-1850s, rural residents 
could purchase a wide range of agricultural implements, some of them made locally.  The 
M’ouat brothers operated a stove and coal shop that advertised plows and cultivators in 
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their shop on East Washington Street.  Their work was “done to order with neatness and 
Despatch.”510  According to Indianapolis historian Edward Leary, “the Eagle Machine 
Works manufactured the new threshers and separators [was] fast becoming one of the 
state’s largest industries.”511  The other implement dealers in the area included Beard and 
Sinex, Birkenmayer and Brewster, and William H. Gause but they were wholesalers in 
the region.512  The Fourth Annual Report of the Indiana State Board of Agriculture, from 
1854, also suggested the recent emergence of manufacturing centers in the city.  It notes 
that, “several enterprising mechanical establishments have been located in this county 
during the past year, at which implements of husbandry are made of which the 
manufacturer may justly be proud.”513  
Indianapolis’ emergence as a central hub was not limited to manufacturing.  Leary 
notes that other industries also developed their own economic sphere of influence.  He 
states that grocers, druggists, iron and tin production centers and others all centered in the 
city and “made daily shipments by rail to all parts of the state.”514  Other industries 
included musical merchandise, gun making, tailoring, furniture making, and various 
hardware goods.515  Moreover, general stores evolved and began specializing in goods.  
Whereas merchants like Nicholas McCarty dealt in all types of goods in the 1820s, by 
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1855, shops like Drum & Hill advertised the sale of “groceries, nails, glass, fish, salt” and 
a few specific other goods.  Samuel Beck, a rifle manufacturer “Keeps always on hand a 
full assortment of everything pertaining to the gun business.”516  Merchants no longer 
dealt in “all” goods; they increasingly specialized in certain industries.    These 
advertisements, however limited, show that the city was growing beyond an economic 
outpost.  Marion County, after the emergence of the railroad, entered the third stage of 
development noted by Timothy Mahoney as it established itself as an economic hub.   
While the region became more economically powerful, social issues continued to 
emerge as class striations developed during the late 1840s and 1850s.  The arrival of the 
railroad allowed for exportation of agricultural products, especially pork.  In 1847, 
Benjamin I. Blythe and Edwin Hedderly began a slaughter and packing house that 
employed fifty laborers to process the five hundred to six hundred hogs that came 
through per day.  These laborers were a new fixture to Indianapolis, a city that had 
previously had cheap farm land even within the city limits.  For the first time, although 
Calvin Fletcher never expounded on it, a labor union marched on the city in 1850 in favor 
of “increased wages, improved educational opportunities, better understanding between 
employer and employee” and a basic level of health insurance in periods of “pecuniary 
distress during sickness of its members.”517  These residents, focused on providing a 
competency for their family, for the first time found themselves in the position that 
workers in New York City had experienced for nearly three decades.518  The 
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transportation revolution, finally by the mid-1850s, created the same labor problems in a 
western land-locked city as it did in the largest city in the United States.   
William Gallagher, in his 1858 address to the Marion County Agricultural Society 
argued that Hoosiers needed to recognize the “floating fact” that agriculture was 
changing.519  The speech ultimately argued that the mechanical revolution emerging in 
agricultural markets was good for farmers.  He stated that rural folks should invest in 
their operations and that “all that is necessary is determination.”520  His advice urged 
farmers to heed the agricultural press and that farmers should stop accumulating large 
tracts of land.  Instead, Gallagher argued, farmers should fertilize their fields, plow 
deeply, and use machinery to save labor.521  Moreover, Gallagher hinted that improved 
agriculture would allow farmers to increase the economic output of their investment.  He 
stated that “why buy and own and pay taxes and keep up fences on two acres, when one 
acre, if property treated, will yield all that you usually get from the two?”522  He noted 
that the increased costs were not too heavy and that improvements’ “expense not eat up 
the product.”523 
Gallagher urged farmers to take up new methods because he felt that Hoosiers 
made no improvements at all.  He stated that “I fail to find satisfactory evidences that 
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your acreable yield of wheat is increasing.  And on your rich bottom…you do not grow 
more corn per acre now than was grown when I was a boy.”524  However, Gallagher’s 
claims seem to be more rhetorical than accurate.  The agricultural census shows a drastic 
increase in production.  As noted above, crop production increased dramatically in 
Marion County during the 1850s and this includes Calvin Fletcher’s notation in July of 
1859 stating that “the Wheat is mostly cut but a poor crop.”525  It seems that Gallagher’s 
comments, while suggesting that Hoosiers should continue to improve their farms, was 
much more rhetorical than descriptive in his address to the society.   
Gallagher’s own speech belies the changes in agricultural practices that occurred 
with lightning speed in the 1850s.  He noted that Hoosiers recognized a feeling of loss of 
old farming methods by the end of the decade.  He, in his 1858 address to the Marion 
County Agricultural Society, described his feeling regarding the increasing 
mechanization of farming and quoted a Wordsworth poem, “But yet I know, where e’re I 
go, That there hath passed away a glory from the earth.”526  He suggested that the feeling 
of loss associated with mechanization “is an amiable one.  Many of you [in attendance] I 
doubt not, have felt it in your better moments.”527  His choice of poem was a rhetorical 
strategy that acknowledged the feelings of agriculturalists who were hesitant about 
undertaking the new agricultural methods, drew them into his frame of mind, and allowed 
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the speaker to make his ultimate argument in favor for improvement that he felt was so 
important.   
The newspaper reports of the state fairs were much more forgiving of Indiana 
agriculture.  The Weekly Indiana State Sentinel report on October 25, 1855 noted that “it 
is well understood…that the collection of stock, implements, and various products and 
manufactures, is larger than has been presented on any previous occasion; the means of 
comparison and experiment are more satisfactory, and the [a]pportunities for the mutual 
improvement of separate districts thereby vastly extended.”528  The report also noted the 
presence of various improved stock breeds including Durhams, Berkshire, Merinos, and 
others suggesting a wide variety of agricultural improvements in livestock.  The article, 
far from admonishing residents of their lack of improvement, proclaimed that “Indiana is 
coming to assume her proper rank in the constellation of sisters, and from poverty and 
seclusion, her people are rising into wealth…Her agriculture is the main support of her 
strength, and in this mighty awakening it requires no seer’s prophetic vision.”529 
Newspaper reports regarding the state fair of 1856 also noted the first contest of 
machinery.  The grinding contest, won by local resident J.O. Joyce and his “Star 
Mill…was preferred above all others for the fineness of grinding, the economy of its 
draft, general simplicity and strength of construction.  It was a glorious victory.”530  The 
other reported event was a corn crushing contest between several mills in the city where 
controversy ensued.  The “Little Giant,” the “Star Mill,” and four others—as listed in the 
results—engaged in a contest over who could produce the most corn using standardized 
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equipment.  The Star Mill was declared the winner in the contest by producing the most 
corn.  The owner of the Little Giant, however, noted that they used less power to produce 
their corn and, when considering this fact, they argued they were the winner.531  That the 
first contest occurred during the 1850s shows that Hoosiers were finally interested in 
agricultural improvements during the era.  Marion County farmers watched the contest 
for entertainment, but also learned that increased yields were manageable to local mills 
while agriculturalists were telling them that they should improve their inputs.  Overall, 
this suggests that the 1850s were the major turning point regarding improved agriculture 
as transportation and manufacturing allowed farmers to increase their harvest and 
efficiently get them to customers.   
The new economy faced its first test during the Panic of 1857.  The Panic 
emerged in August of 1857 after the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company’s failure to 
pay loans shook the national economy and credit dried up as it had two decades earlier.  
The failure of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company left an indelible mark on the 
stock market.  For the next three weeks, stocks fell across sectors and New York banks 
hoarded specie to protect themselves against demand deposit withdrawals.  In addition, 
they called in notes form western and southern banks to meet any potential runs on the 
bank.  More bad news emerged when the Central America, a ship loaded with one and a 
half million dollars of gold specie, sank off the coast of South America.  The ensuing 
dread caused the Secretary of the Treasury Howell Cobb to inject specie into the New 
York banking system but it was not enough to stem the rush of people looking to reclaim 
their deposits.  The end of September witnessed Philadelphia’s Bank of Pennsylvania 
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suspending specie payments, furthering the belief that the shaky banking system would 
crumble under its own weight.  Confident commenters noted that the bank runs would 
stop when farmers sold their exceptionally large crops in the fall.  The end of the 
Crimean War earlier that year, however, lowered prices and kept farmers from selling 
their crops and allowing western merchants to repay their loans to eastern creditors.  The 
ensuing panic lasted until 1860 when European harvests failed and caused an uptick in 
prices.  Regionally, the effects of the Panic of 1857 wore off during the Civil War as 
demand for agricultural goods surged, especially after 1863.532 
Indiana banks experienced the Panic of 1857 slightly differently than the rest of 
the nation.  The Indiana Constitution of 1851 created new banking laws that inadvertently 
safeguarded the state system from the Panic of 1857.  The success of these safeguards 
prevented the mass sales of land that Hoosiers experienced during the Panic of 1837.  
Indeed, newspapers are relatively silent on subject of land sales compared to the crisis 
two decades prior.533  The free banking act of 1852 led to an explosion of paper money in 
the state as banks emerged to embrace the rapidly expanding economy of the state.  By 
1855, ninety one banks opened across the state with five in Indianapolis.  These banks 
were required to have twelve percent reserve specie of a minimum of $50,000 in capital, 
but the low reserve rate allowed unscrupulous investors to acquire bank charters and 
fleece the public.  Wildcat bankers obtained charters, bought land with bank deposits, and 
fled knowing their depositors could not find them.  In less than three years, fifty-one free 
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banks failed.  To remedy the issue, free bankers met in Indianapolis in early 1855 to 
classify banks but the classifications were not accurate.534  A small panic in 1855 cleared 
out most of the small banks and left the remaining institutions on solid footing.535   
The Panic of 1857 didn’t hit Marion County until October.  Calvin Fletcher noted 
on the first of October that “the pecuniary distress of the Country seems to be extreme 
when I say of the Country I rather should say of the great & little mony dealers & 
speculators of the land.  The moderate mechanic & farmer is yet safe & well off.”536  By 
October 14, however, Fletcher noted that “the endibtedness [sic] is from a few banks & 
brokers in our state.  I think now a general suspension must ensue.  I dread that the 
old…state bank will have to do so.”537  Bank leaders met the next day to discuss their 
reactions to the crisis.  Hugh McCulloch, remembered that “I had been tolerably hard 
worked before, but the real hard work of my life commenced with my election to the 
presidency of the Bank of the State of Indiana.”538  He noted that the bank continued to 
distribute specie because “There was really no alternative.  Specie payments must be 
maintained, or the charter [for the bank] would be forfeited.”539  Calvin Fletcher, on 
behalf of the bank, went to New York to meet with Winslow, Lanier & Co. to discuss the 
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fiscal situation.  Fletcher noted that “I sat down with Lanier & looked into a state of his 
affairs.  I found them very good  That a suspension was unnecessary.”540 
The bank hemorrhaged specie in the following weeks but survived the panic 
without ever suspending specie payment.  McCulloch stated that: 
For three or four weeks the calls upon the branches were so 
continuous and heavy that it seemed probable that their 
entire circulation would be sent home.”541  In the fifth week 
there was an improvement in the financial outlook…Calls 
upon the neighboring branches continued for a week or two 
longer, and then ceased altogether.  The crisis had been 
passed—the charter was safe.542  
 
Nonetheless, prices for goods were significantly lower after the panic.  Calvin 
Fletcher noted that, by January of 1858, “things in a pecuniary way look some what 
gloomy...produce cost very high to make or raise [crops] as labor has been quite high up 
to August last.”543  The Panic of 1857 was difficult for local farmers as shown by the 
prices listed in Fletcher’s diary.  He only received sixty cents/bushel for wheat and 
between fifteen and twenty cents/bushel for corn which was less than half of what he 
received in 1854.  Cattle also dropped precipitously.  In March of 1857, Fletcher sold 
cattle at $4.75 each but by the end of the year he was only getting $2.50.544  The collapse 
in prices was felt across the region as noted from an article reprinted from the Cincinnati 
Gazette, which stated that “prices [in Cincinnati] have for some time been above a 
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shipping point, and it will require a material improvement on the Eastern seaboard to 
justify an advance in this market.”545   
In Indiana, wages along the Ohio River were reduced.  The Daily State Sentinel 
noted in a brief article that “The cotton mill company at Cannelton, Ind., determined a 
few days since to suspend all further work for the present, unless the operatives would 
consent to a reduction of 10 per cent. upon their wages.  This announcement produced 
great excitement among the operatives, but they finally consented to the reduction.”546 In 
Indianapolis, wages were cut in half for agricultural workers.  In January 1857, laborers 
between a dollar and a dollar and twenty-five cents a day but by January 1858, they were 
getting only fifty to sixty cents.  By the end of 1858, workers were getting fifteen dollars 
a month as noted by Calvin Fletcher.547   
By 1860, the economy of central Indiana recovered from the shock of 1857.  Corn 
prices were up to “30 to 35 cts per bushell” and cattle prices were back up to the pre-
panic rate of $4.80.548  Fletcher even noted in his diary that “our money returns for 
redemption rapidly…quite an increase the last year.  The business of the county seems 
healthy.”549  Labor prices also seemed to rebound.  Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman 
show that average farm laborers got board plus $13.71 in 1860 in Indiana, and the prices 
in central Indiana were generally higher than the rest of the state.  The fifteen dollar per 
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month wage mentioned in 1858 compared to the 1860 census reflects the resurgent 
economy of Marion County.  Fletcher noted in his diary in late-1858 that he “paid him 
[Lucian Fletcher, his nephew] $15 per month for 8 months 120$ more than he 
deserved.”550  Taking Fletcher’s family loyalty into account suggests that by 1860 wages 
were higher than the state average and show that Marion County workers were 
benefitting from the economic uptick.   
Ultimately, Hoosiers were pushed and pulled into increased market orientated 
production during the 1850s.  The increasing lack of available land during the 1850s 
pushed Hoosiers to make a choice of either moving farther West to remain on the edge of 
the economic frontier or improving the land they already owned.  As the state became 
more fully settled, Hoosiers made the economically-rational decision to increasingly turn 
toward land improvements as a way to take advantage of railroad transportation networks 
to increase their profits.  The lack of available labor also pushed Hoosiers into market-
oriented investments, as low numbers of available farm hands made mechanization the 
economically practical choice.  The high costs of buying machinery were offset by high 
wages and the ability of a community to band together to purchase manufactured goods.  
Finally, they were pulled by high crop prices.  Marion County residents routinely 
experienced higher crop prices, on average, than the rest of the state.551  The availability 
of railroads directly in Marion County probably account for this as wholesalers could buy 
goods at higher prices due to lower shipping costs than from non-rail connected places.   
                                                 
550 Gayle Thornbrough, The Diary of Calvin Fletcher, Vol. 6 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1978), 
267.   
551 Howard Houk, A Century of Indiana Farm Prices. Lafayette (Lafayette: Purdue University Agricultural 
Extension Station, 1943).   
217 
 
 
As a result, these Hoosiers did not share the experience felt by Northeastern 
Americans who made a series of small choices that led to a slow transition toward 
capitalism.  While Christopher Clark and Daniel Vickers posit that Americans in the 
Northeast took on outwork to supplement the family income, Marion County residents 
had little opportunity to do so because of their lack of a connection to outside markets.  
Instead, residents of Marion County had few choices about whether or not to get into 
market-oriented production.  The push-pull factors noted above suggest that their 
connection to markets after the markets were already established gave them the 
opportunity to take part in a relatively mature economic system.  The lack of laborers 
forced Hoosiers to abandon traditional farming methods and community-oriented 
production.  Their existence on the frontier prevented the long-standing ties noted in 
many discussions of the transition to capitalism and the result of that dearth was the quick 
emergence of economically driven choices.   
The speed of the transition toward increased market output during the 1850s is a 
strikingly unique feature of Marion County development.  At the beginning of 1847, 
virtually no trade occurred on a regional or national basis.  Hoosiers were secluded by the 
environment in such a fashion that national market orientation was nearly futile.  By 
1855, Hoosiers were able to participate in trade anywhere the increasingly large and 
efficient rail network reached.  More so than most other Midwestern areas that were 
connected to navigable rivers, Marion County residents relied on the rise of the railroad 
to alter their economic strategies.  By 1860, they were competing with other regional 
cities to be the commercial hub of the region.  Rather than trying to enter the market, they 
were competing to obtain market share.   
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The experience of Marion County is much more similar to cities of the Far West 
than it was to Midwestern cities like Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, or even Chicago.  
The telescoped pattern of development shows that the railroad was far more significant 
for Marion County development than it was for any other city in the regions surveyed 
here.  As Elliot West has noted, “in a frontier city, thoroughly modern 
arrangements…could emerge with a speed and an ease of innovation incomprehensible in 
more settled cities where older ways were firmly in place.”552  The transportation and 
communication revolution allowed Indianapolis and Marion County to become 
“thoroughly modern” by the advent of the Civil War, after only thirteen years of railroad 
connection as the frontier period ended with astonishing speed.   
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CHAPTER 8: “ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: CIVIL WAR, REGION, AND THE 
END OF TELESCOPED GROWTH DURING THE 1860S” 
 
By 1860, Marion County’s economy mirrored those of other regionally and 
nationally oriented markets.  The economic developments regarding wage labor, capital 
acquisition, and investments during the Civil War era were largely changes of degree 
rather than kind.  The city continued to emerge as an economic hub.  By 1862, nine 
railroads serviced the city and Hoosiers could travel in any direction.  Land and crop 
prices show that the emergent economy of central Indiana was on par with the rest of the 
Early West in 1860.  By the end of the war, and especially by 1870, Indianapolis and 
Marion County were fully entrenched into the national economy.  The percentage of 
improved acreage, value of farms, and other measures of rural economic activity all 
stabilized in the region in relation to the larger economic network of the Early West.553  
During the 1860s, the economy of Marion County grew to encompass an even larger 
hinterland as they served the surrounding region with dozens of steam mills, factories and 
wholesale shops.  Hoosiers in Marion County, and all of central Indiana, acquired the 
national and international markets they sought for nearly a half century.554 
Those benefits came with a cost, however, as the Civil War erupted and turned the 
nation into a crucible of war.  Hoosiers—for the first time, and like the rest of the 
nation—experienced the full brunt of being connected to a national society.  The Civil 
War solidified Indianapolis as a central hub of Northern commerce, while at the same 
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time subjugating its residents to the vagaries of a wide-reaching national government.  
Hoosiers felt the wide-spread reach of the federal government as the draft reached for 
local sons.  At the same time, markets, which were already changing drastically, were 
limited by an embargo on the rebelling states.  Significant numbers of agricultural 
producers lost once-stable relationships with southern merchants and had to find new 
ways to market their merchandise.  Residents of Marion County also experienced the 
brunt of military necessity as thousands of soldiers thronged to Camp Morton for 
training.  Quite unpopularly, Camp Morton housed a prisoner-of-war camp that nearly led 
to a Confederate raid and local uprising.   
The city matured economically faster than any water based city in the Midwestern 
commercial network other than Chicago.  The following charts based on the agricultural 
census show that, by 1870, central Indiana was the economic center of the state and that 
Marion County was on par with other major midwestern cities.  Farm values per acre 
show Marion County far ahead of any other county examined in the state, while those 
same farm values were in the middle of the values of other counties across the United 
States.  The value of farms per improved acre show comparable results.  Overall, it is 
clear that by the 1870 census, Indianapolis acquired its place in the Midwestern trade 
network and established itself as the agricultural hub of the state. 
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The agricultural sector shows the telescoped growth of central Indiana.  The early 
adoption of railroad transportation allowed Marion County to easily outpace growth in 
other midwestern cities.  This argument is bolstered by the rate of increase in the 
manufacturing sector.  By any measure, Hoosier manufacturing skyrocketed.  By 1870, 
investments in Marion County factories increased to $8,303,185.  The value of 
manufactured goods increased to $16,642,106.  Both numbers reflect an increase rate of 
over one thousand percent which far outpaced the growth in Cincinnati.555 
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Residents of Marion County experienced further negative traits of cheap rail 
travel as the railroad emerged as the dominant mode of transportation.  Most 
significantly, the central location of Indianapolis in the rail hubs of the Early West—
away from the Ohio River border of Kentucky, on rail connections between East and 
West, and closer to the site of the front than Chicago—brought huge numbers of troops to 
the city, and Governor Oliver Morton pledged vigorous support to the Union.556  
Moreover, Morton created a prisoner of war camp and troop training ground.  Residents 
had mixed reactions to these developments as some saw the sacrifices as a patriotic duty 
while others wished to remain secluded from national affairs.557  All Hoosiers, however, 
were terrified when the city became a target of Confederate aggression and runaway 
slaves settled in the city in large numbers.558  Central Indiana’s connection to the larger 
economic world brought wider prosperity to many of its residents, but it also made the 
city a center of military and economic matters that encroached on the goals of economic 
independence many residents sought when they moved to the region.  In the end, they 
sacrificed their personal liberty for economic security.   
Hoosiers knew that secession was a possibility, but most Hoosiers in central 
Indiana did not believe that disunion would ever occur. Before the war, as recounted by 
Emma Lou Thornbrough, the Indianapolis Daily Journal noted that “one single year of 
Lincoln’s administration…would expose the hollowness of the secession threat so 
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effectually “that it will never be heard from again.””559  Calvin Fletcher noted on October 
29th that “in the eve read that threats of the Southern states S.C. Alabama Miss & La. to 
seceede if Lincon is elected.  I can’t think it possible that such an even can occur.  The 
Slave States would be [in] the most miserable condition to do any such thing.  And a 
voice seems to begin in these very states against it.  Their real & personal estate & credit 
would sadly depreciate at once in such an event.”560  A letter from Elijah Fletcher to his 
father in mid-November stated that “we live right on the crack [at New Albany on the 
Ohio River] where this glorious confederacy will break.  Sometimes it appears to yawn; 
but I cannot think ‘Mr. Palmetto’ so demented as to cut his own throat.  Korn Kracker 
wants to be loyal; and unless forced, will never throw himself behind a cotton bale to 
fight.”  However, the letter ominously continued regarding the economic tensions along 
the Ohio River, noting that “New Albany is greatly dependent on the south for steamboat 
building.  Several hundred thousands having been expended thus during the present 
year…They threated to remove their patronage.  Paducah Ky. has instituted a rival boat 
yard; and appeals loudly to all loyal Southrans [sic] to come to the rescue.”561   
South Carolina’s secession stunned Hoosiers.  They were shocked when South 
Carolina seceded from the Union in December of 1860 and intensified the crisis over the 
course of the next month for Marion County residents.  During the secession process, 
Hoosiers suggested that the North did everything reasonable to maintain the Union.  On 
                                                 
559 Emma Lou Thornbrough, Indiana in the Civil War Era, 1850-1880, (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical 
Society, 1995 ): 96.   
560 Elijah Fletcher to Calvin Fletcher in Gayle Thornbrough, The Diary of Calvin Fletcher, Vol. 6 
(Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1978), 620.   
561 Gayle Thornbrough, The Diary of Calvin Fletcher, Vol. 6 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1978), 
633. 
225 
 
 
December 18, Calvin Fletcher noted that “secession of S. Carolina I think is a fixed 
fact…The north seem to be willing to make all needed concessions.”562  He noted in his 
diary on two days later that “nothing new except the secession of South Carolina…Its 
consequence I cant tell.  The better judgment at present is not to fight them.  They seem 
to court a fight & unless they can consecrate the act by shedding of blood & get up a 
militery fever they will soon die out.”563  The Indiana State Guard—a paper known for 
its support of slavery—on December 22, 1860, noted that “the deed is done!...There is 
now, unfortunately for the country, no Washington or Jackson to say to the turbulent 
factions of either in the North or the South be still.”564  While still not surprised at 
southern secessionists, less than two weeks later, after a run on the banks and the 
increased probability that more states would follow the Palmetto States out of the Union, 
Fletcher lamented that “It has been 35 days of great anguish & fear.  South Carolina 
Seceeded & other states will likely follow in their footsteps…I pray that our union may 
be preserved.”565   
The anxiety over the fate of the Union continued during the winter of 1861.  
Newspapers battered their opponents with accusations of fault and called for various 
solutions from armed force to avoidance.566  Those feelings dissipated in April of 1861 
with the attack on Fort Sumter.  Newspapers emerged fully on the side of Union victory.  
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Even the Indiana State Sentinel, a paper highly unsupportive of Lincoln, argued that “the 
door for reconciliation, compromise or a peaceful separation, was closed against [the 
South].”567  In the long run, the attack on Fort Sumter pushed Indiana into the Union 
camp.  While some Hoosiers maintained their political leanings with the Democratic 
party as noted by the large Copperhead presence in the state during the war, the vast 
majority felt that the time for compromise was over and that the South was to blame for 
the war.   
Rural people struggled with the war effort as their markets were cut off.  Emma 
Lou Thornbrough noted that “disruption of trade with the South worked an especial 
hardship upon certain groups [including] farmers who had sold the bulk of their crops to 
the southern market.”568  The Indiana State Sentinel, on May 15, 1861, discussed the 
closure of the market routes at Cairo, IL.  It stated that the question of whether to close 
markets was undertaken in the House the preceding day “in connection with a proposition 
for the enactment of some law for their relief of debtors.”  The article noted that “it was 
argued by the friends of the proposition, that it was unfair to deprive the farmer, the 
manufacturer and the mechanic of the markets which they have relied upon for the sale of 
the products of their labor and yet permit the laws for the enforcement of the collection of 
debts to remain in full force against them.  If deprived of a market their resources are cut 
off and they are unable to meet their obligations…The stoppage of supplies will operate 
with peculiar hardship upon the citizens of southern Indiana, and those of the middle part 
of the State will also feel its effects.”569  Hoosier farmers were affected by the blockade 
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much in the same as border residents.  Douglas Hurt has noted that “by late November 
1862, tobacco had become one of the staple products of Indiana…farmers in southern 
Indiana reportedly showed “unusual excitement” as they planned to seed a larger tobacco 
crop in the spring.”570      
The transition to the tobacco economy was an excellent way for Hoosiers to make 
up for lost markets.  Corn, as a remnant of the early economy, was still a major crop on 
the eve of the Civil War and one dominant market was still oriented southward.571  
Market listings in newspapers show that the predominant trade was oriented toward two 
cities at the outset of the war: New York and Cincinnati. Cities like Louisville, 
Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, or Chicago were not listed in the local papers, showing that the 
Hoosier economy evolved toward the South and East.572  However, the onset of the Civil 
War brought a severe disruption in markets for Indiana farmers and a recalibration 
toward predominantly eastern markets.  Marion County saw a decrease of 15.5% in corn 
production and an increase of 85.1% in wheat production during the 1860s seemingly as 
a result of the embargo.  The elimination of corn markets during the war drove trade 
away from the South and to the North.  The economic benefits of transitioning to wheat 
production—which was already underway during the 1850s—intensified the market 
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connections with northern commercial centers because of the trade embargo with the 
south.573 
Grain prices in 1859 were unmatched up to that point in the state’s history.  1860 
saw a regression back to more normal—yet still above average prices—but the first years 
of the Civil War saw severe declines in grain prices received by Indiana farmers.574  In 
July of 1861, Calvin Fletcher noted that crop prices for corn were “not over 20 cents & in 
the county away from R.R. it is not exceeding 10 to 15.”575  Not until the third year of the 
war did Hoosier prices for grain recover to levels reached before the war began.  This lag 
time suggests that the embargo of trade between North and South was working and that 
Hoosiers were recalibrating their trade patterns away from the traditional southern 
markets noted in earlier chapters, and toward Northern markets that provided farmers an 
outlet for their increasingly bountiful harvests. Yet, the struggle at the local level 
remained as Hoosiers were forced to adopt new crops like tobacco or struggle with the 
lower income of the corn-hog economy during the early years of the war.     
The Civil War also caused tension over migration into the region.  Even though 
the Civil War created a need for agricultural labor, Marion County advertisements show 
that local Hoosiers only welcomed certain social groups to the area.  One discriminatory 
advertisement for labor published in the Indiana State Guard in 1861 noted that Marion 
County resident J.S. Brown wished “to employ two active hands to cut saw-logs; also one 
to drive oxen…For the farm hand, an Englishman or German preferred; the others to be 
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Americans.”576  That the article specified what ethnicity should apply for the job belies 
the wide-ranging racism present in Marion County.  It is even more important because 
this type of advertisement was absent from earlier issues before the railroad connected 
the city to the rest of the nation.  Only after an influx of outsiders made Hoosiers 
uncomfortable with some residents of the region, did articles specifying the ethnic 
makeup of potential employees emerge.   
Even more tension surrounded increased black migration to central Indiana.  
Though the Constitution of 1851 banned black migration into the state, thousands of 
African Americans found their way into Indiana as the war carried into its second year.  
Calvin Fletcher noted where these escaped slaves were coming from when he noted that 
he got a shirt “for a colered boy 18 who was brot with the Southern army to Ky. & has 
ran away & I am usually called on to aid them on to a safer region.”577  Similar to the 
1840s, when Germans and Irish people surged into the region following the railroad, 
African Americans flooded into Marion County following opportunities to escape to the 
North.   
The number of escaped slaves became a contested issue in the region because it 
challenged the free labor ideology that most Hoosiers supported.  Erik Wade argues that 
“The “multifaceted nature” of free-soil ideology rested on the basis of free white labor, 
which was antithetical to slavery and, in Indiana, at least, opposed competition from free 
black labor.”578  Marion County largely supported this trend.  An article in the Indiana 
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Daily Sentinel, entitled “Cheap Labor” argued that “the thousands and tens of thousands 
of negroes that are coming into this State, unprovided for as they are with any means of 
making a living except by the hardest and roughest labor, is having the effect of reducing 
the price of labor.”  The article continued “We already hear the farmers engaging these 
runaways at labor at greatly reduced prices, and this will continue and increase, until our 
white fellow-citizens, who labor for the support of themselves and their families, are 
compelled to compete with the labor of negroes, ...This is one of the effects of this war 
the laboring class will soon feel, by having the price of labor reduced to that of a runaway 
or emancipated negroe.”579  The article shows the anxiety of local Hoosiers regarding an 
economic competency for their families under the new form of wage labor emergent in 
central Indiana during the 1850s.   
The article is also interesting because implies the increase of a rural/urban split 
that existed for the first time in Marion County.  The article’s tone is one of warning to 
urban folks, rather than complaint when it notes that “We already hear the farmers 
engaging these runaways at labor.”580  African American settlement to the region was less 
problematic for rural residents than for their urban counterparts.  Central Indiana 
Hoosiers, by 1860, were experiencing a widespread urbanization driven by Civil War 
demand.  Soldiers needed food, clothes, and housing which the city provided, at 
exceptional profit.  Rural residents, until 1863, struggled with low crop prices and labor 
losses.  The issue of African Americans coming to the region solved the labor problem 
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caused by the Civil War, and the low wages offered to blacks allowed Hoosiers to make 
up for low crop prices during the initial years of the war.  Rural farmers were already 
hiring African Americans because it allowed poorer farmers to avoid paying for 
expensive machinery during the early war years.  The large number of African Americans 
who emerged at the same time that many white males left to fight provided rural Hoosiers 
the opportunity to limit labor costs and still use their preferred agricultural practices.581  
As the article suggests, urban residents had a different view of African Americans 
coming into the region.  The booming economy of Indianapolis needed fewer laborers 
than its rural counterpart, as most of the jobs were oriented toward clerking, 
entertainment or washing.  When African Americans entered the rural economy, urban 
residents witnessed the emergence of an existential threat to white dominance in the labor 
system.   
A related urban/rural divide festered over the location of the Indiana State Fair.  
The majority of the fairs were held in Indianapolis at the State Fair Grounds north of the 
Circle before the war.  As Camp Morton took over that plot during the belligerent years, 
other cities occasionally received the opportunity to host the event.  In 1865, the fair was 
held in Madison, in 1867 it was held in Fort Wayne, and in 1868 it returned to its 
permanent home.  Not all Hoosiers were thrilled having the State Fair in Indianapolis.582  
So much so that the 1869 report from the Marion County Board of Agriculture stated that 
“there is no disguising the fact that there exists, over almost the entire State, a petty 
jealousy, a pretended dislike of the capital and her institutions…Indianapolis is the 
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property, as a capital, of the whole State, and every Indianaian should feel a just pride in 
her advancement.  Build her up and leave the pulling down business to more unworthy 
hands.”583  This report shows the success of Marion County but also shows that Hoosiers 
were not entirely comfortable creating an urban sphere that was so much more dominant 
than the rest of the state.  The resentment hinted at in the 1869 report shows another 
aftereffect of the transportation revolution, as Marion County Hoosiers were viewed as 
competitors for agricultural events rather than a source of pride to some Indiana residents. 
The onset of the war also provided the city with tensions of its own.  Governor 
Oliver Morton, a staunch Union supporter, volunteered Indianapolis as a new training 
ground and a prisoner of war camp.  The creation of Camp Morton, the influx of soldiers, 
support staff and prisoners create an added layer of tension to a city experiencing massive 
growth during a period of national strife.  Soldiers, rarely known to be polite guests, ran 
roughshod over the city.  Calvin Fletcher noted that, “Soldiers continued to be a problem 
through the end of the war.  In July 1865, Fletcher noted that “found several of 
Hancock’s [corps]…were strolling around the woods…& some prostitutes.  These men of 
the worst character old hardened villians in crime stroled over the farm for few days past 
& are going from Camp Burnside to do much mischief.”584  During a swell in local 
military force in July of 1863, soldiers enjoyed their special brand of fun in various ways.  
George Julian, a volunteer from Wayne County, remembered that “the boys were not 
neglectful of the amenities of life” and that a favorite pastime was to fill preacher’s 
canteens with “rank beverages.”  One group of soldiers, looking to have some fun on a 
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rail trip from Cincinnati to Indianapolis released “the pipe of a watering tank…just as the 
one passenger coach of the train came slowly up.”  The water drenched the passengers 
who were forced to remain in their soggy clothes until they arrived at their 
destination.”585   
Similar to other areas where military camps were stationed, prostitutes became an 
increasingly common sight as the city grew.586  In April of 1862, an article reprinted from 
a Cairo, IL newspaper showed the attitude toward undesirables in the city.  It described a 
“great thing in the way of ridding this town of the hosts of disreputable females.”  The 
story describes the scene:   
There was a floating craft somewhere in the upper portion of the 
town, near the stone depot tied to a tree some dozen rods or more 
from the levee, occupied as a brothel, into which were congregated 
a crowd of abandoned females and their no less abandoned male 
associates.  Despairing of ridding the town of their presence by a 
legitimate method, a Provost Marshal’s guard, last night, cut the 
rope and towing the craft with its occupants out into the current, 
cut loose, and started the concern down to Dixie, to delight the first 
families of chivalrydom.  When last heard from, the expedition 
was gaily floating down the broad Mississippi, nine miles below 
Columbus.  They had hoisted a white flag—a white petticoat—and 
if they escape the dangers of the flotilla, and succeed in eluding the 
diligence of artillerymen at Fort Pillow, and the rebel gunboats, 
they will speedily grace the sweet scented city of Memphis with 
their odorous presence.587 
 
Furthermore, in November of 1862, Fletcher noted that “I found lewd women had been 
sleeping in my stable & I got an officer to go for them.”588  A year later, he was forced to 
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“go for the Mayer to send a police force to take 5 or 6 abandened women who are 
encamped in my English woods.  There have been squads of them taken up on my farm 
the last year.  Many dress in soldiers clothes.”589  Including the soldiers’ rendezvous in 
1865, the issue of prostitution became significantly larger as the war dragged on.  The 
Indiana State Sentinel on May 23, 1864 reprinted an article from the Winstead Herald.  It 
stated that New Haven had six hundred prostitutes “but it should be considered that New 
Haven has been little else than a military camp for the last three years, and prostitution 
follows military operations like a hideous shadow.”590  The placement of Camp Morton 
as a major western military site made certain that a large number of prostitutes in the city.  
These events suggest that Hoosiers were incredibly anxious about having prostitutes in 
their city.  The earliest years of settlement saw few discussions of prostitution, as 
community members knew each other, kin networks remained strong, and outsiders were 
unwelcome.  The placement of Camp Morton in the city ensured that Hoosiers would 
become active in enforcing laws against them and were interested to hear about how 
other towns dealt with the perceived problem.   
The success of the city as a transportation and rail hub also made it a military 
target.  In the summer of 1863, John Hunt Morgan crossed the Ohio River and invaded 
the North in an attempt to draw Union armies away from their campaign goals in the 
southern military theater.  Many Indianapolis residents immediately feared the advance of 
Confederate Raiders due to the cities’ relevance as a crucial transportation hub and, 
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according to Harry Smith, the five thousand prisoners held at Camp Morton.591  In 
addition, Morgan believed that he could force Union generals to turn their attention to 
civil unrest on the home front.  The large number of Copperheads and reputation of 
Indiana as a state with considerable southern sympathies made it an easy choice for 
Morgan’s strategy.592   
Hoosiers’ faced the problem of how to defend their state during the stunning raid.  
Fervent Union supporter Governor Morton, in response to calls for aid in defense of 
Louisville, had sent the Seventy-first Indiana, two companies of the Third Indiana and the 
Twenty-third battery.   Southern Indiana all the way to Indianapolis was left with little 
defense.  In order combat the military threat to the region, Governor Morton called out 
the Indiana Legion and asked citizens to form militias for the defense of the city.  The 
General Order of July 9, 1863, resulted in a stunning muster of 65,000 men from across 
the state.593  45,000 of the new militia were ordered to block Morgan’s potential progress 
by felling trees and tearing down bridges across the region.  The remaining 20,000 were 
stationed at Military Park just west of the circle on Washington Street in Indianapolis.  
George Julian, a volunteer from Wayne County, noted that “Indianapolis was acreep with 
would-be soldiers, and trains from all directions were continually bringing in new 
crowds.”594   
Morgan’s ill-fated raid turned east near Salem, IN to stay close to the Ohio River 
and saved Indianapolis from the “eight days of war.”  Hoosiers, although unprepared to 
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fight, were willing to defend their city.  Fletcher noted that “town full of Soldiers, all the 
public grounds are covered with them many come in to obtain arms which are being 
served out as fast as possible.”595  He continued, two days later after Morgan moved 
toward Cincinnati, that “Troops are drilled continuly here & a good spirit of patriotism 
manifested.”596  George Julian recalled, referring to the volunteers, that “one wag, in 
describing it, said that the participants went battle scared but they came back bottle 
scarred.”597   
While Morgan’s Raid failed to create the kind of statewide uprising that would 
change the course of the war, it did create a political flashpoint.598  The advent of 
Morgan’s tromp into the state gave rise to declarations of disloyalty.  Blame for the raid 
was bandied both ways.  An article in the Indiana State Sentinel argued in defense of an 
attack from the Indianapolis Journal suggesting that local Democrats invited Morgan’s 
Raid.  It stated that “The Journal, the Chicago Tribune, the Cincinnati Gazette and 
Commercial, and all the other radical Abolition papers and speakers, big and little, have 
been proclaiming for the past two years that the North was divided…There is not a rebel 
in the South, if he read and accepted the statements of any of these prints, but would 
believe that the Democracy of the Northwest were ready and anxious to slide the 
Northwestern States into the Southern Confederacy.”599  Far from supporting Morgan’s 
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raid, Democratic paper editors pronounced that “A common duty to each other and a 
common sense of danger, call upon every citizen to give his personal efforts, his 
influence and his means to drive the audacious foe from our soil and to preserve peace 
within our borders.”  The article, although scathingly attacking the handling of the war by 
Morton and Lincoln proclaimed that “the people of Indiana can do this, and they will. 
From every part of the State will come strong arms and stout hearts to stop the progress 
of the invaders and hurl them back from whence they came.”600 
Morgan’s Raid brought political solidarity to the region.  However, as noted in 
Chapter Five, labor issues emerged in the city during the 1850s and grew during the Civil 
War era because of the improved transportation infrastructure and resultant economic 
transition.  By the end of the conflict, there were several trade unions in Indianapolis 
including one for mechanics and another for newspaper typographers.601  More intense 
research is required but one reason for the increase in labor activity may be rooted in the 
rise of a working class.  In the 1857 city directory, an examination of resident 
occupations shows that 254 residents were listed as laborers and there were 
approximately five thousand heads of households in the city.602  This shows that roughly 
0.5% of the population in 1857 were laborers.  These self-declared laborers were also 
predominantly of Irish or German heritage.603  The influx of immigrants during the 
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previous decade and the predominant discrimination toward outsiders explains the 
significant number of names from German and Irish descent.604  By 1867, the percentage 
of laborers in the Indianapolis city directory had increased to 5% of the overall 
workforce.605  The large increase in the number of people listed as laborers suggests that 
there was a lack of economic opportunity in the city to enter professional trades.  There is 
also a decidedly higher number of Anglo-oriented names in the directories, which 
suggests that the labor supply and wage demands were reaching across ethnic lines.  The 
rise of those unions, and their demands for higher wages suggest that a glut of employees 
emerged in the city that the local economy could not handle.606  As a result of supply and 
demand pressures on the labor market, the increase in the number of laborers is further 
support that the transition to capitalism, as described by Christopher Clark, was 
complete.607   
Another strain of the Civil War era was the increasing urbanization that caused 
cities to swell rapidly before the necessary infrastructure was in place to handle 
population pressures.608 Marion Country grew by over 80% during the 1860s from 39,855 
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to 71, 939 while Indianapolis grew by nearly 160% over the same period from 18,611 
residents to 48,244.  This massive urban growth created serious problems for local 
government and especially charity organizations that dealt with the poor.  The 
continuation of reform movements in the early nineteenth century pivoted after the Civil 
War as cities grew so large that they became impersonal spaces and the population 
turnover removed the social safety nets present a generation earlier.  The increasing 
poverty of industrialized workers and the lack of support networks led to a rise in welfare 
rolls.  The increasing stress and the influx of foreigners on public assistance caused a 
reactionary rejection of social welfare as a public good.  As Lisa Levenstein notes, “in the 
second half of the nineteenth century…public officials either drastically reduced the 
value of their relief grants or abolished them altogether.”609   
One excellent example of the response by social welfare organizations to the 
increasing urbanization and anonymity of Indianapolis is seen in a report “Investigations 
and Recordkeeping” by J. F. Wright, a local social worker.  Wright, in response to 
problems caused by “the great tramp evil which has cursed this country ever since the 
war” argued that the city of Indianapolis should create a set of records that would make it 
easier to organize the deserving poor from the undeserving.610  Wright notes in his report 
that if the “conditions of life were not thus rendered easy for this vast army of waste 
manhood, the great bulk of the tramp evil would long since have disappeared.”611  He 
uses the example of the James and Mary Smith family to show how the records allowed 
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officials to follow their criminal misconduct after they returned from Illinois to escape 
criminal charges.  Over the course of their lives, James and Mary were accused of lying 
about an injury, drinking in excess, refusing to go to the hospital when sick, and keeping 
a “den of shame for years.”612  For Wright, the rising number of people on welfare rolls 
in Marion County reflected the supply of public charity.  He believed that Hoosiers were 
taking advantage of the social programs that were in place to provide a safety net to the 
unfortunate.   
Social workers from Fort Wayne and Elkhart present at the conference agreed 
with the increased need for recordkeeping in the social work profession to prevent graft 
by dishonest local citizens.  One example given before the conference told the story of a 
contractor earning eighteen dollars per week who appealed to town trustees to pay for 
coal.  When it was discovered that he was bilking the city out of public funds, he flew 
into a rage and attempted to shoot the trustee who removed him from the rolls.613  The 
social workers were not deaf to complaints from the deserving poor but they were far 
more focused on eliminating the undeserving poor from the rolls.  The end of the 
conference proceedings recorded a discussion by experienced and inexperienced social 
workers as to how to determine the difference between the honest and dishonest 
petitioner.  Ultimately, the conference suggested that these professionals get to know 
their communities intimately so that they could judge the quality of people who applied 
for support.  They were urged to keep detailed records as they familiarized themselves in 
order to aid the next generation of trustees.  The aim of creating a dossier for individuals 
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and families on public assistance aimed at reestablishing the social familiarity decimated 
by the drastically increasing population.  As Indianapolis grew from secluded township 
during the 1840s to major economic hub during the Civil War, Hoosiers in Marion 
County were forced to reconcile the difficulties in managing a major metropolitan city.   
Ultimately, the advent of the Civil War brought prosperity to many people in 
Indianapolis.  Prices for goods went through the roof and enriched an entire layer of 
merchants and transportation specialists.614  Indianapolis became a shining example of 
what a railroad city could look like as Union Station set the precedent for the nation.  
Camp Morton and Hoosier volunteerism during the war allowed Indiana to feel as 
important of a place in American society than it had since settlement.  Prosperity was 
tangible to those who shopped along Washington Street.  Hoosiers regularly bought 
goods imported from New York City.  They could also buy agricultural goods and 
industrial wares manufactured right in the city if they wished to keep their money in the 
local economy.  Certainly, by the end of the Civil War, Indianapolis was an economic 
hub that reached into its own hinterland as it established itself as the crossroads of the 
Midwest.   
The city, however, had to contend with the emergence of an urban/rural divide 
and the divergence of goals with the rest of the state.  The laboring classes also increased 
during the Civil War and an increasing number of people on social welfare created 
tensions among citizens.  For the first time, large numbers of Hoosiers were not able to 
access the kind of economic independence seen in earlier generations as available land 
was completely purchased.  The number of laborers skyrocketed tenfold during a period 
                                                 
614 Emma Lou Thornbrough, Indiana in the Civil War Era: 1850-1880 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical 
Society, 1995), 190-196. 
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of increased industrialization and mechanization.  The city was also a haven for 
prostitution and poverty that was virtually unknown before the railroad arrived.  Finally, 
Hoosiers were caught up in a nationwide economic system that forced a transition in 
agricultural methods during the Civil War Era.  The embargo with the South altered most 
of the corn and hog trade in Central Indiana as the transportation patterns shifted both 
east and north.  Hoosiers who were accustomed to the traditional methods of corn 
production were forced to adopt new crops or methods because of the increasing output 
of the newly emergent Midwestern agricultural regions of Illinois and Iowa who could 
grow crops more efficiently on virgin soil and transport anywhere on the railroad.  For 
the first time, at the end of the Civil War, Hoosiers in central Indiana were fully 
entrenched in an economy that allowed regional, national and international markets—
rather than the local community—to determine the value of labor.   
The story of Indianapolis, from its settlement to the end of the Civil War, 
represents a fascinating developmental journey.  The city emerged on the frontier in the 
wilderness with dreams of establishing a pattern of development similar to those on the 
East Coast.  They believed that their city could become the economic center of the West 
by adopting the same infrastructure systems and economic patterns present in the rest of 
the country.  Rather than looking at the power of railroads, they were convinced that 
canals and roads would allow them to get produce to market and make their state the 
center of western commerce.  Reality was not so kind to their dreams.  The relatively late 
start and geographic difficulties present in the city prevented Hoosiers from finishing 
their canal projects as the Panic of 1837 squeezed the state dry of funding.  Marion 
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County residents were left to deal with the aftermath of a failure unseen in any other state 
in the Union.   
The failure of the canal system, though, may have been a blessing for Hoosiers.  
The use of river transport dwindled during the nineteenth century as railroads emerged.  
Not only could railroads operate year-round, they could be built to any destination that 
escaped the environmental limits demanded by the natural world.  The failure of the 
Mammoth Internal Improvements Bill during the aftermath of the Panic of 1837 kept the 
city structurally malleable.  Hoosiers never fully adopted water-based transportation 
systems like Louisville, Cincinnati or Albany because it was never reliable.  The 
developmental turning point emerged when a railroad finally reached the town in 1847.  
Like the boomtowns of the Far West, Indianapolis and Marion County finally had access 
to stable markets, which led to a “telescoped” pattern of development where an explosion 
of activity allowed the city to “catch up” to its water-based neighbors.  The arrival of the 
railroad did as much for Indianapolis as it did for Wichita, Lincoln, Denver or 
Albuquerque, which, without the railroad, would have remained isolated outposts with 
few prospects for economic success.  By the end of the Civil War, Indianapolis was one 
of the premier economic hubs of the Midwest.  Goods from Chicago flowed Southeast to 
the other cities of the region over rail, rather than going south on the Mississippi and then 
up the Ohio to Louisville, Cincinnati, or Pittsburgh.  
The railroad also brought drastic improvement to agriculture in the region.  In 
1850, Marion County lagged far behind other developed urban centers in key agricultural 
demographics including land values, farm values, and value/improved acre.  By 1870, 
central Indiana Hoosiers could claim that they were on equal footing with the rest of the 
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Midwest as prices became more balanced and farm sizes fell in line with the rest of the 
nation.  Agricultural output and the prices received for goods increased rapidly and the 
ability to get cheap goods from the rest of the nation was no longer a major difficulty, as 
it had been only forty years earlier.   
The economic development of Indiana clearly shows that it quickly emerged on 
an equal footing with other regional cities.  The opportunities also brought difficulties as 
the emergent rail network brought new cultures to the city that challenged the dominant 
Anglo-Protestant character of the city during the early nineteenth century.  Dave 
Burkhardt and his gang robbed people, horses were stolen, and public drunkenness ran 
rampant.  Few residents, however, raised much fuss about these issues.  Occasional 
newspaper articles begrudged people to behave kindly to their neighbors and city leaders 
created codes of conduct for market days.  The 1840s saw a massive transformation in 
attitude.  The arrival of the railroad changed the local feeling toward crime.  The near-
instantaneous emergence of outsiders brought by rail construction in the late-1840s 
created a feeling of anxiety among residents seen in the rest of the United States during 
the same period.  Irish immigrants came to the city looking for work in construction and 
transportation but brought their drinking habits with them.  These perceived outsiders and 
their strange habits caused residents to take a stand against a phantom crime spree.  
Residents of Central Indiana responded by establishing the Eagle Creek Marion County 
Horse Thief Detective Agency and established a semi-judicial way of assuaging their 
fears of outsiders.  The Civil War also brought problems to the region.  As a major 
transportation hub, Indianapolis was the center of troop deployments and a major Civil 
War prisoner of war camp.  These outsiders were a boon to the economy of the city but 
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also created further anxiety, as soldiers brought drunkenness and violence while POW’s 
made the city a target of Confederate raiders looking to free captives.   
What is so important to understand about Indianapolis is that it attempts to grow 
as an eastern city but had to adopt to a western style of development.  Historians must 
remember that the Midwest is the region between the East and the West.  The 
developmental patterns of those cities and regions also straddled the East/West divide.  
The Midwest, in the nineteenth century, was a region where new modes of transportation, 
agriculture, social arrangements, economic models and various other characteristics lost 
their eastern flavor as Americans reconsidered how to best meet their goals.  People in 
places like Indianapolis were forced to jettison their models of development because the 
traditional paths were not available.  As a result, these people experienced a pattern of 
growth unlike any river town nearby.  The Midwest, far more than historians have stated, 
was a training ground for people moving beyond the 100th meridian.  The widely-studied 
cities of Cincinnati and Chicago offer exceptional views into the transformation of the 
region during the nineteenth century, but considering the development of other towns 
sheds light onto the reality that settling the Midwest was not a singular experience and 
that the experience of Far Western settlements was not as unique as followers of Walter 
Prescott Webb would have us believe.   
In fact, Indianapolis is an excellent lens through which to understand the western 
United States during the early nineteenth century.  Its place on the frontier until mid-
century helps us comprehend the ways that transportation limitations stunted growth of 
urban areas.  Historians examining the city can appreciate how, when, and why labor 
tensions emerged, how capital markets cropped up, how social institutions propagated, 
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and how citizens reacted to the economic success of their river-based neighbors, among 
many other important questions.  By understanding places that lacked access to 
transportation, historians will be able to reexamine the role of the frontier in American 
life.   
Indianapolis is also a useful study for both the old and new histories of capitalism.  
First, the cities’ secluded nature until midcentury shows the way that various factors of 
development were stunted by lack of transportation access.  An even broader comparison 
of Marion County to other cities in the nation or world than the one done here will show 
the importance of transportation networks in altering the economic life of a region.  The 
city is also important because it is settled during the transition to capitalism.  As noted 
above, Hoosiers in central Indiana had a clear vision for their homes.  They wanted to 
connect to markets as quickly as possible so they could sell their goods to regional and 
national markets to improve the lives of their families.  By examining these details more 
deeply through a concerted effort to understand the makeup of the community, historians 
will be able to more fully comprehend a region that was just being settled as the transition 
to capitalism was occurring in the Northeast.  The debate over the transition to capitalism 
was, arguably, settled by Christopher Clark in 1990, but the most recent analysis we have 
of the transition to capitalism in the Early West is John Mack Faragher’s work from 
1986.  The arguments put forward in this dissertation are only a starting point for 
understanding how nineteenth century Americans experienced their lives.  At the same 
time, Indianapolis is an excellent location for study simply because it is antipodal to other 
regions that were long settled.  Rather than rehash the social turmoil created by the 
breakdown of long-standing economic relationships that were, at times, wrenched apart, 
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Indianapolis can shed light on how Americans thought when they were not bound by 
communal ties.    
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APPENDIX A. SELECTED AGRICULTURAL CENSUS DATA FOR 1850 
In 1850, the effects of waterways on the settlement patterns of the Old Northwest 
were still very visible according to census data.  Marion County, after years of promoting 
eastern style development patterns focusing on canals lagged far behind other 
Midwestern and eastern cities in terms of agricultural development.  In 1850, landlocked 
Marion County only had 43.1% of its land improved.  In contrast, Wayne County in the 
Whitewater River Valley had 52.5% improved land and Dearborn County in southern 
Indiana on the Ohio River had 55.2% of its land improved.  Tippecanoe County, home to 
Lafayette on the Wabash River in northwestern Indiana, had 50.8% of its land improved.  
This suggests that settlement patterns did not simply move from south to north as 
historians like Donald F. Carmony have suggested, but instead that settlement was 
influenced by the availability of rivers.  Places like Clark County, on the Ohio River, 
were 43.7% improved but Tipton County and Kosciusko County, in North-Central 
Indiana away from any major rivers were only 15.6% and 29.7% improved, respectively.  
It seems that the steady flow of population to the northern part of the state followed 
waterways as much as roads.  As a result, the lack of a river made Marion County a less 
desirable destination for settlement and improvement because of its secluded nature.615  
Only the site of the political capital gave city residents any added impetus to improve 
their land.   
                                                 
615 All census date comes from the University of Virginia Library Historical Census Browser.  
http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/, Accessed Dec. 12, 2014.  
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This trend is supported when examining major regional urban centers.  The 
amount of improved land was higher in areas that had more direct contact with the Ohio 
River and large urban centers.  Hamilton County, OH, home to Cincinnati, was 65.3% 
improved while Jefferson County, KY, home of Louisville, was 57.9% improved.  
Allegheny County, home to Pittsburgh, also mirrors this trend by having 61.5% of its 
land improved.616  The trend is noticeable further east as places like Albany County in 
New York had 76.7% of its land improved and Essex County, MA had 72.9% of its land 
improved.  In general, the proximity to a useful transportation avenue and a high 
population rate generally led to a higher rate of improvement in the Old Northwest and 
the nation. Marion County’s lack of a easily navigable river makes it more similar to 
                                                 
616 The urban counties chosen for this study are based, in part, off Richard Wades’ book The Urban 
Frontier.  Richard Wade, The Urban Frontier: Pioneer Life in Early Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Lexington, 
Louisville, and St. Louis.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964. 
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Franklin County, OH, home to Columbus, which was 59% improved, than cities like 
Louisville or Cincinnati that were geographically closer.617   
The end result of this analysis remains that the frontier was not a line as noted by 
Frederick Jackson Turner, but more a boundary between those who had easy access to 
urban area economies and those who didn’t. Franklin County, while having market access 
due to successful canal construction during the 1820s and 1830s, remained secluded from 
the heavier populations in upstate New York or the Ohio River Valley by distance the 
same way that Marion County was.  Even canal access could not overcome basic 
problems of distance when the major economic outlets for crops were still in New 
Orleans or New York City. 
Figure 12: Percent of Improved Land in United States-1850 
                                                 
617 Franklin County’s 59% rating stems from Ohio’s ability to complete its canal system before the Panic of 
1837 called in debts.  Columbus, while still relatively secluded, was able to reach foreign markets via 
waterway as early as 1833 which explains why their improved land rate was so much higher.  For a short 
history of Columbus and its relationship with the Ohio and Erie Canal, see Ed Lentz, Columbus: The Story 
of a City (Charleston: Arcadia Publishing, 2003), 58.   
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The developmental ties to rivers evident in improved acreage percentages were 
also seen in farm values.  The 1850 census shows that Marion County farms were worth 
$2,189 on average while Wayne County farms were worth $3,016 and Tippecanoe 
County farms were worth $2,831.  Dearborn County farms were only slightly lower at 
$2,386 but still shows the value of river access for increased farm values.  Tipton County 
had an average farm value of $1,195 and Kosciusko County had an average value of 
$1,149.  Lake County, adjacent to Chicago, had the lowest average farm value at $947.   
Figure 13: Cash Value/Farm in Dollars in Indiana-1850 
Regional and national farm averages, again, for cash value/farm reflect the trend 
seen in the percentage of improved land noted above.  Hamilton County farms were 
worth $6,706, Allegheny County farms were worth $9,438, and Jefferson County farms 
were worth $6,150.  Fayette County, KY farms were the leading county with an average 
value of $12,007.  The decreasing value of eastern farms, mostly from decreasing farm 
sizes, led Albany County acreages to be worth $3,906 and Essex County farms to be 
worth $3,424.  Franklin County, OH farms were much more in line with Marion County.  
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Their average farm value was $2,376 and reiterates that geographic proximity was not as 
important as access to water along the transportation frontier.   
 
 Average farm values do not tell the whole story.  Farm prices per acre are one of 
the best ways to measure farm worth.  Indiana farm prices per acre overwhelmingly show 
that access to markets via was an incredible factor in average farm value per acre.  
Marion County farms, probably getting a boost in price from the arrival of the Madison 
and Indianapolis Railroad in 1847 and that it was the state capital, were worth $18.10 an 
acre on average.  That the railroad boosted prices in Marion County is nearly certain, but 
average farm prices per acre show that rivers were still more important factors in farm 
prices in most places.  While Tippecanoe County farms were only worth $14.40 per acre, 
Wayne County farms were worth over $22.60 per acre and Dearborn County farms were 
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worth over $23.40.618  That Tippecanoe County farms were worth less than those in 
Marion shows the transition to the significance of rail infrastructure.  However, the land 
prices per acre in those counties are the only ones that are above $11.00.619  Lawrence 
County farms were worth $7.70 per acre, Tipton County farms were worth $6.00 per acre 
and Kosciusko County farms were worth $8.20.   
 
 Average farm values per acre were also larger in other regions that had more 
developed economies and river access.  Hamilton County farms, clearly influenced by the 
success of Cincinnati as a market center, led the Midwestern region at $82.90 per acre.  
                                                 
618 Tippecanoe County farm prices/acre were probably lower because population along the east border of 
Indiana was longer settled and had access to the Miami and Erie Canal which ran along the western edge 
of Ohio.  Dearborn County was also able to take advantage of the Cincinnati and Whitewater Canal which 
went all the way to the border between the two states.  For information on the Miami and Erie Canal, see 
Bill Oeters and Nancy Gulick, The Miami and Erie Canal (Charleston, SC: Arcadia Publishing, 2014).   
619 Vanderburgh County, IN, home to Evansville, was the only other county studied that had land values 
above $10.  Its land values were just under $11 at $10.80.  For the rest of the examined counties, 
Kosciusko County was in the lead with an average land value per acre of $8.20.   
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Other Midwestern centers were far more reasonably priced but still higher than Marion 
County.  Jefferson County acreages were worth $34.40, Fayette County farms were 
valued at $47.00 per acre and Allegheny County prices were at $46.70 in 1850.  Eastern 
farms show that the Midwest was taking hold as the nation’s agricultural center.  Albany 
County farm values per acre were at $38.10 and Essex County farms were worth $46.30, 
which were both much higher than Marion County, but they were much lower than 
established urban centers in the Midwest.620  Franklin County again shows that land 
values per acre were limited in other parts of the Midwest that lacked solid access to 
established markets.  Average acreage prices in that county were at $24.30 in 1850.   
                                                 
620 The average farm size in Albany County was 102 acres in 1850.  This was smaller than any measured 
county in Indiana other than Vanderburgh County.  Albany County farms were also smaller than those in 
Allegheny, Fayette, and Jefferson County but larger than those in Hamilton and Franklin counties in Ohio 
which suggests that it was actual farm values that were plummeting in the region as the Midwest 
produced increasing amounts of agricultural goods on a more efficient scale than the Northeast.  For the 
geographic shift in grain farming, see Paul Gates, The Farmer’s Age: Agriculture, 1815-1860 (Armonk: M.E 
Sharp, Inc., 1960), 163-169.   
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 The value of improved farm land presents only a slightly different picture on the 
surface.  The value of farm land measured by the 1850 census enumerators included both 
improved and unimproved land.  The value of improved land in Indiana counties suggests 
that river access was not the only factor that mattered in the price of improved farm land.  
Marion County improved acreages were worth $41.90 in 1850.621  This value put them in 
similar categories as Wayne County, at $43.10, and Dearborn County, at $42.50, per 
improved acre.  Even Tipton County was relatively high at $38.50 per improved acre but 
the value of its improved acres are inflated.  The number of improved acres are very 
small relative to other counties and the low number of implements, farm produce and 
                                                 
621 The price of improved acres is calculated the same way as the value of total acres.  The number is 
divided by the total value of farms listed in the census.  These figures are inexact because the value of an 
average parcel of land is unknown.  More research is needed to find the average value of improved and 
unimproved land so more specific calculations can be pursued.  Average prices paid for established farms 
in different years would be an excellent place to begin.   
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livestock in the county suggest that the high value of Tipton County improved land is 
influenced heavily by the amount and quality of unimproved land.  The value of farm 
implements was only $20,711 in 1850 and the number of “market gardens” was only 17.  
The values of orchards as $695, the value of animals slaughtered was only $11,898, and 
the value of livestock was only $75,878.  By contrast, Marion County’s figures for the 
same categories were $114,709, 5,725, $15,247, $110,650 and $360,741, respectively, 
which shows that there are significantly more improved acres as a part of the total.  Thus, 
the values of the improved acres are less influenced by the value of unimproved acres.  
Overall, the trend remains similar.  There was some variation because of the imprecise 
nature of the available data but river access increased the value and availability of 
improved farmland in the state.622   
 
                                                 
622 Marion County almost assuredly received a large boost in the value of improved land because they 
could begin exporting crops to national markets with significant ease by 1850.   
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National data also show the increased value of improved farm land when access 
to transportation networks were available.  While Franklin County was roughly in line 
with Marion County at $41 per improved acre, Hamilton County led the way with 
improved land values of $126.80.  Allegheny County had improved land values of $75.90 
per acre.  Fayette County had improved land values of $93.20 and Jefferson County had 
land values of $59.40 per acre.  Clearly access to river transportation and a large city had 
a major effect on Midwestern land prices.  Northeastern counties showed that their farms 
were becoming less valuable than Midwestern regions as Albany County improved acres 
were worth $49.60 and Essex County values were $63.50.  The values shown here still 
suggest that, like in the Old Northwest, access to transportation networks and large cities 
kept the price of farmland higher than those that were more recessed.   
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This data will be expanded upon in the next two chapters to show exactly the 
nature and speed of telescoped development seen in Marion County.  For now, suffice to 
say that this data shows that counties like Marion and Franklin, in which it was relatively 
difficult to access markets relative to other state or regional areas, lagged behind in their 
economic development.  Even by 1850, when railroads were fully capturing the 
imagination of most Americans, rivers still had a major effect on land values and 
development.   
The 1850 census shows that central Indiana economic development lagged behind other 
western regions but the arrival of the railroad in 1847 quickly altered the economic 
forecast of the area.  Hoosiers finally accessed the desired markets that eluded them for 
nearly three decades.  As noted above, Calvin Fletcher noted that over the course of one 
year that the price for wheat increased from $.45/bushel in 1846 to $.68-$.73/bushel in 
1847 “since the R.R. carrs have arrived.”623  The seemingly boundless opportunity in the 
city made Hoosiers more optimistic than ever that their city would become the center of 
the Early Western economy.   
 
  
                                                 
623 Gayle Thornbrough, The Diary of Calvin Fletcher, Vol. 4 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1975), 
309, 417.   
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APPENDIX B. SELECTED AGRICULTURAL CENSUS DATA, 1850-1860 
The 1860 census shows that Marion County was beginning to reap the advantages 
of the railroad at a faster pace than cities with established water networks.  The Panic of 
1837, while hampering immediate development in the city, helped Indianapolis avoid the 
trap of tying its economy to water-based transportation systems.  Like the “phoenix” of 
Chicago after the Great Fire of 1871 mentioned by Cronon’s impressive work Nature’s 
Metropolis, the infrastructure of Marion County experienced a rebirth fostered by the 
lack of a stable transportation network before the fire.624  Had the Mammoth Internal 
Improvements Bill projects been completed, the investment in and upkeep of the canals 
would have, presumably, siphoned off funding for railroad projects from the Three 
Percent Fund and other investment sources.  The availability of funding for internal 
improvements without significant competition from canal boosters after economic 
recovery in the 1840s allowed the state to build railroads on a massive scale and did not 
have to worry about lobbying to save the increasingly ineffective canal system as 
happened in Ohio.625   
Several major factors showed the positive impact that railroads had for central 
Indiana farmers than they did for other regions and shows the integration of the area into 
the larger regional economy.  The first major factor showing that Marion County was 
                                                 
624 William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
1991), 345-350. 
625 The only real push to continue canal building was for the completion of the Wabash and Erie Canal.  
See Donald Carmony, Indiana: The Pioneer Era, 1816-1850 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1998), 
293-306.  Unlike Marion County, the use of canals in Ohio was increasingly contentious as the century 
wore on.  Businesses dependent on canal water lobbied hard to keep them operational while the 
usefulness of railroads was hard to ignore in the state. See Ohio Historical Society, History of the Ohio 
Canals, Their Construction, Cost, Use and Partial Abandonment (Columbus: Ohio State Archeological and 
Historical Society, 1905), 48-55. 
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reaping the benefits of the railroad is the percentage of improved land.  Marion County 
was 58.7% improved in 1860 which skyrocketed it to first place in the state.626  Lawrence 
County was in a close second at 58.6% improved while Wayne at 56.8%, and Tippecanoe 
at 56.6%, Vanderburgh at 56%, Dearborn at 55.3%, and Clark County, on the Ohio River 
across from Louisville, followed at 51.1%.  The significance of these numbers are hard to 
miss.  Marion County rose from fifth place in 1850 to first by 1860.  The arrival of the 
railroad in 1847 gave impetus for an increased commercial agriculture in the county early 
on, but the completion of six lines leading directly to the city by 1853 made commercial 
agriculture a very popular option for many ruralites.  The success of commercial 
agriculture in the county by 1860 is seen in the jump in the amount of improved land. 
Marion County increased its percentage of improved land by 15.6% from 1850-1860.  Of 
the other significantly improved counties in 1860, only Vanderburgh County increased 
more than Marion County with an increase in improved land jumping 22.5%.627  Many of 
the other highly improved counties of the state in 1860 showed significantly less increase 
than Marion County.  Lawrence County increased only 4.5%, Clark County increased 
7.4%, Wayne County increased 4.3%, Tippecanoe County increased 5.8% and Dearborn 
County increased a paltry 0.1% during the period.  The only other counties that improved 
on the same level as Marion County are Kosciusko, in northern Indiana, which improved 
                                                 
626 At least amongst the ten counties measured.  More research needs to be done to examine every 
county in the state to make a final judgment but the trends stated here should hold up very well.  The 
counties chosen to be representative were deliberate and represent the various types of counties in the 
state at the time.   
627 Vanderburgh County’s increase is probably due to the arrival of the Evansville and Crawfordsville 
Railroad and the completion of the Wabash and Erie Canal by 1853.  They were to be the terminus for the 
Wabash and Erie Canal as part of the Mammoth Internal Improvements Act, but the Panic of 1837 
prevented the completion of the project.  As a result, it seems that the rise of Vanderburgh County is due 
to having a lower starting point in 1850 and catching up to other Ohio River counties by 1860, instead of 
an experience like that of Marion County which started low because of seclusion.   
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10.1% and Tipton County which improved 21.7%.  These rates of increase occurred for 
similar reasons seen in Marion County.  By 1860, railroads reached these counties and 
gave impetus for farmers to increase the output of their agricultural production.   
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The regional and national numbers again show that Marion County benefitted 
disproportionately from the expanded railroad access achieved during the 1850s.  While 
Marion County still lagged behind longer settled and developed counties, the rates of 
increase were much lower than in the Hoosier capital. Hamilton County, OH was 69.4% 
improved in 1860, but the ten year increase in improved land was limited to 3.9%.  
Jefferson County, KY was 66.7% improved but only saw in increase of 8.8% and 
Allegheny County was 69.1% improved for a 7.6% increase.  Northeastern counties also 
reflect this trend.  Albany County was 80.7% improved in 1860 but only increased its 
improved land by 4% from 1850.  Essex County was 77% improved for an increase of 
4.1%.  What this shows is that the longer settled regions of the Midwest and Northeast 
were able to improve very quickly during the Canal Era, but that their rates of 
improvement were limited thereafter because of the early commitment to water travel.   
George Rogers Taylor described the weakness of water travel, saying that “at first 
railroads often stimulated water transportation…but when through rail routes were 
completed [as they had been by 1860] the steamboats found their erstwhile helper their 
deadly enemy.”628  The evidence for this is seen in the relationship between water and 
land-oriented counties in the 1850s.  The infrastructure systems constructed in the other 
urban counties by 1840 were oriented toward river traffic, but the meteoric rise of 
railroads left Hamilton, Jefferson and Allegheny counties hampered by a transportation 
system that was rapidly becoming obsolete.  Not even Franklin County, OH, which was 
less tied toward water travel, matched the development of Marion County.  In 1860, 
Franklin County was improved 66.7% but its increase in improvement was only 7.7%.  
                                                 
628 George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution: 1815-1860 (New York: Rinehart and Company, 
Inc., 1951), 72. 
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The slightly higher percentage of improved land and the lower rate of improvement are 
probably due to the fact that Ohio was able to more successfully complete a significant 
portion of the Ohio and Erie Canal before the Panic of 1837 hit.629  Ohio, as a whole, was 
more tied to water transportation than Indiana and fewer residents were starved for 
market access when railroads finally emerged.630  Ohio residents were able to improve 
their land at their own pace up through 1850 because navigable river access was 
functional in most of the state.  In Indiana, the failure of the Central Canal starved 
Hoosiers for market access.  Once the availability of railroads arose in the region, an 
explosion of market opportunities emerged in Marion County that was a less momentous 
change in other urban centers in the Midwest, and led to a major incentive for increased 
agricultural improvements and improved land.631   
                                                 
629 Ronald Shaw, Canals for a Nation: The Canal Era in the United States, 1790-1860 (Lexington: University 
of Kentucky Press, 1990), 208-209.  See also Harry Schreiber, Ohio Canal Era: A Case Study of Government 
and the Economy, 1820-1861 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1969), 151.   
630 See Jeremy Atack, et al., “Did Railroads Induce or Follow Economic Growth?: Urbanization and 
Population Growth in the American Midwest, 1850-1860” (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2009): 6.   
631 Fayette County is not included in this chart because of enumerator error in the census.  The 99% 
improved rate for 1860 is highly unlikely due to several factors.  For one, the percentage of improved land 
in 1850 is 50.4% and is 77.3% in 1870.  No other county examined sees the drastic rise and fall felt in 
Fayette County.  At the same time, crops, livestock and land prices also stay relatively similar throughout 
the 1850, 1860 and 1870 census schedules.  There is no drastic increase in hay or oat production, or 
increased river traffic, in Fayette County which casts further doubt on the validity of the enumerator’s 
numbers.   
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Longer-established Midwestern counties, all heavily oriented toward river trade in 
the antebellum era, show that rivers allowed a region to improve drastically early on 
because available transportation technology allowed for market access.  However, the 
railroad did not help them improve their relative positions to land-locked areas as 
demonstrated by average farm prices.  By 1860, the increasing number of railroads in the 
Midwest drastically altered the relationship between farm prices and river access.  The 
average price of a Marion County farm rose to $5,338, an increase of 143.8%.  This price 
increase is only matched by Lake County, adjacent to Chicago and Lake Michigan, which 
increased average values by 149.2%.632  The rest of the state saw improved land prices, 
but nowhere near the increases seen in Marion or Lake County.  Lawrence and Clark 
counties saw the next highest growth at 107.7% and 107.2%, respectively but they were 
the only other two counties that doubled their land values.  Wayne County nearly 
accomplished the feat but only saw a 93.2% increase.  Other counties were not even that 
lucky.  Kosciusko County increased 69.8% and Tipton County increased 62.6% showing 
an uptick in values from rail access that emerged during the 1850s. Showing the early 
faltering of water-based infrastructure in the Midwest, the paltriest increases were seen in 
counties with water access.  Tippecanoe County only increased its land values 41.1% by 
1860.  Dearborn County’s average farm value only increased 23.1%, showing the relative 
decline of Cincinnati as a major transportation hub by the beginning of the Civil War.633  
                                                 
632 Lake County farms also started out significantly lower.  In 1850, the average farm price in Lake County 
was only $947.  In 1860, the average price was $2,362.  The increase in Lake County land value was due to 
the rise of Chicago as an important transportation center in much the same fashion that Marion County 
land values improved as railroads connected to Indianapolis.   
633 George Rogers Taylor briefly mentions the decline of Midwestern rivers as an effective mode of 
transport compared to railroads.  See George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 
(New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1951), 70-73.   
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These mixed numbers suggest that the infrastructure system of the American Midwest 
was in flux during the 1850s.  The largest rises were seen in land-locked counties without 
a canal that gained railroad access during the decade.  River oriented counties like 
Lawrence or Clark still had respectable gains during the period, but were outpaced by 
those that obtained rail access by 1860.  Land-locked cities that obtained rail access did 
begin to increase in value, but the draw of a county with water access was still greater 
than counties like Kosciusko that did not have a major urban center.   
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This story is repeated in other areas of the Midwest.  Longer established urban 
centers and their communities did not improve as much as those that obtained rail access 
during the 1850s.  Franklin County, which acquired rail access in 1850, saw its average 
farm price increase by 110.4%.  Fayette County increased its average farm value 61.8% 
and Jefferson County increased by 65.2%.  The decline of agriculture in Hamilton 
County is seen clearly as average farm values decreased by 1.1%, and in Allegheny 
County, they decreased by a whopping 40.6%.  The stagnation of Ohio River cities was 
equaled by Northeastern urban areas.  Albany County average farm prices increased 
21.5% and Essex County farm price averages only increased 11.9%.  These figures show 
that the transformation in American agriculture was shifting toward the Midwest and that 
the relative power of that region was increasing along railroad tracks.  The more fertile 
and open land of the Midwest along with the increased access caused by railroads 
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allowed for a relative increase in the price of an average farm.  Settlers who were smart 
or lucky enough to emigrate a place without a river, but obtaining a railroad during the 
1850s, had a distinct advantage in the new rail-driven economy.   
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There are also other major factors that show the significance of the railroad for 
Marion County.  The increase in the value of farmland shows the massive jump in price 
provided by transportation access.  By 1860, the value of all farmland in Marion County 
increased to $48.20 per acre which made it the most valuable land in the state.  Wayne 
County, still showing the power of water transportation systems came in second place at 
$43.30/acre.  Dearborn County came in a distant third at $29.50/acre and Tippecanoe 
County came in fourth with land values at $27.50.  Tipton and Kosciusko counties, 
because of increased transportation access due to the arrival of railroads had improved 
land worth $17.80 and $19.40, respectively.  The clear conclusion shows that the 
predominant transportation network was shifting toward rails and that the counties based 
on water transportation were beginning to lag behind.  Marion County was a major 
beneficiary for this as the failure of the canal project allowed them to quickly adapt to the 
new rail technology without having to overturn an older infrastructure.   
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This trend was not mirrored everywhere in the Old Northwest.  Franklin County 
remained relatively low to the rest of the regional counties studied by only have land 
values at $45.60.  Hamilton County, again, led the pack with land values at $98.40.  
Fayette County followed at $76.10 and Jefferson County came in at $64.70.  Allegheny 
County brought up the rear with land values at $63/acre for Midwestern counties with 
major cities.  The values of these counties is explained by the emergence of large cities 
during the early nineteenth century that helped boost land prices.  Unlike Indiana, whose 
largest city was Madison until it was overtaken by Indianapolis in the 1850 census, Ohio, 
Kentucky and Pennsylvania all had major urban centers that kept the price of land quite 
high.  Rural counties in those states would undoubtedly show land prices more on par 
with those of Indiana.  A similar trend is seen in the Northeastern Counties examined 
here.  Albany County land was worth $49.70/acre in 1860 and Essex County land was 
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worth $56.20 per acre.  These high prices reflect that the established cities were very 
valuable to the pricing of agricultural land nearby.   
 
The value of overall land prices must be examined further, however, to uncover 
the better picture of lived experience.  The cash value for each improved acre suggests 
that by 1860, Marion County was the central agricultural hub of the state and beginning 
to catch up with other regions of the country.  The transportation revolution allowed 
central Indiana Hoosiers to obliterate space and time and helped bring the area more 
solidly into the economic network of the rest of the United States.  In Marion County, 
improved acres were worth $81.90 on average in 1860.  This price emerged as rail access 
to the city made it a successful economic center and the existence of the political capital 
only increased the value of land in the region.  Wayne County was in second place with 
land worth $76.20 per acre because of its access to the National Road, the Whitewater 
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River and the excellent farmland of east-central Indiana but all other counties began to 
lag behind development of the Hoosier capital.  Dearborn County improved land was 
worth $53.80 per acre and Clark County improved land was only worth $47.80 per acre, 
which showed the relative decline of the Ohio River as a trade route as railroads began to 
emerge.  Tipton and Kosciusko County were worth $47.70 and $48.70 per acre 
respectively, which bracketed them around the river based Tippecanoe County, whose 
land was worth $48.50 per care.  Ultimately, the value of improved land prices per acre 
from 1850-1860 in Indiana show that the railroad was becoming far more significant for 
transportation than water routes.  The state likely would have maintained more loyalty to 
canal projects had the Panic of 1837 not completely destroyed the ability of the state to 
foster a stronger network.  But the absence of a sound, in-place system during the 1840s 
made the state to be a relative “free agent” when deciding which transportation 
technology to use.634  Hoosiers made the smart choice and began reaping the benefits of 
rail construction rather than pushing to complete the various canal projects planned 
during the 1830s.   
                                                 
634 As mentioned above, William Cronon mentions this possibility in Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the 
Great West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 345-50.   
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Railroads, however, did not immediately make Marion County an economic 
dynamo.  The economic inertia created in the Midwest still pulled money toward older, 
river based cities.  Hamilton County improved acres showed that railroads did not 
immediately change the economic structure of the Midwest.  Improved farm acres there 
were worth $141.70 each.  Allegheny County actually outpaced Hamilton County.  Its 
improved acres were worth $145.20 each and led the Midwestern counties studied.  
Jefferson County land was worth $96.90 per acre and shows that the Ohio River still was 
still the dominant regional trade artery based on actively producing farm land instead of 
including unimproved farm land that made Marion County a contender when including 
all agricultural land.  The Ohio River valley still had the most expensive farm land, but 
the railroad created a new landscape where Marion County began outpacing some older 
areas in terms of land price.  Fayette County improved land was only worth $76.80 per 
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acre and shows a significant moment when river and rail access to the Ohio River created 
land prices that were roughly the same.635  Marion County also surpassed northeastern 
counties.  Albany County had improved land worth $61.60 per acre and Essex County 
had improved land worth $73.00 per acre which shows the relative decline of the 
Northeast as an agricultural hub and the rise of the Midwest, including Midwestern areas 
that were cut off from the rest of the nation’s economy only ten years before.  Franklin 
County, while still lagging behind the other regional counties studied here at $68.30 was 
also gaining a lot of ground on older river based cities, but its complete canal network 
held it back from seeing the massive economic jumps emerging in Marion County.  
Overall, frontier counties like Marion and Franklin were beginning to see the benefits of 
modern transportation networks that would allow them the same easy access to a market 
as those seen by cities established on rivers.  The transformation was not complete by 
1860 but it was certainly underway as technology allowed humans to overcome 
environmental barriers to trade.   
                                                 
635 Obviously, access to the Ohio River is only one factor out of many that influence land prices.  Indeed, 
Fayette County land was improved at a 99% rate which brought down the price of improved land based 
on the measurements used here, but the trend still holds.  Water based cities were losing some of their 
economic hold on the Midwest as railroads challenged old economic patterns and arrangements and new 
settlers flowed into the region.   
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Showing just how quickly Marion County was catching to the rest of the region’s 
cities is seen by comparing the percentage of land value increases.  Higher increases 
show a rush to an area while lower percentages suggest stability in a region. The 
changing transportation structure of the Midwest gave Marion County a massive increase 
in land values.  The ten year increase in land value per acre was 166.2% in Marion 
County.  Only Tipton County saw a larger increase as it shot up 196.6%.  Kosciusko 
County and Lake County also saw large increases at 136.5% and 125.3%, respectively.  
These increases show the effect of rail access on the land values of a county.  These rates 
show that areas without water access remained on the frontier a lot longer than areas 
where transportation technology allowed easier connections.  None of the counties had 
water access to major cities in 1850 but the rise of railroads allowed land prices to reflect 
the increased market export potential.  Counties with river access did not fare so well.  
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Wayne County maintained its relatively strong position among water-based counties by 
increasing its values by 91.5% and Tippecanoe County did well too by increasing 90.9%.   
 
Cities on the Ohio River increased their land values significantly less.  Dearborn 
County only increased its land values 26% which put it right in line with the increases 
seen in Hamilton and Allegheny County.  Hamilton County land prices only increased 
18% from 1850-1860 and Allegheny County prices only increased 34.9%.  Louisville 
seemed to see a bit of a land boom during the decade as the prices of land in Jefferson 
County on the Kentucky side and Clark County on the Indiana side saw increases of 88% 
and 73%, respectively.  However, the general trend is for counties on rivers to see land 
values increase at rates significantly lower than those in former frontier areas that lacked 
water access but obtained rail access before 1860.  Fayette County only saw an increase 
of 61.9% which was dwarfed by Franklin County, which increased its land value by 
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87.6%.  Northeastern counties also diminishing returns on their land prices.  Albany 
County land prices increased at a modest 30.4% and Essex County prices increased only 
21.3%.   
 
Land value increases per improved acre tell a similar story.  Counties that 
obtained solid market access by 1860 saw huge increases in land values and shows that 
the frontier of American economic activity was quickly receding to the Far West.  From 
1850-1860, Marion County land prices increased 95.4% because of their increased access 
to markets.  Lake County improved land increased 108.1% during the same period as 
Chicago emerged as a regional economic behemoth and Kosciusko County improved 
land values increased 75.8%.636  Other Indiana counties that were tied to rivers saw 
                                                 
636 Tipton County in northern Indiana only increased 23.8% per improved acre during the 1850s but that is 
due to the massive increase of 21.7% in improved land.  In real numbers, the improved land increased 
from 10,588 acres to 42,431 for an increase of just over 400%.  The large swing in improved acres suggests 
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significantly less growth.  Wayne County maintained a healthy rate of growth at 76.7% 
but was abnormal.637  More representative counties included Tippecanoe County, which 
increased 26.1%, or Clark County, which increased 27%.  Dearborn County continued to 
struggle with its overwhelming ties to Cincinnati.  It only improved its land values 9% 
from 1850-1860. 
 
Regional counties also show the lower rates of increase for improved acres.  
Hamilton County, as the leading economic center of the West, was the most stable 
economic region and increased its improved land values by just 11.7%.  Other areas saw 
relatively large changes in their land values.  Allegheny County increased its improved 
acre land value by 91.1%.  The completion of the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1852 that 
                                                 
that the land was just beginning to be productive and is an outlier rather than evidence to contradict the 
large amount of evidence presented in the rest of this analysis.   
637 As stated before, the national combination of the National Road, fertile land, and the Whitewater River 
continued to make Wayne County an attractive investment area for investors until the 1870s census.   
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connected Pittsburgh to Philadelphia made it a very solid investment for anyone who held 
land in the region and gave Allegheny County the highest increase in improved acre land 
value of any of the regional urban centers outside of Marion County examined in this 
study.638  Jefferson County saw growth of 63.1% during the decade which put it near the 
66.5% increase seen in Franklin County.  Again, these two counties show the relatively 
quick emergence of the railroad on land prices.  Franklin County, although not matching 
the land value per improved acre, its value was increasing at a slightly higher rate again 
showing that railroads were having an increasing effect on the frontier nature of land-
locked regions in the Midwest.639  Albany and Essex counties also suggest that land 
prices were stabilizing in the Northeast.  Increases in land values per improved acre only 
increased 24.1% and 14.9%, respectively.  Overall, the numbers examining the increase 
in improved acres of farm land suggest that the railroad was opening up a frontier to 
lands that were previously unable to produce goods for a market economy because of a 
lack of transportation infrastructure.  However, the massive expansion of the railroad in 
the Midwest during the 1850s allowed previously less usable land to become very 
attractive to potential settlers.   
                                                 
638 George Rogers Taylor briefly mentions the Pennsylvania Railroad.  See George Rogers Taylor, The 
Transportation Revolution (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1951), 85, 90.   See also, William B. 
Sipes, The Pennsylvania Railroad: It’s Origin, Construction, Condition and Connections (Philadelphia: The 
Passenger Department, 1875); Robert McGonigal, Heart of the Pennsylvania Railroad: The Main Line, 
Philadelphia to Pittsburgh (Waukesha: Kalmbach Publishing, 1996).  
639 Fayette County saw a 17.4% decrease in its value of each improved acre, but, like Tipton County’s rate 
of improved acreage value increase it is more due to drastic changes in the amount of improved land.  
Fayette County increased its amount of improved land from 102,879 acres in 1850 to 174,866 acres in 
1860.  This massive jump gave them a 99% improved land acreage rate and makes them a severe outlier 
when examining the overall trends of land values in the urban Midwest.  Further research needs to be 
done to uncover to causes of this drastic change.   
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The railroad opened the Midwest long before it opened the West to settlement and 
market participation.  Perhaps the most telling statistic showing the frontier nature of 
landlocked areas in the Midwest is the relationship between the number of farms and the 
overall average size of those farms.  The number of farms increased in Marion County as 
a response to rail access.  In 1850, there were only 1,581 farms in the county which was 
good enough for second place behind Wayne County, which had 1,934.  By 1860, there 
were 2,046 farms in the region which put it in first place in the state.640  The increase in 
total number of farms shows the increased value that the railroad gave to prospective 
residents.  The 29.4% increase was unmatched by any county with water access in 1850.  
                                                 
640 Marion County had more residents in 1860 but also had a significantly larger urban population that did 
not own farms.  In 1850, both counties had roughly 25,000 residents.  By 1860, Marion County had an 
extra 10,000 residents, but the city of Indianapolis also grew by 10,000 people.  Certainly there were 
some residents of the city who owned farms, but it seems that people were starting more farms in Marion 
County relative to rural population than in Wayne County.   
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Only Tipton and Lake Counties were able to best the rate of increase seen in Marion 
County.641  Most counties with water access in 1850 saw very stable numbers of farms by 
1860.  Clark County saw zero change, having 1,381 farms in both 1850 and 1860 and 
Wayne County only had 53 more farms 10 years later.  The only other counties that 
showed a significant increase were those near established cities.  Tippecanoe County 
increased from 1,377 farms in 1850 to 1,717 in 1860 and Dearborn County increased 
from 1,520 to 1,858. 
 
                                                 
641 These increases are due to the extremely low number of farms in 1850.  Tipton County increased from 
339 in 1850 to 1,042 in 1860 for an increase of 207.3%.  Lake County went from 423 farms in 1850 to 871 
in 1860 for a 105.9% increase.   
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The increase in the number of farms was not always caused by increased access to 
transportation.  As noted by many historians discussing agricultural trends in the 
Northeast, families attempted to create long term family security by providing their 
children with a parcel of land.642  In the other urban centers in the Midwest examined 
here, overall farm numbers increased but average farm size decreased, suggesting that 
family farms were beginning to experience a similar dilemma seen in northeastern 
communities during previous generations.  From 1850-1860, every long-settled 
Midwestern county with an urban center included in this study shows that the number of 
                                                 
642 There is a sizeable historiography on the topic of family land use patterns.  One solid summary is seen 
in Hal Barron, “Listening to the Silent Majority: Change and Continuity in the Nineteenth-Century Rural 
North,” in Lou Ferleger, Agriculture and National Development: Views on the Nineteenth Century (Ames: 
Iowa State University Press, 1990), 3-23; James Henretta, “Families and Farms: Mentalité in Pre-Industrial 
America” in The William and Mary Quarterly 35 (1978): pp. 3-32; and Richard Easterlin, “Population 
Change and Farm Settlement in the Northern United States” in The Journal of Economic History 36 (1976): 
45-75.   
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farms increased but that the average farm size decreased or remained the same.643  
Hamilton County saw an increase from 2,602 farms in 1850 to 3,520 in 1860, but farm 
size averages fell from 81 to 63 acres.  The number of Allegheny County farms increased 
from 1,902 to 4,535 but dropped from 202 to 88 acres.  Jefferson County farms grew 
from 877 to 1,096 but average acreages fell from 176 to 156.  Fayette County showed a 
surprising trend.  The number of farms actually decreased from 799 to 691 but was the 
only county to maintain a stable 255 acres/farm.644  Unsurprisingly, northeastern counties 
began smaller and ended smaller during this period.  Albany County fell from 102 acres 
to 95 acres on an average farm.  Essex County fell from 73 to 52 acres. Marion County 
fell from 121 acres to 111 acres which suggests that the city was reaching a point where 
its development pattern matched some of the other urban centers of region and nation.   
                                                 
643 Columbus is not included in the “long-settled” county category.  It was created by the state legislature 
in 1812 to be the capital of Ohio and no permanent European settlers lived in the region until then.  See 
Ed Lentz, Columbus: The Making of a City (Charleston, SC: Arcadia Publishing, 2003). 
644 Further research is needed to ascertain the reason for this trend.  The extreme property values of the 
county may account for its unique development.  The pattern of farm consolidation mirrors that of the 
20th century and stands out among the other cities studied.   
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The ultimate conclusion of the 1860 census shows that places like Marion 
County, secluded from market access until the arrival of the railroad, experienced a lag in 
their development.  They existed on the frontier of American society because 
transportation technology was not able to overcome the environmental barriers present.  
Only the revolutionary technology of the railroad allowed cities like these to prosper.  
Non-water based counties like Marion, Tipton and Kosciusko saw telescoped economic 
development as railroads opened them to outside market systems much more quickly than 
counties tied to water transportation.  Large relative increases in land value, percent of 
improved acreage, total number of farms, and cash values per farm all show that the 
railroad was altering the landscape of the Old Northwest and reorienting it toward the 
East instead of the South.  Goods that once travelled down the Wabash, Ohio and 
Mississippi Rivers toward New Orleans now could be shipped to Chicago or Pittsburgh 
on their way to Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York or Boston more quickly and cheaply 
than ever before and gave added incentive to begin large scale cash-cropping that 
emerged in the Midwest during the 1850s.   
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APPENDIX C. SELECTED AGRICULTURAL CENSUS DATA, 1860-1870 
Census analysis shows that, by 1870, agricultural changes in Marion County were 
regionally stable compared to the 1860 census.  In only twenty years, the region 
transformed from a relatively secluded political center to the leader of a state-wide 
network and equal economic player in the region.  The 61.2% rate of improved land in 
Marion County in 1870 is very near the improved land rates in other counties in the state.  
Dearborn County was 61.8% improved and Vanderburgh County was 61.6%, suggesting 
a near equilibrium between longer-settled, river-oriented counties and the central part of 
the state.  Wayne County and Lake County were improved 65.2% and 64.8, further 
suggesting that regions away from the Ohio River surpassed the southern portion of the 
state in agricultural importance by the 1870s.645  The outliers, Tippecanoe and Kosciusko 
counties, were 73% and 46.2%, respectively, but were far outside the norm for the 
examined counties.  Most of the state was improved at a rate that would increase in the 
following decades but in proportion to the 1870 level.   
                                                 
645 For a brief discussion of northward population movement and clearing of farmland, see Emma Lou 
Thornbrough, Indiana in the Civil War Era: 1850-1880 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1995), 362-
366.   
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The increasing stability is better examined by looking at the rate of change in 
improved land in Indiana counties.  Marion County increased its rate of improved land by 
3.5% from 1860 to 1870.  This stability was seen in many other regions of the state and 
suggests that the transportation revolution was basically complete by 1870.  Clark, 
Vanderburgh, and Dearborn counties increased their rates of improved land by 6.6%, 
5.6% and 5.3%, respectively.    Wayne, Tipton, and Kosciusko counties increased by 
8.4%, 8.8%, and 8.1%, respectively.  The only county to lose value was Lawrence 
County, whose percent of improved land decreased 3.2%.646  There were only two 
counties that showed marked improvement from 1860 to 1870.  Lake County increased 
                                                 
646 The decrease in improved land was probably due to farmers allowing the land to go fallow.  Farmers in 
southern Indiana were more hesitant to adapt to scientific agriculture than their northern counterparts.  
Improved crops and breeds emerged in places like Lawrence County later than they did in Marion.  See 
William Latta, Outline History of Indiana Agriculture (Lafayette: Lafayette Printing Company, 1938), 349-
370; see also, Richard Nation, At Home in the Hoosier Hills: Agriculture, Politics, and Religion in Southern 
Indiana, 1810-1870 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 77-127.   
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its rate of improved land by 19.3% and Tippecanoe County increased by 16.4%.  These 
two counties affected by the rise of Chicago and an expanding steel industry were 
abnormal in their rates of increase.  Discounting the three outliers, the rest of the state 
saw rates of increase between 3.3% and 8.8% which that the Indiana frontier was 
basically eradicated by 1870.647   
 
The experience of Indiana is mirrored by the rest of the region.  As the 1870 
census shows, Marion County lagged behind other agricultural centers.  Its 61.2% rate of 
improved land fell relatively far behind Hamilton at 78.9, Allegheny at 75.7%, Fayette at 
77.3%, and Jefferson at 74.5%, counties.  Even Franklin County was well ahead of 
                                                 
647 All counties examined saw a rate of increase in improved land between ten and fifteen percent in the 
1880 census which suggests that the greatest stabilization of prices occurred during the decade of the 
1870s.  The increasing stabilization of land values in the 1870 census implies that the greatest change was 
probably completed relatively early in the following decade.  More research on land values, especially 
during the Panic of 1873, would show how stable prices were in Indiana and the region.   
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Marion County at 73.9%.  This, however, does not suggest that Marion County lagged 
behind other regional centers.  By including the rate of increase in improved land, the 
1870 census shows a definitive stabilization of improved land.  The region marked a 
significant resemblance to the rest of Indiana.  Marion County, at 3.5% increased the 
least, but Hamilton County, which improved by 9.5% improved the most.  The rest of the 
regional counties increased somewhere in between and shows that the region, much like 
the state of Indiana were experiencing a distinct evening out of land use due to the rise of 
railroads.  Comparing the Early West with the Northeastern counties examined shows 
another transformation of that historians have noted.  Drastic decreases in rates of 
improved land show that comparative advantages and urbanization were forcing eastern 
counties to abandon agricultural land.  Albany County saw a decrease in improved land 
of 1.3% and Essex County, probably because of increasing urbanization in the region, 
had a decrease of 6.8%.  Overall, the changing rates of improved land, and their 
stabilization during the 1860s, shows that the transportation revolution was practically 
complete in the Early West.  Marion County lagged behind the other major regional 
centers, but the rates of change in the succeeding decades suggest that those changes 
were proportional to the 1870 numbers.  By 1870, the agricultural flexibility of the region 
was settled.  The changes of the late nineteenth and through the twentieth century would 
be altered more by economic decisions rather than transportation barriers.   
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Cash values per farm also show the success of Marion County farmers, as the 
average value was head and shoulders above any other county measured in the state.  
Marion County farms were worth an average of $8,368 in 1870 while the next closest 
were in Wayne County with an average value of $7,337.  The agriculturally valuable—
and infrastructurally connected—land of Wayne County was the only county to come 
within 25% of the value of Marion County farms.  Tippecanoe County was the next 
highest at $5,536, due to its access to the Wabash and Erie Canal, rail lines that 
connected it to Chicago, and the newly opened land grant Purdue University which 
opened in 1869.  Other counties in Indiana fared much worse.  Dearborn County, which 
was third in 1850, slipped to ninth out of ten with average farm values at $ 3,373 and 
Lawrence County, which was fourth in 1850, was eighth in 1870 with an average value 
of $3,898.   
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The rates of increase for these farms also show the significance of railroads for 
increases in farm values.  The greatest rates of increase were seen in counties that 
obtained rail access during the previous decade.648  Marion County land values increased 
at a rate of 56.7% from 1860-1870.  That mark was only bested by three counties, all in 
northern Indiana.  Tipton County led the way with an increase of 77.3%, while Kosciusko 
followed closely behind with a rate of 74.3%.  These counties improved due to improving 
rail networks that more closely connected them to the rest of the national network instead 
of just Indianapolis.  Lake County was the other with a higher rate of increase than 
Marion County with 60.9%.  This is mostly attributed to the closeness of the county to 
the emerging metropolis of Chicago and the easy access to lake-based markets, improved 
implements as well as a railroad that connected the rest of Indiana to the future Windy 
City.  The rest of the counties in the state did not fare so well.  Vanderburgh and Clark 
Counties improved relatively well at 52.4% and 44.1%, respectively.  But the increase in 
Vanderburgh County was caused by an abnormally low starting price for farms rather 
than large increases in farm value.649  Clark County was the only water-oriented region to 
have a strong rate of increase through 1870 and still lagged behind regions that relied on 
rail power. The next highest rate of increase was seen in Wayne County at 25.8%.  The 
remainder showed an even worse picture of improvement.  Lawrence County increased 
16.6% and Dearborn increased 14.8% and ultimately show that counties dominated by 
                                                 
648 Clark County had an increase similar to some of the rail counties but was more of an outlier than 
something that would break the trend.   
649 It was easier for Vanderburgh County farm prices to rise because they were a relatively paltry $1,922 in 
1860 and only increased to $2,931 by 1870, significantly lower than the prices seen in other counties.   
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water-based transportation methods began experiencing a serious decline in 
importance.650   
 
The 1870 census was also an important point for Marion County as a regional city 
because it caught up to the average farm price seen in Hamilton County, which had an 
average farm value only $7 higher than in Marion County at $8,375.  The water-based 
transportation system of the Ohio River and the lack of a strong rail network in 
Cincinnati by 1870 allowed rural residents of Marion County to enjoy land values that 
rivaled the Queen City of the West.  Marion County farms were worth roughly 80% of 
Hamilton County farms in 1860, but made up the ground by 1870.  Jefferson County 
farms also saw a relative decline in the value of their farms compared to Marion County.  
In 1860, Marion County farms were worth slightly more than 50% of Jefferson County 
                                                 
650 Tippecanoe County, for reasons to be discussed later, increased 15.1%.   
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farms.  By 1870, they were worth nearly 90% of Jefferson County farms, which were 
valued at $9,443 on average.  Marion County also increased its average value compared 
to Franklin County whose farms were worth $7,037. The only county in the region that 
improved its relative position to Marion County, unsurprisingly, was Allegheny County 
which increased its average farm value to $11,565 because of its placement as a hub on 
the Pennsylvania Railroad.  Also unsurprisingly, Albany County lost more ground to 
Marion County as its farms were worth $6,974 in 1870.   
 
Rates of increase for regional and national counties also show the significance of 
rail development in the nation.  Allegheny County saw a massive 106.5% rate of increase 
for its average farms.  The Pennsylvania Railroad, as a transition hub between East and 
West through the Appalachians, allowed farmers easy access to markets in multiple 
regions of the country, provided a nearly guaranteed market for sale which inflated land 
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values.  Franklin County was the only other county examined in the Midwest to 
recognize significant growth, but it still lagged behind Marion County with average farm 
value increases of 41.2%.  Hamilton County experienced a rate of increase of 26.3% as it 
remained an important meatpacking hub on the Ohio River.  Farms near Kentucky urban 
centers fared significantly worse.  Fayette County farm values only increased 0.7% by 
1870 and Jefferson County farms decreased in value 7.1%.  The story in the Northeast 
fared slightly differently, as Albany County farms, which grew in size by 2.1% during the 
1860s, increased in value at a rate of 46.9% reflecting the increasing output caused by 
investments in improved breeds and fertilizer.651  But Essex County farms, which 
increased in size by 14% during the preceding decade, only increased in value by 23%.  
In sum, the rates of increase of farms show that counties that acquired rail access during 
the 1860s were in an ideal position to benefit from added connections to market and the 
burgeoning industrial areas that finished American raw materials into construction goods.  
Indeed, percent increases in farm values show the relative success of areas that were not 
tied to water access in the early years of the nineteenth century. 
                                                 
651 Paul Wallace Gates, “Agricultural Change in New York State, 1850-1890” New York History, 50 (1969): 
115-141.   
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Farm values per acre show that by 1870, Marion County was well entrenched as 
the leader of the state’s agricultural sector.  The average value of an acre of agricultural 
land in Marion County in 1870 was $85.40.  This figure dwarfs the other counties 
examined in this study.  Wayne County had the second highest value per acre at $60 in 
1870 but showed the limited development of the region.  In 1860, average land values 
were relatively similar between Marion and Wayne County, but the creation of Marion 
Count as the central rail hub of the state allowed its land values to rise disproportionately 
by 1870.652  Other Indiana counties fared similarly to Wayne County.  The next highest 
land values/acre were in Tippecanoe County at $48.  Vanderbrugh, Clark and Dearborn 
counties, all on the Ohio River, were at $39.10, $37.90 and $36 respectively.  Kosciusko 
County land was worth $38.50/acre, while Tipton County land was worth $30.30.  
                                                 
652 Average land values in Marion County and Wayne County in 1860 were $48.20 and $43.30, 
respectively.   
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Lawrence County, probably due to lack of fertilization and crop rotation, brought up the 
rear with land worth$19.80.  Overall, these numbers shows that Marion County, with its 
access to railroads, an urban population and improved implements was able to increase its 
land value/acre to a range higher than any other county in the state. 
 
The variation in land values shows that Marion County was integrating itself into 
the regional economy as well.  Hamilton County farmland was still worth more per acre, 
at $138.50 and Allegheny County farm land was worth $146.30, which was still higher 
than seen in the Hoosier capitol.  However, Marion County land values of $85.40/acre in 
1870 pushed their land values higher than Franklin County, which was worth $66.30, and 
just above Jefferson County, with land values of $84.30/acre.  Marion County farmers, by 
1870, found that their land values were not dampened by the seclusion seen in the early 
years of settlement.  The rail access afforded during the period from 1850-170 finally 
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allowed residents of Central Indiana to obtain land prices that matches those of other 
regional districts without worrying about water access.  Northeastern counties saw a bit 
of relief in their land values.  Albany County land values increased to $71.50/acre and 
Essex County values increased to $64.30/acre.  These land values were nearly as high, 
relatively, as they were in 1850, and shows that by 1870, land values in the eastern third 
of the United States were beginning to find equilibrium and that comparative advantage 
was settling in to the economic networks of rail connected regions.653   
 
                                                 
653 One early example using comparative advantage to explain changing agricultural patters is seen in 
Percy Bidwell and James Falconer, History of American Agriculture, 1620-1860 (New York: Peter Smith, 
1941), 236-238.  Another excellent example of the rise of comparative advantage in the Northeast is seen 
in the rise of dairying in the New England region.  See Paul Gates, The Farmers Age: Agriculture, 1815-
1860 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1960), 232-236.  Various other examples of this trend are seen in Martin 
Brueghel, Farm, Shop, Landing: The Rise of a Market Society in the Hudson Valley, 1780-1860 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2002), 93-103; Christopher Clark, The Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western 
Massachusetts, 1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Joan Jensen, Loosening the Bonds: 
Mid-Atlantic Farm Women, 1750-1850 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).  For one discussion of 
how transportation improvements affected the economic and agricultural development of the United 
States, see Jeremy Atack and Peter Passell, A New Economic View of American History from Colonial Times 
to 1940 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), 143-174.   
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The average improved acre in Marion County was worth $139.60 which put it 
high above the next closest, Wayne County, which averaged $92/acre.  The rest of the 
counties examined in this study show a significantly lower value for improved acreage.  
The only other county with farm values per acre above $70 was Kosciusko County, 
which were worth $80.40/acre and show that the railroads of northern Indiana were 
becoming significantly more important than the river valleys in the southern portion of 
the state.  Prices also suggest that railroads across the state had negated the economic 
advantage provided by rivers.  Clark, Tipton, Tippecanoe, and Vanderburgh counties—all 
in different regions of the state—had average farm values/acre worth between $63 and 
$66 in 1870.  Dearborn County was close behind at $58.20/acre as closeness to 
Cincinnati markets decreased in importance to the overall economy.  Lake and Lawrence 
counties brought the lowest average values per acre at $44.90 and $35.70, respectively.  
Lake counties low values were driven by the high rate of swamp land in the county.  Low 
values in Lawrence County were driven by a lack of improvement and connection to the 
market.  No real river flowed through the area and railroads were absent from the region 
until later in the century.   
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Improved land values per acre also suggest that by 1870, Marion County was 
enmeshed in the regional economy as an increasingly equal partner.  Marion County’s 
$139.60/acre price puts it in the range of the other counties in this study.  Allegheny 
County, again because of its importance as a transportation route through the 
Appalachians and the booming steel industry, saw land prices of $193.20/acre.  Hamilton 
County farms were close behind at $175.40/acre because of the economic power obtained 
in the early half of the nineteenth century as a manufacturing, meatpacking and 
agricultural hub.  However, the Hoosier capital eclipsed both Fayette and Jefferson 
counties, which were worth $121.60 and $113.10 respectively.  Franklin County because 
it was situated between Cincinnati, Cleveland and Pittsburgh, lagged far behind at 
$89.60, showing the power of the environment and transportation technology to limit 
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growth as economic development occurred in the region.654  Instead of lagging behind in 
their economic development, the telescoping effect of the railroad fostered economic 
stabilization of the region so that the Midwestern “frontier” was effectively pushed west 
of the Mississippi river.   
 
The increase in average value per acre also shows the relative success obtained by 
Marion County agriculturalists.  From 1860-1870, land values increased in Marion 
County increased by 77.1%.  This increase, when coupled with the higher starting land 
prices show that Central Indiana was improving dramatically when compared to areas in 
the southern part of the state.  Lawrence County land values increased by 38.4% during 
the 1860s and Dearborn County land only increased by a paltry 22%.  The once powerful 
                                                 
654 Columbus could never establish itself as a transportation hub the same way that Indianapolis could 
because it had to compete with larger cities that surrounded it in much the same way that St. Louis and 
Chicago affected each other.  See William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 295-309.  
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agricultural Wayne County only improved by 38.5%, showing that the agricultural land 
values in the eastern portion of the state—while still high—were beginning to level off 
more drastically than those reliant on rail access.  Most of the counties that improved at a 
higher rate than Marion County were in the northern portion of the state.  Tipton, 
Kosciusko and Lake Counties increased by 70.2%, 98.4% and 92.7%, respectively as 
their agricultural land continued to draw settlers and speculators for the newly available 
land.  Tippecanoe County, was the only river based county to improve at a rate higher 
than Marion County, probably due to the proximity of railroads that led to Chicago 
markets and the rise of manufacturing in the county.655  Vanderburgh County also saw a 
dramatic increase in its rate of improvement but for the same reason that Tipton and 
Kosciusko counties improved so drastically during the 1850s.  Land values were so small 
that any appreciable growth during the decade would make the county look like it was an 
economic behemoth.  Unfortunately for Vanderburgh County residents, they lagged far 
behind the development of the rest of the state due to competition from the New 
Harmony settlement in neighboring Posey County into the second half of the nineteenth 
century.656 
                                                 
655 Tippecanoe County invested $2,512,211 in manufacturing materials which was, among the counties 
examined here, only second to Marion County.   
656 For general background information about the development of Vanderburgh County and its major city, 
Evansville, see Joseph Peter Elliot, A History of Evansville and Vanderburgh County, Indiana (Evansville: 
Keller Printing Company, 1897).  For a discussion of transportation in the region, see especially, 98-110.   
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The percent increase in land values in the region lagged far behind those in 
Marion County.  Allegheny County had the closest experience during the war decade, as 
land values increased by 56.9%.  Franklin County saw the next highest rate of increase at 
31.2% but was followed closely by Hamilton County, which increased by 28.9%.  
Jefferson County increased its land values by 23.2% and Fayette County increased by 
19%.  The similarity of the other regional urban centers and the low rates of increase 
demonstrate that their land values were extremely stable and that they volatility of 
western expansion and transportation change were levelling out.  These counties were 
settled into the national economy as prices ceased to fluctuate separately from each other.  
Depressions would take their toll on land values, but they would do so for most regions at 
the same time.  The region was binding itself together.  Albany and Essex counties also 
suggest that railroads were beginning to bind the East and Early West to each other.  
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Similar to Hamilton and Franklin County, Albany County increased its land value by 
30.4%.  Essex County improved slightly less than the rest of the examined counties in 
this study during the 1860s but still managed an increase of 12.5%.  Overall, the trends 
seen in the nation were beginning to show stability rather than volatility that suggests the 
significance of the railroad for bringing Marion County into a closer relationship with the 
rest of the nation.   
 
 
The percent increase in improved land values again reiterate the point that Marion 
County agriculture dominated the state by 1870.  The cash value/improved acre was 
already the highest in the state in 1860 and the 41.3% increase from 1860-1870 separated 
it even further.  The only county to increase its land values/improved acre faster was 
Vanderburgh County, which had a 49.6% increase  It and Lawrence County, which 
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lagged behind achieved their rates of increase based on low starting land values.657  Only 
Kosciusko County approached Marion County with a 39.4% rate of increase.  The rest of 
the counties lagged far behind Marion.  Lake County, as a production center for Chicago, 
only increased its land value by 26.2%.  Tippecanoe County land only increased by 
26.1% and Clark County improved acres increased by 27%.  Even the agriculturally 
mighty Wayne County saw its increase improved land values rise by only 17.1%.  The 
county faring worst, Dearborn, increased the value of its improved acres by a mere 9%.  
Overall, the increase in the price of improved acres by 1870 shows that Marion County 
separated itself from the rest of the state.  Instead of lagging behind due to transportation 
issues, the state capital rocketed into a leading position of agriculture in the state because 
it was a major shipping and urban center.   
 
                                                 
657 As stated above, Vanderburgh County, as is Lawrence County in this instance, was a statistical outlier in 
this category because its land values were so low in the 1860 census.  The high rate of increase is 
unsurprising here but does not distort the overall picture presented in this dissertation.  
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While Marion County was pulling away from other regions of the state regarding 
improved land values, it was finally emerging as an equal in the Midwest.  The massive 
95.4% increase in the value of improved acres from 1850-1860 declined to 41.3% from 
1860-1870.  While still higher than the rest of the counties examined, Marion County was 
regressing to the mean, suggesting that the greatest changes induced by the introduction 
of the railroad were over.  Only Fayette County, with a 36.8% increase approached the 
same level seen in central Indiana.  Most other counties experienced the kind of rate of 
increase that allowed Marion County to move much closer in terms of overall land 
value/improved acre.  Hamilton County, which was worth more per improved acre in 
1860 only increased its rate by 19.2% from 1860-1870.  Allegheny County, which was 
worth the most of any county studied in the 1860 census, only improved by 24.8%.  
Jefferson County continued its slide in the region by increasing the value of their 
improved acres by a slight 14.3%.  What these numbers suggest is that the relationship 
between river and railroad were beginning to level out the playing field by lowering the 
environmental barriers to market participation and opening the door to farmers who had 
fertile land.  Jefferson County, never known for its abundant agriculture, slid behind 
places like Marion County because agriculture in the center of the Hoosier state was more 
abundant.  As the railroad decimated transportation barriers, the economics of agriculture 
changed.  Places like Indianapolis, surrounded by a fertile, flat plain were able to 
capitalize on the excellent soil and new agricultural implements to challenge the 
comparative advantage held by places like Louisville in the first half of the nineteenth 
century.   
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The total number of farms in Indiana also shows that Marion County was losing 
its frontier character during the 1860s.  As noted by Paul Salstrom, families tried to hand 
down their farms to their children so that they could maintain agricultural pursuits.658  By 
the end of the 1850s, families were forced to alter their farm reproduction methods by 
ensuring the viability of new farms based on size, which accounts for the small increase 
in the number of farms in Marion County and the larger rises in Kosciusko County and 
Lake County.  The longer settled regions were less able to buy out neighbors to create 
extra farms because residents did not experience the telescoped growth seen in Marion 
County.   
 
                                                 
658 Paul Salstrom, From Pioneering to Persevering: Family Farming in Indiana to 1880 (Lafayette: Purdue 
University Press, 2007), 104-105.   
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Examining the average farm size with the total number of farms in mind also 
shows that Hoosiers in Marion County were experiencing a change in agricultural 
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strategy seen in the rest of the state.  The railroad allowed the region to fit into the rest of 
the state framework and mirror the decline in farm sizes, as the numbers increased.  In 
Marion County, the average farm size dropped by 12.6% between 1860 and 1870 which 
is similar to counties including Lawrence with 15.5%, Kosciusko with 11.8%, Wayne 
with 8.9%, and Lake with 12.8%.  The only county to increase in size on average was 
Tipton County, which improved at a meager 3.6%.  The trend is clear by 1870, farm sizes 
were getting smaller as Hoosiers sought to reproduce the family style of agriculture that 
existed during the antebellum era.   
 
Comparing the increasing number of farms and the decreasing average farm size 
in the regional and national variations shows that the Early West and the Eastern patterns 
of development diverged during the 1860s.  The trend of most of the cities in the 
Midwest mirror the pattern seen in Marion County.  Only Hamilton and Franklin 
Counties in Ohio got fewer farms, while also shrinking in size.  All the other counties 
studied here including Fayette, Jefferson and Allegheny, increased the number of farms 
and decreased their average size.  The rates of change were also similar as most counties 
saw a moderate decrease in farm size of between 10% and 18% and a small drop in the 
number of farms per county.  Overall, this shows that the Midwest was beginning to 
separate itself as a region from the East instead of simply following eastern development 
patterns.    
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